The Olson conjecture for discrete public goods

Nöldeke, Georg and Peña, Jorge (2018) The Olson conjecture for discrete public goods. IAST working paper, n. 18-86, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://iast.fr/pub/33125

Abstract

We consider the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary contributions. A fixed amount of the good is provided if and only if the number of contributors reaches an exogenous threshold. The threshold, the group size, and the identical cost of contributing to the public good are common knowledge. Our main result shows that the maximal probability of reaching the threshold (and thereby obtaining the public good) which can be supported in a symmetric equilibrium of this participation game is decreasing in group size. This generalizes a well-known result for the volunteer’s dilemma – in which the threshold is one – to arbitrary thresholds and thereby confirms a conjecture by Olson for the class of participation games under consideration. Further results characterize the limit when group size goes to infinity and provide conditions under which the expected number of contributors is decreasing or increasing in group size.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: November 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Participation games, Private provision of public goods, Group-size effects, Olson conjecture
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 30 Nov 2018 09:12
Last Modified: 30 Nov 2018 09:12
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:33125
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26531

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