Cabral, Luis and Salant, David J. (2019) Sequential Auctions and Auction Revenue. Economics Letters, 176. pp. 1-4.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.11.022

Abstract

We consider the problem of a seller who owns K identical objects and N bidders each willing to buy at most one unit. The seller may auction the objects at two different dates. Assuming that buyer valuations are uniform and independent across periods, we show that the seller is better off by auctioning a positive number of objects in each period. We also provide sufficient conditions such that most objects should be auctioned at the first date or in the second date.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: March 2019
Refereed: Yes
JEL Classification: D44 - Auctions
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Jan 2019 10:46
Last Modified: 04 Sep 2023 07:03
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:33103
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26442
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