Sequential Auctions and Auction Revenue

Cabral, Luis and Salant, David (2019) Sequential Auctions and Auction Revenue. Economics Letters, 176. pp. 1-4.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/33103

Abstract

We consider the problem of a seller who owns K identical objects and N bidders each willing to buy at most one unit. The seller may auction the objects at two different dates. Assuming that buyer valuations are uniform and independent across periods, we show that the seller is better off by auctioning a positive number of objects in each period. We also provide sufficient conditions such that most objects should be auctioned at the first date or in the second date.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: March 2019
Refereed: Yes
JEL codes: D44 - Auctions
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Jan 2019 10:46
Last Modified: 16 Jul 2019 12:08
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:33103
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26442

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