Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation

Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2018) Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-955, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32952

Abstract

The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that material outcomes drive evolutionary success, under what circumstances does evolution promote Homo oeconomicus, defined as material self-interest, and when does it instead lead to other preferences? The literature suggests that Homo oeconomicus is favored by evolution only when individuals' preferences are their private information and the population is large and well-mixed so that individuals with rare mutant preferences almost never get to interact with each other. If rare mutants instead interact more often (say, due to local dispersion), evolution instead favors a certain generalization of Homo oeconomicus including a Kantian concern. If individuals interact under complete information about preferences, evolution destabilizes Homo oeconomicus in virtually all games.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 17 September 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
JEL codes: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior - Underlying Principles
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2018 12:40
Last Modified: 04 Apr 2019 04:09
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32952
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26269

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