Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition

Correia da silva, Joao, Jullien, Bruno, Lefouili, Yassine and Pinho, Joana (2019) Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 28 (n° 1). pp. 109-124.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32920

Abstract

This paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two-sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of "average-marginal-cost-preserving" mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: January 2019
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Mergers, Multi-Sided Platforms, Cournot Competition
JEL codes: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 07 Sep 2018 09:22
Last Modified: 28 Jun 2019 09:35
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32920
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26228

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