Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure

Moriya, Fumitoshi and Yamashita, Takuro (2018) Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-941, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32884

Abstract

In the context of team production, this paper studies the optimal (deterministic and stochastic) information allocation that implements desired effort levels as the unique Bayesian equilibrium. We show that, under certain conditions, it is optimal to asymmetrically inform agents even though they may be ex ante symmetric. The main intuition is that informing the agents asymmetrically can be effective in avoiding "bad" equilibria, that is, equilibria with coordination failure.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: July 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Moral hazard, Unique implementation, Asymmetric information allocation
JEL codes: D21 - Firm Behavior
D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D86 - Economics of Contract - Theory
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 25 Jul 2018 07:59
Last Modified: 25 Jul 2018 08:00
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32884
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26155

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