Gualdani, Cristina (2018) An Econometric Model of Network Formation with an Application to Board Interlocks between Firms. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-898, Toulouse

Warning
There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of wp_tse_898.pdf]
Preview
Text
Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

The paper provides a framework for partially identifying the parameters governing agents’ preferences in a static game of network formation with interdependent link decisions, complete information, and transferable or non-transferable payoffs. The proposed methodology attenuates the computational difficulties arising at the inference stage - due to the huge number of moment inequalities characterising the sharp identified set and the impossibility of brute-force calculating the integrals entering them - by decomposing the network formation game into local games which have a structure similar to entry games and are such that the network formation game is in equilibrium if and only if each local game is in equilibrium. As an empirical illustration of the developed procedure, the paper estimates firms’ incentives for having executives sitting on the board of competitors, using Italian data.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: March 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: network formation, pure strategy Nash equilibrium, pairwise stability, multiple equilibria, partial identification, moment inequalities, local games, board interlocks
JEL Classification: C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods - General
C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 24 Apr 2018 11:08
Last Modified: 30 Aug 2019 07:51
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32550
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25876

Available Versions of this Item

View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year