On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2017) On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-863, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32199

Abstract

We study competing mechanism games in which principals simultaneously design contracts to deal with several agents. We show that principals can profit from privately communicating with agents by generating incomplete information in the continuation game they play. Specifically, we construct an example of a complete information game in which none of the (multiple) equilibria in Yamashita (2010) survives against unilateral deviations to mechanisms involving private communication. This also contrasts with the robustness result established by Han (2007). The role of private communication we document may call for extending the standard construction of Epstein and Peters (1999) to incorporate this additional element.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: November 2017
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 17 Apr 2018 07:57
Last Modified: 15 Jul 2019 13:08
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32199
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25757

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