On Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty

Tyutin, Anton and Zaporozhets, Vera (2017) On Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-807, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31704

Abstract

We study a simple influence game, in which a lobby tries to manipulate the decision of a legislature via monetary offers to one or more members. The type of a legislator is the relative weight he/she places on social welfare as compared to money. We study the equilibria of this lobbying game under political certainty and uncertainty, and examine the circumstances under which the lobby is successful, and the amount of money invested in the political process. Special attention is paid to three primitives of the environment: the budget available for lobbying, the internal organization of the legislature and the proportion of "bad" and "good" legislators in the political arena.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: May 2017
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 15 May 2017 12:36
Last Modified: 21 Mar 2018 14:48
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:31704
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/24058

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