Optimal Search Auctions with Correlated Bidder Types

Crémer, Jacques, Spiegel, Yossi and Zheng, Charles Z. (2006) Optimal Search Auctions with Correlated Bidder Types. Economics Letters, 93 (1). pp. 94-100.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/4506

Abstract

We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumptions that (i) the bidders’ values are correlated and (ii) the seller needs to incur search costs when contacting prospective bidders. We show that although in general, the seller cannot fully extract the social surplus as in the case without search costs, it is nontheless possible to construct a search mechanism that will fully extract the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: October 2006
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:54
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:21
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:4506
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2382

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