Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A theory for large electorates

Laslier, Jean-François and Van Der Straeten, Karine (2016) Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A theory for large electorates. Social Choice and Welfare, 47 (3). pp. 559-587.

Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31561

Abstract

We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting. With a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded, best responses involve voting by pairwise comparisons. Two candidates play a critical role: the weakest expected winner and the strongest expected loser. Expected winners are approved if and only if they are preferred to the strongest expected loser and expected losers are approved if and only if they are preferred to the weakest expected winner. At equilibrium, if any, a candidate is elected if and only if he is approved by at least half of the voters. With single-peaked preferences, an equilibrium always exists, in which the first candidates according to the majority tournament relation are elected. The theory is applied to individual data from the 2011 Regional Government election in Zurich.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: October 2016
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 04 Apr 2017 13:48
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:24
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:31561
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/23213

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item