Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility

Ambec, Stefan and Kervinio, Yann (2016) Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility. Social Choice and Welfare, 46. pp. 119-155.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31295

Abstract

We consider the decentralized provision of a global public good with local external- ities in a spatially explicit model. Communities decide on the location of a facility that benefits everyone but exhibits costs to the host and its neighbors. They share the costs through transfers. We examine the cooperative game associated with this so-called NIMBY ("Not In My Back-Yard") problem. We derive and discuss conditions for core solutions to exist. These conditions are driven by the temptation to exclude groups of neighbors at any potential location. We illustrate the results in different spatial settings. In particular, we construct a hypothetical example on a real administrative unit in which the core is shown to be empty. These results clarify how property rights can affect cooperation and shed further light on a limitation of the Coase theorem.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2016
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: NIMBY, externality, Coase theorem, pollution, waste, core, cooperative game, spatial model
JEL codes: C71 - Cooperative Games
D62 - Externalities
Q53 - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
R53 - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 04 Jan 2017 11:18
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:24
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:31295
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22665

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