Secret contracting in multilateral relations

Rey, Patrick and Verge, T. (2016) Secret contracting in multilateral relations. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-744, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31289

Abstract

We develop a general but tractable framework of multilateral vertical contracting between upstream and downstream Örms, without any restriction on tari§s, and yet taking into account their impact on downstream competition. In equilibrium, tari§s are cost-based and replicate the outcome of a multi-brand oligopoly, a Önding in line with the analysis of a recent merger. To illustrate its versatility, we use this framework to analyze the e§ect of vertical restraints (resale price maintenance and retail price parity clauses) and of alternative business models (resale vs. agency). Finally, we extend the framework so as to endogenize the market structure.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: December 2016
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Bilateral contracting, vertical relationships, agency, resale price maintenance, price parity clauses
JEL codes: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
K21 - Antitrust Law
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jan 2017 16:32
Last Modified: 21 Mar 2018 14:25
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:31289
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22634

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