Garrett, Daniel F. (2016) Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values. American Economic Review (AER), 106 (11). pp. 3275-3299.
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Abstract
We study the profit-maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with constant values, optimal prices fluctuate with time. We argue that consumers'randomly changing values offer an explanation for temporary price reductions that are often observed in practice.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | November 2016 |
Refereed: | Yes |
JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 21 Jul 2016 11:53 |
Last Modified: | 27 Oct 2021 13:36 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:30569 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22243 |
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Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values. (deposited 21 Jul 2016 11:55)
- Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values. (deposited 21 Jul 2016 11:53) [Currently Displayed]