A Note on Lobbying a Legislature

Zaporozhets, Vera (2016) A Note on Lobbying a Legislature. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-673, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30553

Abstract

We study a simple in?uence game, in which a lobby tries to manipulate the decision of a legislature via monetary offers to one or more members. We compute the minimum budget needed for the lobby to pass the bill and the distribution of this budget between the legislators. We also show the connection of the problem to the combinatorial optimization.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: July 2016
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Legislative lobbying, Combinatorial optimization, Knapsack problem
JEL codes: C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 19 Jul 2016 13:35
Last Modified: 21 Mar 2018 14:02
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:30553
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22221

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