Stable Environmental Agreements and International Trade in Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets

Cavagnac, Michel and Cheikbossian, Guillaume (2017) Stable Environmental Agreements and International Trade in Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets. In: Economics of International Environmental Agreements : A Critical Approach Çağatay, S. (ed.) Routledge. pp. 35-60. ISBN 9781138650657

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30522

Abstract

This chapter analyzes the stability of international environmental agreements between heterogeneous countries in the context of free trade. For this purpose, we develop a simple model of international trade with three countries of unequal market size. Strategic interactions between countries come from the imperfect competition among producers in the integrated market and from the transboundary pollution generated by the firms. To capture efficiency gains from coordinating policies, countries can participate to an international environmental agreement, which is modeled as a simple coalition formation game. We show that a global agreement is less likely to form if a sub-global agreement between two countries is already in place. Interestingly, the global agreement may be blocked by either the outsider or by the participants to the sub-global agreement.

Item Type: Book Section
Language: English
Date: 2017
Uncontrolled Keywords: International Environmental Agreements, Transboundary Pollution, International Trade, Asymmetric Oligopoly, Coalition Formation
JEL codes: C72 - Noncooperative Games
F55 - International Institutional Arrangements
H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2016 12:44
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2018 15:01
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:30522
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22150

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