Researcher's Dilemma -

Bobtcheff, Catherine, Bolte, Jérôme and Mariotti, Thomas (2017) Researcher's Dilemma -. Review of Economic Studies, 84 (3). pp. 969-1014.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30520

Abstract

We model academic competition as a game in which researchers ¯ght for priority. Researchers privately experience breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before making them public, thereby establishing priority. In a two-researcher, symmetric environment, the resulting preemption game has a unique equilibrium. We study how the shape of the breakthrough distribution affects equilibrium maturation delays. Making researchers better at discovering new ideas or at developing them has contrasted effects on the quality of research outputs. Finally, when researchers have different innovative abilities, speed of discovery and maturation of ideas are positively correlated in equilibrium.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2017
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Academic Competition, Preemption Games, Private Information
JEL codes: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Sep 2016 08:04
Last Modified: 23 Jul 2018 13:05
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:30520
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22142

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