Competition for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation

Offerman, Theo, Schram, Arthur and Van Leeuwen, Boris (2014) Competition for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation. IAST working paper, n. 14-16, Toulouse

[img]
Preview
Text
Download (2MB) | Preview
Official URL: http://iast.fr/pub/28902

Abstract

We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for a competition for status dynamic that predicts when, and if so which, repeated game equilibrium is reached. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that the supergame effects we observe are driven by social motives.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: December 2014
Place of Publication: Toulouse
JEL codes: C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D85 - Network Formation and Analysis - Theory
H41 - Public Goods
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2016 12:59
Last Modified: 30 May 2018 06:42
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:28902
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/21625

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year