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Offerman, Theo
, Schram, Arthur and Van Leeuwen, Boris
(2014)
Competition for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation.
IAST working paper, n. 14-16, Toulouse
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Abstract
We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for a competition for status dynamic that predicts when, and if so which, repeated game equilibrium is reached. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that the supergame effects we observe are driven by social motives.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2014 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| JEL Classification: | C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D85 - Network Formation and Analysis - Theory H41 - Public Goods |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Jun 2016 12:59 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:53 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28902 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/21625 |
