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On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2015) On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition. TSE Working Paper, n. 15-609, Toulouse

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We study games in which several principals design incentive schemes in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each agent can participate with at most one principal, and principal-agents corporations are isolated. We analyze the role of standard incentive compatible mechanisms in these contexts. First, we provide a clarifying example showing how incentive compatible mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that truth-telling equilibria are robust against unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms. We then consider the single agent case and exhibit sufficient conditions for the validity of the revelation principle.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: November 2015
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Competition, Incomplete Information
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse), TSM Research (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 14 Jun 2016 14:49
Last Modified: 19 Jul 2018 14:52
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