Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Auriol, Emmanuelle, Flochel, Thomas and Straub, Stéphane (2016) Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay. World Development, 77. pp. 395-407.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29635

Abstract

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs. A large scale microeconomic database, including all public procurement operations over a 4 year period in Paraguay, amounting annually to approximately 6% of the country’s GDP, is then used to corroborate these predictions.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: January 2016
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Procurement, Corruption, Rent-seeking, Development
JEL Classification: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H57 - Procurement
O5 - Economywide Country Studies
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 02 Oct 2015 13:40
Last Modified: 02 Oct 2019 23:03
["eprint_fieldname_oai_identifier" not defined]: oai:tse-fr.eu:29635
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18478

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