Private, social and self insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help

De Donder, Philippe and Pestieau, Pierre (2017) Private, social and self insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 19 (1). pp. 18-37.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
Text
Download (213kB) | Preview
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29131

Abstract

We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters can top up with private insurance, saving and family help. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help, and amount of family help received. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels, while private insurance is actuarially fair. The income-to-dependency probability ratio of agents determines whether they prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority chosen level. A majority of voters would oppose banning private insurance.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: February 2017
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: long-term care, political economy, social insurance, top up, famil- ism, crowding out, weak and strong prospects of family help, voting
JEL codes: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
J14 - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:56
Last Modified: 26 Mar 2018 08:33
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:29131
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16728

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year