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He, Yinghua, Li, Sanxi and Yan, Jianye (2015) Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective. TSE Working Paper, n. 15-559
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29118
Abstract
We show that every (random) assignment/allocation without transfers can be considered as a market outcome with personalized prices and an equal income. One can thus evaluate an assignment by investigating the prices and the induced opportunity sets. When prices are proportional across agents, the assignment is efficient; when prices are common, the assignment is both efficient and envy-free. Moreover, this market perspective reveals a weakness of envy-freeness.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | March 2015 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | allocation without transfers, competitive equilibrium, equal incomes, market perspective, envy-free, Pareto efficient, coalitional-envy-free, random assignment |
| JEL Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2015 14:56 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Mar 2018 13:23 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:29118 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16723 |
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