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Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities

Cremer, Helmuth and De Donder, Philippe (2016) Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol.118. pp. 594-615.

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Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker’s past earnings) as opposed to the non- contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2016
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: generosity, redistributiveness, pay-as-you-go pensions, collective annuity, longevity, Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium
JEL Classification: D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:56
Last Modified: 08 Oct 2019 23:01
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