Risk-sharing or risk-taking? An incentive theory of counterparty risk, clearing and margins

Biais, Bruno, Heider, Florian and Hoerova, Marie (2014) Risk-sharing or risk-taking? An incentive theory of counterparty risk, clearing and margins. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-522, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28439

Abstract

Derivatives activity, motivated by risk-sharing, can breed risk taking. Bad news about the risk of the asset underlying the derivative increases the expected liability of a protection seller and undermines her risk prevention incentives. This limits risk-sharing, and may create endogenous counterparty risk and contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers incentives and enhance the ability to share risk. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk-prevention incentives.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: June 2014
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Hedging, Insurance, Derivatives, Moral hazard, Risk management, Counterparty risk, Contagion, Central clearing, Margin requirements
JEL codes: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse), TSM Research (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:49
Last Modified: 19 Nov 2018 15:51
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:28439
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16560

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