Remarks on existence and uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria in the non-potential case

Blanchet, Adrien and Carlier, Guillaume (2014) Remarks on existence and uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria in the non-potential case. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-491

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28214

Abstract

This article is devoted to various methods (optimal transport, fixed-point, ordi- nary differential equations) to obtain existence and/or uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria for games with a continuum of players with both attractive and repulsive effects. We mainly address separable situations but for which the game does not have a potential, contrary to the variational framework of [3]. We also present several nu- merical simulations which illustrate the applicability of our approach to compute Cournot-Nash equilibria.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: May 2014
Uncontrolled Keywords: Continuum of players, Cournot-Nash equilibria, optimal transport, best-reply iteration, congestion, non-symmetric interactions
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:44
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:28214
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15920

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