Competition and the Hold‐U p Problem: a Setting with Non‐exclusive Contracts

Roig, Guillem (2014) Competition and the Hold‐U p Problem: a Setting with Non‐exclusive Contracts. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-481

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28042

Abstract

This work studies how the introduction of competition to the side of the market offering trading contracts affects the equilibrium investment profile in a bilateral investment game. By using a common agency framework, where contracts are not exclusive, we find that the equilibrium investment profile depends on the competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome. Full efficiency can only be implemented when the trading outcome is the most competitive. Moreover, lowering the outcome competitiveness is not always Pareto dominant for the parties offering the contracts, and larger social welfare can be obtained with low competitive equilibria.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 26 March 2014
Uncontrolled Keywords: bilateral investment, hold-up, competition, Pareto dominance, social surplus
JEL codes: D44 - Auctions
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:43
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:28042
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15874

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