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Fong, Yuk-fai and Garrett, Daniel F.
(2010)
Bidding in a Possibly Common-Value Auction.
Games and Economic Behavior, 70 (n°2).
pp. 494-501.
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26404
Abstract
We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders
is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium
strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders
instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the
values are different. We derive su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium existence.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | French |
| Date: | November 2010 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| JEL Classification: | D44 - Auctions D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:30 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Oct 2021 13:36 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:26404 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15419 |
