Blanchet, Adrien and Carlier, Guillaume (2012) Optimal Transport and Cournot-Nash Equilibria. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-321

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Abstract

We study a class of games with a continuum of players for which
Cournot-Nash equilibria can be obtained by the minimisation of some cost,
related to optimal transport. This cost is not convex in the usual sense in
general but it turns out to have hidden strict convexity properties in many
relevant cases. This enables us to obtain new uniqueness results and a characterisation
of equilibria in terms of some partial differential equations, a simple
numerical scheme in dimension one as well as an analysis of the inefficiency of
equilibria.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: June 2012
Uncontrolled Keywords: Cournot-Nash equilibria, mean-field games, optimal transport, externalities, Monge-Amp`ere equations, convexity along generalised geodesics
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:27
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:47
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:26030
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15337

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