Communication Equilibria Payoffs in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Renault, Jérôme and Tomala, Tristan (2004) Communication Equilibria Payoffs in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Games and Economic Behavior, 49 (n°2). pp. 313-344.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/25865
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2004
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:26
Last Modified: 06 Apr 2018 10:08
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:25865
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15306

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