Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations

Maestri, Lucas (2012) Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4 (3). pp. 34-56.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/25663
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: August 2012
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:24
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:25663
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15230

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