Altruism and Career Concerns

Shchetinin, Oleg (2009) Altruism and Career Concerns. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-093

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/22198

Abstract

The paper studies the impact of altruism on Agent’s motivation in the
career concerns model. The paper shows the new channel of interaction
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The common point in the literature is that intrinsic motivation can be crowded out by the extrinsic
incentives. My paper shows that crowding effect can go in the opposite
direction: extrinsic incentives can be lessened for the intrinsically motivated agent. The analysis shows that altruism can decrease effort, though conventional wisdom suggests that effort should always be higher for the more altruistic worker. The key for the result is the distinction between current and anticipated altruism. The paper also studies the effect of altruism on wage. The model has a number of other interesting features. It gives an example of winner’s blessing, it shows that ambitions can hinder altruistic relation. The model can be naturally applied to the workplace relation; another application is the local public good provision.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: September 2009
Uncontrolled Keywords: extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, career concerns, altruism
JEL codes: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues)
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:07
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:22198
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15018

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