From Cooptation to Violence: Managing Competitive Authoritarian Elections

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From Cooptation to Violence: Managing Competitive Authoritarian Elections

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Abstract

Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime's prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak's Egypt (1981-2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime has a lower capacity for coopting local elites, it faces competition from ideological (rather than rent-seeking) challengers with no cooptation potential, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens' capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for containing electoral manipulation and violence in less democratic contexts.

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In 2003, as a complementary strategy to the US war on terror, President George W. Bush announced that Washington would adopt a "forward strategy of freedom" and no longer accommodate friendly authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. This announcement demarked an expansion of the US democracy promotion strategies in the MENA region (e.g., Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Iraq) and beyond (e.g., Indonesia, Liberia, Ukraine, Venezuela) (Carothers, 2007). Authoritarian regimes, especially those reliant on the US, then faced a dilemma inherent to most hybrid regimes: enabling more domestic political competition without jeopardizing political control. How do authoritarian regimes select their electoral strategies to manage such a tradeoff?

Elections perform critical functions for autocratic survival by providing information to the regime and adding a facade of legitimacy to its rule. Electoral competitiveness increases the returns from autocratic elections, but also the political risks associated with them (Knutsen, Nygård and Wig, 2017). Hedging against such risks, authoritarian regimes might rely on cooptive electoral strategies to buy elites' and voters' support. Violence offers another option to obstruct the opposition from reaching voters and translating their support into victories. Unlike clientelistic electoral strategies that might be publicly perceived as the way of doing business in autocracies, violent electoral strategies could lead to the loss of lives and destruction of property, fueling voters' grievances and potentially de-legitimizing the elections. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? Which electoral districts are more vulnerable to violence?

I approach these questions in the case of Mubarak's Egypt (1981-2011); an authoritarian regime where the National Democratic Party (NDP) exercised hegemony

over Egypt's political life for three decades. Specifically, this paper focuses on the most competitive and violent electoral contest during Mubarak's reign: the parliamentary election of 2005. In response to domestic and international pressures, Mubarak's regime allowed more room for contesting the NDP, leading the main opposition group -the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)- to secure its largest share of the parliament in its history at the time. Nevertheless, the ruling NDP leveraged its political impunity and control of the state to benefit from violent electoral strategies in tipping plenty of electoral contests to its side. This increased violence during the election, but disproportionately across districts.

Explaining this subnational variation, I argue that the level of electoral violence in autocratic elections is related to the regime's cost-benefit calculus of inclusive (i.e., cooptive) relative to exclusionary electoral strategies for managing the risks from competitive elections on the regime's political control. Because violent electoral strategies are politically costlier than cooptive ones, the regime should resort to them only when cooptation is less probable. Following that same logic, the regime should also limit the use of violent strategies, if it expects them to trigger politically costly reactions. Thus, electoral violence should increase where: (1) the regime's prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (2) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low.

I draw on quantitative and qualitative data to test this argument in the context of the 2005 Egyptian parliamentary election, underscoring three key results. First, violence decreases where the regime's prospects for coopting local elites and competitors are stronger. Elections are more peaceful where the regime enjoys higher cooptation capacity, indicated by its successful cooptation of local elites before the

election. The potential cooptation of the regime's challengers after the election is also relevant to understanding levels of violence. The NDP's contestation with non-ideological rent-seeking elites, with a higher probability of post-election cooptation, comes with less violence. On the contrary, where the regime faces ideological opponents (the MB), violence rises. Second, violence increases in districts where clientelistic strategies are less effective for mobilizing voters and securing electoral victories. Urban areas, where the regime cannot fully rely on patronage politics and kinship loyalties to mobilize voters similar to rural districts, suffer more violence. Meanwhile, where mass vote-buying occurs, elections are less violent. Third, districts with a high capacity for citizens' non-electoral mobilization witness less violence, suggesting that the regime's expectation about the political cost of violence tames its reliance on it.

This case demonstrates how authoritarian regimes balance their pursuit of the informational and legitimacy returns of elections (both were priorities of the NDP) and mitigating threats from electoral competition. Besides competitive autocracies, this dilemma is also present in many unconsolidated democracies where the incumbent enjoys an advantage in utilizing the state's resources and where accessing rent-seeking opportunities is intertwined with political power. Yet, there are scope conditions to our study. First, the opposition's ability to initiate and produce violence is limited. In many weak states, opposition groups could incite violence, sometimes more effectively compared to the state, complicating the incumbent's calculus (Collier and Vicente, 2012). Second, this study does not consider the possibility of fraud, which was negligible in our case. Bringing fraud into the regime's portfolio of strategies should reflect on its incentives to use violence (Van Ham and Lindberg, 2015). Finally, the centralization of the NDP's decision-making and the

heavy presence of the state's repressive apparatus homogenize the regime's capacity to produce violence across districts. In more decentralized polities, this capacity might vary locally and explain subnational variation in violence. These scope conditions, however, come with the advantage of a setting convenient to test our claims with fewer complexities.

This study contributes to accounts linking electoral violence to elections' competitiveness (e.g., Asunka et al., 2019, Taylor, Pevehouse and Straus, 2017, Wilkinson, 2006, Salehyan and Linebarger, 2015, Fjelde and Höglund, 2016). However, it poses that different forms of electoral competition could lead to divergent levels of violence, depending on the goals and ideologies of the (incumbent) regime's challengers. On one hand, competition with rent-seeking challengers carries higher prospects for cooptation and increases the regime's informational returns from elections, hence they go more peacefully. This departs from the argument that competition for rent-seeking opportunities drives up violence in states with weak rule of law and limited political accountability (Birch, 2020). However, it sides with the notion that elite alliances (even among potential competitors from the same political party) could contain electoral violence (Turnbull, 2021). On the other hand, competition with ideological challengers comes with no similar prospect for cooptation, thus rationalizes violent interventions. This also implies that the inclusion of ideological outsiders (opponents) in authoritarian elections could spur rather than deter violence, as in more democratic settings (Fergusson et al., 2021), due to the regime's reaction to their increasingly credible threat from obtaining formal political power. Therefore, the potential for coopting challengers conditions the relationship between competitiveness and violence.

Additionally, this study supports works posing that violent and clientelistic electoral strategies are interdependent, have different functions, and target distinct constituents (e.g., Collier and Vicente, 2014, Bratton, 2008, Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2020, Rauschenbach and Paula, 2019, Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014, Van Ham and Lindberg, 2015, Birch, 2020). Theoretically, it generalizes previous accounts by relating violence to a broader set of cooptive strategies that encompass buying voters, electoral challengers, and local elites. This integrated theoretical framework contends that the feasibility and returns of cooptive strategies used during the election matter for explaining violence, as do expectations on the cooptation of challengers after the election. Empirically, the paper illustrates this interdependent relationship at the district level, addressing the paucity of subnational analyses of electoral violence (Birch, Daxecker and Höglund, 2020, 7) and complementing prevalent individual-level analyses (e.g., Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2020) and cross-country comparisons (e.g., Van Ham and Lindberg, 2015).

The Argument

Theoretical Framework

Elections serve a multi-faceted informational role for authoritarian regimes. They allow the regime to assess the strength of opposition groups (Magaloni, 2006, Blaydes, 2010). They facilitate identifying politically influential local elites, for cooptation into the regime's political institutions (Magaloni, 2006, Blaydes, 2010, Lust-Okar, 2006). Additionally, electoral competition enables the regime to evaluate the effectiveness of its electoral strategies for mobilizing voters, and locate constituents where repressive strategies might be optimal to contain political threats. Furthermore, the regime's electoral victories could legitimize its rule and project an image

of popularity (Schedler, 2002, Levitsky and Way, 2010).

More competitive elections are more effective in delivering these goals. In a non-competitive and predetermined election, the opposition might have no incentives to seriously participate. The influence of local leaders could be hard to detect. Voters might disengage. And, the regime's electoral victories would be less credible. Following this logic, electoral fraud should limit autocrats' ability to benefit from elections to coopt contenders, legitimize their regime, and gather information. It is also risky, as it can agitate the opposition and raise democratization demands (Tucker, 2007, Magaloni, 2010, Lankina and Skovoroda, 2017). Accordingly, authoritarian regimes might have incentives to hold elections and permit a fair degree of competitiveness.

However, competitive elections could jeopardize the regime's stability. Political openness reduces barriers to coordination and collective action for the opposition. Fair elections might reveal the regime's unpopularity. These risks increase with the competitiveness of the election. Indeed, Knutsen, Nygård and Wig (2017) find that autocratic elections are associated with a higher probability of autocratic breakdown in the short-term, but have a stabilizing effect once the regime survives this immediate post-election turbulence. So, autocratic regimes holding competitive elections as a long-term political survival strategy need to manage such short-term risks. This dilemma of authoritarian elections guides our argument.

There exist two scholarly understandings of coercive electoral strategies. The first is a form of clientelism using negative inducements - mostly relying on economic coercion- for electoral mobilization rather than the obstruction of electoral participation. This is often referred to as electoral intimidation (e.g., Mares and Young,

2016, Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi, 2019). Alternatively, electoral coercion could be an exclusionary and demobilizing strategy, for example, by preventing voters from casting their ballots. The latter is often more violent. It is the focus of this paper. Hence, I use the term electoral violence to refer to an exclusionary and obstructive form of electoral manipulation entailing violent, coercive, and disruptive actions in connection to the electoral process and directed towards electoral actors and objects.[1]

Before describing my argument, it is important to state its underlying assumptions. First, it presupposes negligible local-level variation in the supply of electoral violence. Incentives of local actors could determine the supply of economic intimidation (Mares, 2015). More violent forms of electoral manipulation, however, require the involvement of state actors directly by supplying violence via security forces, or indirectly by acting passively and allowing violence by the regime's favorites. Unlike economic intimidation, electoral violence is publicly visible, and hence less likely to be supplied without the state's partial or full involvement.[2] Second, the regime's opponents suffer a disadvantage in using violence. This is particularly true in autocracies where the state's security apparatus is often biased against opposition candidates.[3] Given these assumptions, I take that electoral violence should be primarily shaped by the regime's demand.[4]

[1]This working definition resembles others in the literature (e.g., Birch, 2020, 8). It encompasses acts of intimidation and harassment of voters and candidates, which might involve variant degrees of violence, albeit all being coercive and exclusionary.

[2]Cross-national evidence indicates that electoral violence in autocracies is primarily led by state actors (e.g., Birch, 2020, 2).

[3]These assumptions align with works showing that incumbents enjoy an advantage in producing electoral violence (e.g., Taylor, Pevehouse and Straus, 2017, Straus, 2012, Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013). While I do not assume the opposition's full disengagement from violence, its inclination toward violence should be less provocative and rather reactionary, representing a side effect of violence by the regime.

[4]In our context, violence does not involve political paramilitary groups or organized crime.

Theoretical Predictions

Electoral violence could act as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections by enabling the regime to run competitive races while tilting their outcomes in its favor. Its utilization should reflect the regime's cost-benefit analysis of its menu of electoral manipulation strategies. I argue that two factors should feed into this assessment, leading us to expect higher levels of violence where: (a) the regime's prospects for coopting local political elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of violence is low. Violent strategies should follow cooptive ones on the regime's menu of manipulation strategies due to the former's higher political costs (Birch, Daxecker and Höglund, 2020, Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi, 2019). As the regime's capacity and expectations to coopt competitors and voters improve, the opportunity cost of violent strategies increases. The regime should then shun violent electoral strategies and limit their use to maximize its returns from holding competitive elections. Similarly, the expected political cost of electoral violence should also constrain its use by the regime.

Electoral competitiveness and the threat of the opposition are widely documented explanations of electoral violence (Collier and Vicente, 2012, Wilkinson, 2006, Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski, 2014, Taylor, Pevehouse and Straus, 2017). The dilemma of autocratic elections suggests that the regime might tolerate competition and limit electoral violence to maximize its returns from holding elections, but also hedge against losing to challengers who might undermine its political control. This trade-off requires refining our expectations on the relationship between electoral competitiveness and violence by distinguishing between two forms of challengers, pending their probability of cooptation.

The first challenge comes from non-ideological local political elites. In autocracies and polities with weak party systems, local elites might pursue political careers without a specific ideological agenda, but for rent-seeking opportunities (Blaydes, 2010). These elites often rely on their wealth, kinship, and charisma to cultivate votes for themselves or back certain candidates in exchange for material favors, potentially competing with the regime's candidates. However, their rent-seeking goals facilitate their cooptation by the regime, during or after the election, through political and economic perks. Thus, it is in the regime's interest to maintain fair competition between such elites and the regime's candidates to assess the strengths of local actors and enhance its performance in subsequent elections by coopting the winners.[5] Because the regime's expectation for coopting these elites is high, it should limit the use of violence to better assess their strengths.

Although the participation of the ideological opposition adds to the elections' credibility and informational returns, it creates serious risks. Ideological opponents are those committed to a certain political agenda distinct from that of the regime, for example, on religious or economic dimensions. A high degree of ideological polarization between the regime and its opponents inhibits the regime from buying off its ideological challengers and their supporters (Chaturvedi, 2005). And, if ideological opponents were to accumulate enough electoral victories, they could broaden their influence on policy-making and threaten the regime's survival. Therefore, the regime would have incentives to encourage its ideological opponents' electoral participation, but also hinder their success. Electoral violence can serve the regime's goals by obstructing the opposition's campaigning and its supporters' electoral mo-

[5]It is also less likely that non-ideological elites would challenge the regime's policy orientations. In addition to their non-commitment to a particular ideology, the diversity of their rent-seeking goals should hinder their cooperation and limit their ability to block the regime's interests. This form of low-risk competition reduces the attractiveness of violence to the regime.

bilization, leading to over-representing the regime's supporters in the polls (Klopp, 2001, Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014, Rauschenbach and Paula, 2019).

This distinction redefines the role of competition in authoritarian elections by conditioning it on the expected cooptation of challengers. When cooptation is less likely, the regime's expected costs of electoral competitiveness rise, and violent electoral strategies' appeal increases. Hypothesis (1) states three observable implications of this logic:

Hypothesis (1): In any given district, electoral violence increases as the regime's capacity for coopting political elites and challengers decreases, as in districts where the regime: (a) has lower cooptation capacity of local elites, (b) faces less competition from rent-seeking elites, or (c) faces competition from ideological elites.

Similarly, the level of electoral violence should reflect the regime's expectations about the effectiveness of its candidates' electoral strategies in coopting voters. Clientelism and patronage are commonly used strategies to buy voters' support. Compared to violent forms of electoral manipulation, the provision of positive inducements is less likely to get detected, cause loss of lives and property, or agitate the public. Therefore, clientelism should precede violence on the menu of electoral manipulation strategies (Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi, 2019). The regime's demand for violent strategies would then be linked to the cost-benefit calculus of clientelism.

The regime's actors should resort to electoral violence to control the electoral participation of non-supporters when clientelism is less efficient.[6] Several factors may

[6]Assuming the regime's unpopularity, competitive elections with higher turnout and lower ability to buy votes could turn electoral outcomes against the regime.

lower the returns from clientelism. Better economic conditions increase the price of the vote, subsequently raising the costs of clientelistic strategies (e.g., Stokes et al., 2013, Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). A higher cost of monitoring voters would also render clientelism less efficient. This cost might be shaped by the rural-urban nature of districts. In rural areas, the regime can rely on local leaders and kinship networks to deliver block votes, because monitoring behavior and activating norms of reciprocity is easier in closely-knit communities. Monitoring becomes costlier and less feasible in urban areas, where patron-client relationships are less likely to rely on loyalty and kinship ties (Kitschelt, 2000). These rationales shape the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis (2): Electoral violence should be higher in districts where clientelistic strategies are less efficient and costlier, as in: (a) economically better-off districts, and (b) more urban constituencies.

These hypotheses specify the regime's incentives for electoral violence as a function of its net returns relative to cooptive strategies. However, violent strategies have potential costs. They could increase voters' grievances against the regime, inspire anti-regime mobilization, erode the elections' credibility, and threaten the regime's survival (Bratton, 2008, Rosenzweig, 2021, Staniland, 2014, Smidt, 2016). The regime's calculus should take into account such potential political costs.

In line with the literature on the costs of electoral manipulation (Tucker, 2007, Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2020, Rosenzweig, 2021), I focus on non-electoral mobilization (e.g., protests) as a potential cost of violence.[7] True that this is not the

[7]There is also an economic -but unobserved- cost of violence to perpetrators, which could entail the cost of hiring thugs or bribing security forces.

only possible consequence of violence. Electoral violence could drive international condemnation and strengthen the opposition's claims against the regime, but such implications are often driven by the overall quality of the election. Locally, the regime's concern should be to contain public backlash to avoid wider disclosure of electoral violations. Accordingly, the regime should be inclined to tame its repressive strategies in contexts where voters have more capacity for non-electoral mobilization, as voters' protests against electoral violations in their district could draw domestic and international attention and amplify the political costs of violence to the regime.[8] This factor shapes our third hypothesis:

Hypothesis (3): Electoral violence should be lower in districts where voters have more capacity for non-electoral mobilization.

The 2005 Egyptian Parliamentary Election

In September 2005, Egypt held its first multi-candidate presidential election. This remarkable openness to political competition by Mubarak's regime reflected growing US pressures for democratization and domestic calls for political reform. Hence, when Egyptian voters went to elect their parliamentary representatives in November of 2005, hopes for a competitive and fair election were high.

Within the NDP, two factions debated the party's electoral strategies. The old guard preferred nominating experienced parliamentarians to maintain the party's electoral hegemony. The new guard cited the declining popularity of the NDP to

[8]Similarly, the presence of election monitors could deter the incumbent from using violence. This theoretically-relevant factor is less applicable to our case because the judiciary monitored polling stations in all districts.

advocate for expanding the party's support base by coopting and nominating new faces.[9] This internal conflict on whom the NDP should nominate in the election led some members to dissent and run as independent candidates to prove their electoral value to the party. The 2005 parliamentary election presented an opportunity to adjudicate between these two competing views. It had a critical informational value for the NDP that required a fair degree of competitiveness.

Indeed, the 2005 parliamentary election proved to be the most competitive in Mubarak's era. It took place in 222 districts over three subsequent phases. Each phase, a set of governorates elected their districts' representatives over two rounds.[10] The NDP ran in all districts but incurred heavy losses. Only 141 candidates running on its ticket made it to the parliament, securing about 33 percent of all contested seats.[11] Meanwhile, the main political opposition, the MB, made its then-biggest historical gain by winning 88 seats.[12] Other opposition parties won 9 seats (2.5 percent), indicating their limited popularity.[13] Independent candidates won 195 seats, defeating the NDP's official nominees in tens of districts and revealing the NDP's electoral vulnerability. Nevertheless, 170 of them were former members of the NDP, who were re-coopted into the party after the election to bring its share of the parliament to 72 percent (Zahran, 2006, 178).[14]

[9]The new guard was constituted of business elites and led by Mubarak's son, Gamal Mubarak.

[10]The governorate is the largest subnational administrative unit. Each includes a set of districts. Governors are appointed.

[11]Each district had two contested seats. 12 seats remained vacant after the election with no declared winner.

[12]Since the MB was banned from establishing a political party, MB candidates ran officially as independents. Yet, they campaigned under the slogan of the group and publicly distinguished themselves from other independents. The MB competed in only 132 districts.

[13]These secular parties rarely presented any serious threat to the regime (Sallam, 2022).

[14]This is a common practice in the NDP's politics. Independent candidates are left to compete with the party's candidates, but most winners are later coopted into the NDP. Independents tend to have weak political inclinations. They compete to land rent-seeking opportunities by securing parliamentary seats and membership in the ruling party (Blaydes, 2010).

Incidents of electoral fraud were limited (Brancati and Penn, 2022). Election monitoring groups reported serious fraud in only 10 districts (Abdel Magid, 2005, 13). This is due to the enforcement of the judiciary's supervision over the election. Judges remained impartial throughout the process and many openly opposed attempts of electoral manipulation. Domestic civil society organizations were also allowed to monitor the election for the first time. These factors contributed to limiting violations inside polling stations, yet they were rampant outside.

The 2005 election was the most violent under Mubarak's rule. 12 citizens were killed and hundreds were injured or arrested. As one of the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders described it, "they [the regime] turned the polling stations into a battlefield" (Allam, 2005). Reports by different electoral observers provide detailed accounts of the violent nature of this election. Hired thugs attacked voters with swords. Public and private properties were destroyed. Few candidates were subject to kidnapping and assassination attempts. The police turned a blind eye to most of these violations since they often involved candidates favorable to the regime.[15] In many districts, security forces actively prevented voters from reaching the polls by blocking roads, firing teargas, and making random arrests. This significant level of violence became a hallmark of the 2005 election.[16]

[15] In some accounts, the violence involved supporters of the MB. However, I do not find evidence for the opposition's initiation of violence, but reactions to violence by the regime's actors.

[16] For more detailed accounts, see Rabi'a (2006) and Abdel Magid (2005).

Empirical Analysis

Data

I test the hypotheses at the district level. Yasin (2006) notes that the NDP's electoral strategies, including its nominations and manipulations (e.g., vote-buying, bribery, and violent interventions), were set by its leadership in Cairo for each electoral district. Abu-Taleb (2006) adds that local authorities followed the NDP's instructions to support its favorites for each district. Moreover, most of the electoral violence occurred in public spaces, where the effect of violence might spread across the targeted district. These reasons justify taking the district as the unit of analysis.

The outcome measures the number of reported acts of electoral violence on election day. It includes violence against candidates (e.g., murder, kidnapping, and physical attacks), the obstruction of electoral campaigning, destruction of campaigning material, security forces' interventions in favor of particular candidates (e.g., hindering opposition voters from casting their ballots), blockades of polling stations by police, physical intimidation of voters, and disruptive acts around polling stations (e.g., sieges of polling stations).

These data are obtained from Abu-Taleb (2006), who collects reports on electoral violence in the 2005 election from Egyptian newspapers and reports by local NGOs that monitored the election.[17] Each action is a reported incident of violence that occurred within the boundaries of the electoral district. This measure counts separate reports of violent incidents, not necessarily the number of affected polling stations.

[17]This is part of al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies', one of Egypt's most distinguished think tanks, analysis of the election. Appendix A.2 discusses data collection and sources.

Though some actions might affect voting in multiple -physically proximate- polling stations within the district, data limitations render knowing all affected polling stations infeasible. Hence, the outcome focuses on reports of the occurrence of violence.[18]

The dataset includes 2170 reported acts of electoral violence on election day. Around 97 percent of all reported actions were targeted at voters. About a quarter involved police forces as the main perpetrator. The majority of acts were carried out by hired thugs and candidates' supporters. However, according to monitoring reports, the police -deliberately- did not intervene to contain the violence, indirectly contributing to its escalation. Abdel Magid (2005) and Abu-Taleb (2006) provide detailed accounts from election monitoring reports on the police's passivity. Even more, some reports suggest that thugs might have been commissioned by security forces in some districts to disrupt the process without implicating state actors. If we account for this indirect role of security forces, the scope of the state's involvement would be much higher than a quarter of all incidents. This supports our theoretical assumption that most violence involved the regime's affiliates.[19]

The first and runoff rounds of the election witnessed comparable levels of violence.[20] The mean district experienced about 5 incidents of violence in any given round, while the median district suffered two violent acts in the first round versus one incident in the runoff, reflecting the outcome's skewness. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the overall level of electoral violence and its subcategories for the two electoral rounds,

[18] For example, the police might block a street leading to multiple polling stations. This is counted as one act because it is unclear how many stations were affected and the perpetrator remains the same actor.

[19] Appendix A.3 provides the distribution of different forms of violence over the elections' phases and rounds. Appendix A.4 presents a few examples of electoral violence.

[20] 14 districts did not have runoffs.

illustrating the relative stability of violence levels over the two rounds.

Figure 1 – Distribution of Electoral Violence by its Different Subcategories for the First (in Blue) and Runoff (in Brown) Rounds



(a) Total Violence **(b)** Against Voters

(c) By State Actors **(d)** By Non-State Actors

The blue plots refer to the first round. Brown plots refer to the runoff round. The vertical lines mark the mean values.

The violence escalated during the later phases of the election. Figure 2 shows that districts electing in the second and third phases experienced more violence, with their average district suffering triple the mean level of violence of the first phase. This reflects the rising electoral threat to the regime after the first phase, which delivered major losses to the NDP and historical gains for the MB.

Figure 2 – Density Plots of Electoral Violence by its Different Subcategories Summed over the Two Rounds for the First (in Blue), Second (in Brown), and Third (in Yellow) Phases



(a) Total Violence **(b)** Against Voters

(c) By State Actors **(d)** By Non-State Actors

The blue, brown, and yellow plots refer to the first, second, and third phases, respectively. The vertical lines mark the mean value.

The geographical distribution of violence exhibited significant variation. Figure 3 maps the two-round total number of violent acts and their subcategories for electoral districts. Aside from the sparsely populated areas afar from the Nile, we see noticeable variation in the center where most of Egypt's population resides. This geographical variation characterized violence in both rounds. At least one act of violence was reported in 72 percent of the districts in the first round and in 51 percent

of the runoffs. Our goal is to explain this subnational variation.

Figure 3 – The Geographical Distribution of Electoral Violence by its Different Subcategories Summed over the Two Rounds



(a) Total Violence **(b)** Against Voters

(c) By State Actors **(d)** By Non-State Actors

Darker shades indicate more incidents of violence. The white areas are sparsely populated regions.

Hypothesis (1) poses the regime's capacity to coopt local elites and challengers as an explanation for electoral violence. I test this claim using three different variables. The first is the number of NDP candidates officially competing under the party's label for the first time. These are either incumbents who ran and won as independents in the previous parliamentary election in 2000, or new nominees with

no parliamentary experience.[21] Bringing new cadres to run under the NDP's label reflects its ability to revitalize its local presence through cooptation. It also signals the party's openness and capacity to incorporate new faces into its local leadership, incentivizing local elites to compete for these openings. Therefore, I consider this measure of successful cooptation an indicator of the NDP's cooptation capacity, which should be associated with less violence as per hypothesis (1a).

The second measure is the number of incumbents dissenting from the NDP to run as independents, representing the non-ideological competition. These are incumbents who were NDP members or won under its label in the previous election, but split from the party after being denied its official nomination for the 2005 election. They run as independents (labeled as NDP dissidents) against NDP candidates to prove their electoral strength and improve their future stance within the party. Most rejoin the party once victorious. Therefore, competition with these dissidents comes with high expectations for the NDP's cooptation of the best performers. This competition is also informative to the regime, weakening its incentives to unnecessarily tolerate costly violent electoral strategies (hypothesis 1b).[22]

The third is the electoral threat of the ideological opposition. The MB presented the most credible threat to Mubarak's regime, due to its distinct Islamist political agenda (different from that of the NDP and other secular opposition parties) and high mobilization capacity. The regime's concerns over the MB's electoral threat translated into mass detentions of MB leaders and supporters in the lead-up to the

[21] The party might coopt competitors between the first round and the runoff. The measure accounts for these cases.

[22] This competition is not cost-free to the NDP. Its nominees' losses to dissidents carry reputational costs, revealing the regime's vulnerability and unpopularity. Cooptation, however, renders such costs less consequential.

election (Allam, 2005). This worry was well-founded, as the MB managed to secure 88 parliamentary seats. So, I focus on the MB's electoral threat, measured by a dummy variable (MB Running) with a positive value if at least one MB candidate ran in the district-round. The presence of MB candidates should be associated with more violence (hypothesis 1c).

The second hypothesis poses two factors contributing to the cost and feasibility of clientelistic strategies: (a) economic conditions, and (b) urbanization. I first measure the district's economic conditions using two variables (hypothesis 2a). The employment rate is the percentage of those employed out of those in the labor force. The second is the level of education in a district, measured as a weighted average of the level of education of the adult population of the district.[23]

Clientelism should also be more efficient in rural districts (hypothesis 2b). As scholars of Mubarak's Egypt note, the regime enjoyed a mobilization advantage in rural areas by relying on patronage politics and clientelistic exchanges (Blaydes, 2010, Masoud, 2014). Accordingly, we might expect the regime to resort more to violent strategies in urban areas, where clientelism is less efficient. I measure urbanization as the percentage of the district's population living in urban areas. We expect these three variables to positively predict violence.[24]

The third hypothesis supposes that constituencies with a higher capacity for protests would witness less violence. Since a district's mobilization capacity likely depends on its historical experience with contention, I take the log of the total number

[23]This variable has a theoretical range from 0 to 5, capturing 6 levels of education starting from illiteracy to university level. It is standardized to facilitate interpretation.

[24]These socioeconomic measures come from the official census estimates published in 2006. The timing of data collection overlapped with the election, offering close and reliable estimates.

of protests over the five-year period (2000-2005) preceding the election, obtained from the ACLED dataset, as a measure for protest capacity. Although the ACLED dataset might under-report protest activities during this period, it could offer a measure of protest activity particularly relevant to our case. The regime utilized the 2005 election to signal its openness to democracy to the international community and the US. It might be primarily concerned about protests significant enough to draw international attention. Since ACLED relies on reports of protest activities from international media, it captures protests most concerning for the regime.

The estimation procedure uses negative binomial regressions to account for over-dispersion in the count outcome.[25] The models include fixed effects for governorates to absorb local-level factors that could affect the outcome for any set of districts within a given governorate, such as the identity of the governor, the capacity of police forces, and the phase of the election. Standard errors are clustered for governorates.[26] In addition, the models control for the size of the voting population (the log of the number of registered voters), the percentage of the female population, the round of the election (a dummy indicator for the runoff round), the number of candidates competing, and the number of incumbents re-running.[27]

[25] A test of overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990) rejects the null at the 99 percent level. The outcome's variance exceeds its mean, so negative binomial regression offers the best model that fits the count dependent variable.

[26] These two specification choices address concerns related to spatial correlation in the outcome and error terms. Generally, I do not find consistent evidence for spatial dependency in the main outcome (Appendix B). Moran's test indicates no support for spatial dependence in the runoff round, but only in the first round. However, testing for spatial dependency among districts of the same electoral phase (with phases based on districts' governorates) fails to reject Moran's null hypothesis of random dispersion (i.e., no spatial dependencies).

[27] Appendix A.1 provides all variables' definitions, data sources, and descriptive statistics.

Findings

Column (1) of Table 1 presents negative binomial coefficient estimates from regressing the total acts of electoral violence on the predictors for the two rounds of the election. Confirming hypothesis (1a), violence is lower in districts where the NDP has a higher cooptation capacity. The coefficient on (New NDP) is statistically significant and negative, indicating that one newly coopted nominee is associated with a 34 percent decrease in the number of violent actions. As per hypothesis (1b), competition with NDP dissidents (non-ideological challengers with high potential for cooptation) is similarly linked to lower violence, though the coefficient is statistically insignificant. On the contrary, the presence of MB candidates (ideological opposition) is associated with more violence. Where at least one MB candidate competes, the number of violent incidents increases by more than 200 percent. This difference between the outcome's correlation with competition from NDP dissidents and MB candidates confirms that competition matters, but its implications depend on the ideological leanings of challengers and their openness to the regime's cooptation.

The second set of variables evaluates the relationship between electoral violence and the theoretical predictors of clientelism. The most notable result here is the significant positive association between urbanization and violence. This urban-rural divide is also substantively meaningful: a one percent increase in the proportion of the district's urban population predicts about an 8 percent rise in the number of violent incidents. Although this backs hypothesis (2b), I find no statistically significant association between the outcome and the district's employment rate or educational attainment.

Finally, following hypothesis (3), constituents with more capacity to protest (based

on past protest activity) experience less violence. Therefore, a higher expected political cost of electoral violence is associated with less tolerance and utilization of violence by the regime.

In columns (2) and (3), I separate the analysis by rounds and note two observations. First, the coefficient on (MB candidates) is much larger in the runoff, suggesting that the threat of ideological opposition becomes a stronger predictor of violence in decisive electoral contests. Second, the coefficient on (NDP Dissidents) shifts to the opposite sign -but loses statistical significance- in the runoff. This might indicate a reordering of the regime's priorities. At first, the regime tolerates dissidents to assess their strengths and coopt those advancing to the runoff. However, even if dissidents can be coopted after the runoff, the electoral defeat of NDP candidates reveals the regime's vulnerability and increases dissidents' bargaining power, hence raising the cost of cooptation and incentivizing electoral manipulation (i.e., violence). Supporting this explanation, in Appendix C, I show that the positive link between dissidents and violence in the runoff is particular to districts where they face the newly coopted -and less experienced- NDP candidates who might be more electorally vulnerable. Outside such districts, competition with NDP dissidents in the runoff remains less violent.

Column (4) expands the analysis to include the pre-election period, constituted of the two months preceding the election and dedicated to campaigning. The pre-election period is treated as a separate round with its own variation on the outcome, but similar district characteristics to the first round.[28] This analysis yields very similar results to those presented in column (1).

[28]The pre-election period contains only 66 additional acts of electoral violence, involving mostly attacks on candidates and campaigns.

Table 1 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) First Round	(3) Second Round	(4) Pre-Election and Two Rounds
New NDP	-0.422***	-0.401*	-0.476*	-0.354**
	(0.117)	(0.175)	(0.241)	(0.111)
NDP Dissidents	-0.329	-0.573*	0.417	-0.340
	(0.262)	(0.232)	(0.521)	(0.250)
MB Running	1.17***	0.415	2.10***	1.05***
	(0.231)	(0.291)	(0.317)	(0.241)
Employment (%)	0.126	0.163+	0.106	0.142
	(0.121)	(0.090)	(0.244)	(0.117)
Education (sd)	-0.186	-0.176	-0.360	-0.087
	(0.169)	(0.149)	(0.271)	(0.168)
Urban (%)	0.073**	0.093***	0.095*	0.072**
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.024)
Protest (log)	-0.380**	-0.455**	-0.385	-0.409**
	(0.124)	(0.144)	(0.312)	(0.128)
Registered (log)	-0.128	-0.141	-0.001	-0.043
	(0.505)	(0.369)	(0.770)	(0.512)
Female (%)	-0.018	0.082	-0.024	0.071
	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.233)	(0.165)
Incumbents	0.095	-0.046	0.181	0.070
	(0.163)	(0.144)	(0.261)	(0.152)
Candidates No.	0.023*	0.028**	0.123	0.020+
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.235)	(0.012)
Runoff	0.480			3.12***
	(0.364)			(0.373)
Round (1)				2.71***
				(0.250)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In all models, we see no significant role for the size of the voting population, the gender composition of the district, or the number of running incumbents. Yet, a higher number of candidates competing in the district, an indicator of the election's competitiveness, positively predicts violence.

I next address potential alternative explanations of these results. Possibly, violence is higher where the MB runs due to the movement's historical popularity and legacies of its repression by the state, rather than the prospect of elite cooptation in this particular election. Leveraging the 1984 parliamentary elections' results in Appendix D.1, when the MB competed as part of an electoral coalition in a relatively open election, I find that the MB's coalition's vote share in 1984 does not positively predict the probability that MB candidates run in 2005. It also does not change the coefficient on (MB Running) or predict violence, when included in replications of Table 1. Furthermore, the probability of the MB competing in a district is unrelated to past protests by the MB, an indicator of its popularity and vulnerability to repression. Thus, violence is driven by the MB's electoral threat and unlikely cooptation in this election, rather than the historical conditions of districts where they run.

Similarly, we might see less violence where new NDP candidates or NDP dissidents run because of the party's historical popularity and promotion of a clientelistic culture, not solely the prospects for elite cooptation. In Appendix D.2, I show that we cannot fully rule out this interpretation, which aligns with hypothesis (2). However, it remains insufficient to fully explain the observed drop in violence, suggesting that the two interpretations on the prospects for elite and voter cooptation might hold.

Finally, legacies of regime repression and securitization might explain violence and

contribute to the observed relationships between our explanatory variables and the outcome. In Appendix D.3, I rerun the analysis after excluding districts in Upper Egypt -where the regime granted security forces impunity to fight militant Islamists in the 1980s and 1990s- and report similar results, discrediting this explanation.

In sum, electoral violence is a function of the regime's expectations about its cooptation capacity and the political cost of violence. Where the regime can coopt local elites, or where it faces competition from rent-seeking non-ideological opponents, violence drops. Competition with ideological challengers, however, is associated with more violence. Similarly, violence increases where obstacles to buying voters' support via clientelistic means, as in urban areas, are higher. Nevertheless, because violence is politically costly, the regime limits its use in places with more credible threats of mass protests.

Robustness

Measurement

I start by addressing three concerns about the outcome's measurement. The first regards potential biases in the data collection process. In Appendix E.1, I test whether urban bias in reports of violence might drive our findings. I rerun the analysis by restricting the sample to more urban districts, where variation in reporting probabilities should be negligible and unsystematic. Our conclusions remain unchanged using various thresholds of urbanization and operationalizations of the outcome. The diversity of sources consulted for reports of violence, including well-established national news agencies present across Egyptian governorates, further reduces potential geographical biases in reporting. Additionally, the data are derived from

multiple sources with diverse political orientations (government-funded, partisan, independent civil society), ameliorating concerns that the outcome is systematically biased against the regime (see: Appendix A.2).

The second relates to the aggregation of violence against voters and candidates because these two forms of violence might be qualitatively different. Given our theoretical emphasis on violence against voters which represents 97 percent of all reported incidents, I redo the analysis after excluding candidate-targeted violence, in panel (a) of Figure 4, and report similar patterns to Table 1. Further undermining concerns over aggregation, in Appendix E.2, I report that the two forms of violence are positively correlated suggesting a complementary relationship, albeit to a lesser degree where electoral violence is more prominent as in urban and MB districts.

The third limitation is that the outcome does not explicitly distinguish between state-perpetrated (or regime-perpetrated) violence and that by the opposition. Theoretically, we are interested in the former. Our conceptual understanding of state involvement entails both its direct supply of violence and implicit involvement by enabling violence by non-state actors.[29] Election monitoring reports (e.g., Abdel Magid, 2005) do not exonerate the MB from engagement in some violent incidents. Nevertheless, they assert that regime affiliates (whether state or non-state actors) were often initiators or similarly involved in these altercations. They also highlight the police's passivity towards violence by non-state actors and deliberate inaction in certain incidents. Moreover, the security's bias against the MB strongly constrains its willingness and capacity to produce violence. Given that, our outcome conceptually matches our understanding of state-perpetrated violence in Egypt's

[29] Wilkinson (2006) notes that state actors might deliberately and strategically enable violence.

case. But I also empirically address this concern by breaking down the outcome by the perpetrator in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 4 to confirm that both state and non-state violence are correlated with the same factors.[30]

Relatedly, if the MB significantly contributes to the initiation and production of violence, then we should expect the MB to employ it regardless of the identity of its opponents. On the contrary, the evidence in Appendix E.3 shows that districts where the MB competes with NDP dissidents witness significantly less violence than those where it faces new NDP candidates, although the former proved to be electorally stronger. Therefore, even if we assume the MB's engagement in violence, this evidence suggests the regime's actors are always implicated, undermines the possibility that our outcome is driven by opposition-initiated violence, and advances the regime's electoral vulnerability to the MB as the likely interpretation.

[30]The consistency of our findings across these outcome measures adds that our conclusions are robust to the potential -disproportionate- misreporting of certain forms of violence.

Figure 4 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence towards Voters, by State Actors, and by Non-State Actors



(a) Violence against Voters



(b) Violence by State Actors



(c) Violence by Non-State Actors

All models include governorate fixed effects and the same set of controls in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered for governorates. Confidence intervals are estimated at the 95 percent level. The model for the three rounds covers the first round, runoff, and the pre-election period.

Clientelism and Electoral Violence

On the relationship between clientelism and electoral violence, our results are inconclusive especially since urbanization might be capturing other factors besides the feasibility of clientelism. Accordingly, I leverage additional data from election monitoring reports to construct a direct measure of large-scale vote-buying. The National Campaign for Monitoring the Elections, an alliance of civil society organizations, was one of the main entities monitoring the electoral process. Its final report (see: Abdel Magid, 2005) presents accounts of mass vote-buying. I utilize this source to create a dummy indicator for clientelism, identifying districts where mass vote-buying is reported. One limitation of this measure is that it does not specify the electoral round when vote-buying was observed. So, the following analysis aggregates the outcome over the two rounds.[31]

This measure is not a comprehensive account of all incidents of vote-buying because clientelistic exchanges often take place away from monitors' eyes. It captures incidents of large-scale vote-buying (such as buying blocks of voters) on election day, reflected in concerns raised by opposition candidates and observers in media and official complaints. These violations are reported in 18 percent of the districts.

In column (1) of Table 2, I regress the total number of reported violent actions (aggregated over the two rounds) on the dummy for vote-buying with only fixed effects and basic controls. The coefficient is negative, but only statistically significant at the 90 percent level. This negative correlation persists across different model specifications. In column (2), I include the main political explanatory variables, ex-

[31] Based on a few reports specifying the round when vote-buying was observed, there is no consistency across districts on when candidates use mass vote-buying.

cept covariates that might be related to clientelism. This improves the precision of the estimated coefficient. Model (3) includes all predictors, but yields a smaller and imprecisely estimated coefficient. Model (4) drops the fixed effects to leverage more variation. Here, the coefficient on vote-buying is negative, statistically significant, and larger in magnitude.

Despite the minor fluctuations of the coefficient of interest across models, we consistently observe a negative correlation between vote-buying and electoral violence.[32] This suggests that electoral violence is a function of the feasibility of clientelistic mobilization strategies. Supplementing this analysis, I report suggestive descriptive evidence that electoral violence increases with the price of votes in Appendix F.1. In Appendix F.2, I provide additional support to the link between electoral violence and clientelism by considering electoral turnout as a proxy for clientelistic mobilization and leveraging the specifics of turnout patterns in Egypt.

[32] I validate this measure and report a similar pattern using a survey-based measure of clientelism prevalence in Appendix F.3.

Table 2 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Electoral Violence Aggregated Over the Two Rounds (Outcome) and Vote-Buying

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Vote-buying	-0.452^{+}	-0.454*	-0.341	-0.688**
	(0.258)	(0.222)	(0.245)	(0.255)
Female	-0.144	-0.060	-0.034	0.048
	(0.239)	(0.213)	(0.203)	(0.090)
Registered (log)	0.164	-0.200	-0.077	0.601^{+}
	(0.448)	(0.500)	(0.467)	(0.318)
Incumbents	0.288	0.229	0.245	0.227
	(0.188)	(0.208)	(0.202)	(0.200)
Candidates No.	0.046**	0.060**	0.047^{+}	0.051*
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.020)
New NDP		-0.345*	-0.344*	-0.025
		(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.113)
NDP Dissidents		-0.187	-0.278	0.369
		(0.382)	(0.386)	(0.318)
MB Running		0.805***	0.831***	1.02***
		(0.224)	(0.234)	(0.232)
Protest (log)		-0.106	-0.252*	-0.227^{+}
		(0.157)	(0.106)	(0.118)
Urban (%)			0.065**	0.030^{+}
			(0.022)	(0.017)
Employment (%)			0.028	-0.053
			(0.109)	(0.077)
Education (sd)			-0.214	-0.097
			(0.141)	(0.130)
Fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Note: Total number of districts is 222. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. The variables Incumbents, Candidates No., New NDP, and NDP Dissidents are measured as the mean of the two rounds. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Model Specification

I confirm the robustness of the findings to various model specifications. I first replicate the main analysis using OLS (Appendix G.1) and Poisson (Appendix G.2) regressions. I then redo the analysis after removing the governorate fixed effects to exploit more variation in Appendix G.3, and alternatively with more restrictive FEs (governorate x election round) in Appendix G.4. I also confirm that the results are not driven by influential observations in Appendix G.5. Finally, Appendix H presents a sensitivity analysis of the main coefficient estimates to unobserved confounders, following the procedure suggested by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), which still yields support to the robustness of our conclusions.[33]

Electoral Violence in Three Districts

To substantiate the quantitative results, I provide a brief overview of electoral contests in three districts. The first is Damanhour, a case of a high level of violence. The second is Esna, which witnessed a significantly low level of violence. Finally, I look at Bila, where violence was high in the first round, but dropped in the runoff.

Damanhour

Damanhour (*Qism Damanhour*), one of the most urbanized districts in al-Beheira governorate, lies in the upper quartile in terms of violence levels in the 2005 election. It is a district where security forces played a major role in intimidating voters and preventing them from reaching the polls. At three main voting sites, the police suspended the voting process and blocked roads leading to polling stations. When

[33]The only exception is the coefficient on protest activity, with its magnitude exhibiting sensitivity to unobserved confounders, albeit still carrying the predicted sign.

gatherings of voters and election monitors protested against these restrictions, security forces responded with tear gas and random arrests (Abdel Magid, 2005, 164). The police's interventions preferred the regime's candidate (*Mostafa al-Feki*), a distinguished figure in the NDP, against his main opponent of the MB (the incumbent). The interventions prompted the MB supporters to block buses carrying NDP voters from reaching the polls. Armed gangs, affiliated with the NDP, reacted by attacking MB supporters and burning the MB's electoral headquarter (Abdel Magid, 2005, 156). The violence escalated, leading to hundreds of injuries and arrests and turning the district into a "war zone" (Rashid, 2006, 454). What factors contributed to this high level of violence?

The district witnessed strong competition between the NDP and the MB. The NDP nominated a distinguished member who held a parliamentary seat by appointment in the preceding parliament. However, the MB candidate was the incumbent and had a dedicated popular following and local political experience. The strength of the MB candidate was apparent during the campaigning period and his electoral conferences attracted a much larger audience than his challenger's (Rashid, 2006, 428). During the early hours of the election, more voters indicated that they chose the MB over the NDP (Rashid, 2006, 454). Accordingly, the NDP faced a serious electoral threat in Damanhour with almost no possibility of coopting its ideological opponent.

The NDP had a weak capacity to coopt voters through patronage politics and vote-buying. Its candidate was a national-level politician residing in Cairo. He lacked strong ties with locals and failed to secure alliances with local leaders. In contrast, the MB had a strong local presence, provided various social services to the district,

and relied on a loyal support base.[34] This meant that the NDP's attempts to buy votes on election day were unlikely to succeed in turning the results. Indeed, there were no reports of significant vote-buying in the district.

Given these limitations on cooptive electoral strategies, the NDP resorted to violence as the last option to secure its candidate's victory. The regime rallied both the police and thugs to sway the election to their candidate's side.

Esna

Esna, the seventh electoral district in Qena governorate, is a predominantly agrarian district with about 80 percent of its inhabitants living in rural areas. 19 candidates competed for two parliamentary seats in the district. Nevertheless, the election went peacefully during both rounds with negligible reports of violence. Two key factors might have contributed to this outcome.

The district posed no electoral threat to the regime and the NDP. The main opposition, the MB, did not nominate or support a candidate in the district. The NDP candidates still faced competition from independents. Yet, they presented no serious future threat to the NDP's control over the parliament. The most serious independent competitors held previous positions within the NDP, meaning that they were easy to coopt into the party after the election. Indeed, two independents managed to beat the NDP's candidates, and both joined the NDP once victorious. With the competition being a win-win situation for the NDP, security forces remained neutral in the election and had no intentions to enable violence by candidates.

[34]For example, two MB candidates won the district's two parliamentary seats in the 2000 parliamentary election. Yet, one was later disqualified from the parliament and his seat went to an NDP member.

The second factor is the prevalence of patronage politics in the rural district. Esna is an agrarian tribal society, where few families alternated parliamentary seats, sometimes through implicit agreements. This reflected on the pool of candidates: 6 of the candidates had previous personal political experience or came from families with a political background (Rashid, 2006). During the campaigning period, candidates offered favors to the heads of the main families in exchange for block votes. This order made reliance on these alliances more important than inciting violence, which could agitate clans and affect the long-term prospects of candidates. Those who lacked strong local ties relied heavily on money for buying support. For example, one of the candidates who spent only 6 months in the district secured the fifth position in the first round by primarily relying on vote-buying (Rashid, 2006, 430).

In Esna, electoral violence was an unnecessary costly strategy. The regime did not see competition in the district as a threat to its political control. Candidates relied on patronage politics and clientelism to inflate their support.

Bila

In Bila, a historically competitive district in Kafr al-Sheikh governorate, electoral outcomes were often hard to predict, lending it the title of "the district of wonders" (Munufi and Husayn, 2006, 241). During the first round, electoral violence was severe. Security forces obstructed voters from casting their ballots and violently clashed with opposition voters that led to the use of tear gas and the burning down of four houses (Munufi and Husayn, 2006, 263). However, the runoff passed with no significant violence. This drop in violence could be explained by the changing patterns of competition in the district.

In the first round, the MB nominated a strong candidate who represented the district in the preceding parliament. He campaigned heavily by visiting villages and holding meetings with voters outside his support base. Meanwhile, the NDP could not risk losing more seats to the MB. This was the third phase of the election. In the first two phases, the NDP had already lost 76 seats to the MB and needed to contain its losses. In Bila, the police suspended voting in the MB candidate's village and arrested a group of his supporters. However, the NDP candidates and independents were allowed to campaign and mobilize their supporters freely (Munufi and Husayn, 2006, 255-256). Accordingly, the MB candidate lost in the first round.

By eliminating the MB's threat, the regime had no strong incentives to intervene in the runoff held between two NDP candidates and two independents. Although both NDP candidates lost, the two independents were coopted into the NDP's parliamentary block. Knowing that the independents had no leanings toward the opposition made violence unattractive for the regime's actors. In addition, reported vote-buying by the regime's favorites and independents facilitated voters' mobilization in the runoff (Munufi and Husayn, 2006), further reducing the need for violence.

Conclusion

I presented an explanation for electoral violence in competitive authoritarian regimes, resting on two propositions. The first is the regime's prospects for coopting elites, competitors, and voters. Where the regime expects to coopt rent-seeking local elites and competitors, it has weaker incentives for violence. Yet, when its electoral challengers commit to a distinct ideological agenda inhibiting their cooptation, their

threat gains credibility, and violence rises. Similarly, violence increases where barriers to relying on clientelism for electoral mobilization are severe. The second proposition contends that the regime's utilization of violence decreases with its political costs, arising from citizens' capacity to protest. The quantitative and qualitative evidence from Egypt's 2005 parliamentary election supports these propositions.

Albeit derived from one case with its -aforementioned- scope conditions, the findings speak to other polities with similar settings. Hybrid regimes hold elections where rent-seeking elites, ideological groups, and regime favorites compete for parliamentary seats. Incumbents enjoy disproportionate access to state resources to utilize violence. Autocrats have incentives to run relatively competitive elections without risking political control. These premises of our argument describe a broad class of polities where our conclusions apply.

The study describes multiple conditions, integrated into a cost-benefit logic, under which electoral violence increases. It does not establish causal relationships due to data limitations and the multiplicity of examined conditions, but offers a comprehensive descriptive understanding of electoral violence. As Gerring (2012) states, descriptive inferences of "intrinsically important" topics such as violence are "important in their own right" to inform the study of causal relationships by offering "more valid, more precise, more complete - descriptions of reality" (733-744). Thus, our analysis can inform future causal examinations of overlooked factors behind electoral violence, such as the implications of different forms of electoral competition. Moreover, descriptive analysis is equally important for policy actors, for example, by providing a logic to map where violence is likely to escalate.

This study has implications for discussions of electoral malpractices. First, international pressures for democratization might bring autocrats to run competitive elections inclusive of serious ideological opposition. However, absent the rule of law, such adopted measures could provoke violent reactions from regimes fearing for their political control, separating electoral openness from *de facto* political inclusion and representation. Second, for international and domestic electoral monitors and democracy promoters, the interdependencies between different forms of electoral manipulation strategies in contexts with weak democratic institutions should be seriously taken into account. Daxecker (2012) shows that monitors' revelations of electoral manipulation could spark political unrest. In Egypt, Brancati and Penn (2022) underline that when electoral fraud is harder to commit, electoral violence rises. Similarly, our results indicate that electoral violence increases where "peaceful" electoral manipulation strategies are less effective. This is not to say that non-violent electoral manipulation should be ignored, but to develop comprehensive monitoring strategies and accountability mechanisms that take into account such tradeoffs. Finally, long-term investments in citizens' capacity to mobilize might raise the cost of electoral violence in less democratic contexts, acting as a bottom-up accountability mechanism.

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Appendix A Variables: Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics

A.1 Variables: Definition and Sources

- Electoral Violence (outcome): The total number of acts of electoral violence on election day. These include: violence against candidates (i.e., murder, threats of murder, kidnapping, and physical attacks), hindering electoral campaigning for certain candidates, destruction of campaigning material (such as billboards and posters), interventions of security forces in favor of particular candidates (e.g., blockades of polling stations by security forces, preventing voters from casting their ballots, firing tear gas against voters), fights and physical attacks on voters, and disruptive acts around polling stations (such as sieges of polling stations and destruction of ballot boxes). In models where the preelection period is analyzed, the variable includes acts of violence conducted in the two months period preceding the election. The data for this variable are obtained from Abu-Taleb (2006), as described in the main text.

- Violence against Voters (outcome): This is a sub-category of the main outcome and excludes violence against candidates, destruction of campaigning material, and the obstruction of campaigning.

- Violence by State Actors (outcome): This variable includes interventions that directly and explicitly involve security forces' obstruction of the electoral process (e.g., blockades of polling stations by security forces, preventing voters from casting their ballots by the police, firing tear gas against voters).

- Violence by Non-state Actors (outcome): This excludes acts of violence where security forces are directly involved.

- MB Running: A dummy variable with a positive value if the MB has at least one candidate competing in the district. The variable was obtained from Masoud (2014).

- New NDP: The number of NDP candidates officially competing under the party's label for the first time: incumbents who ran and won as independent candidates in the previous parliamentary election, or new nominees from local leaders with no previous parliamentary experience. This variable is constructed from the official lists of candidates published by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior and records of members of the parliament published in Rabi'a (2000).

- NDP Dissidents: The number of incumbents dissenting from the NDP to compete as independents in the 2005 election. These are incumbents who were NDP members or won under the party's label in the previous election, but split from the party to run as independents in this election. This variable is constructed from the official lists of candidates published by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior and records of members of the parliament published in Rabi'a (2000).

- Urban: The percentage of the district's population living in urban areas. The variable is based on the official population census estimates of 2006 by the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.

- Employment: The percentage of the employed out of those in the labor force in the district. The variable is based on the official population census estimates of 2006 by the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.

- Education: A weighted average of the level of education of the district's adult

population. This variable has a theoretical range from 0 to 5, capturing 6 levels of education starting from illiteracy to university level. It is then standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The variable is based on the official population census estimates of 2006 by the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.

- Protest: The log of the total number of protests (peaceful and non-peaceful) over the five-year period preceding the election. It is constructed from protest data collected by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

- Registered: The log of the number of registered voters in the district. It is obtained from the official electoral results published by the Higher Electoral Commission of Egypt.

- Female: The percentage of females out of the district's population. The variable is based on the official population census estimates of 2006 by the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.

- Incumbents: This is the number of incumbents running in the district in a given round. This variable is based on records of the members of the parliament published in Rabi'a (2000) and the official lists of candidates published by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior.

- Candidates No.: This number of candidates competing in the district for any given round. The variable is based on data from Masoud (2014) and the official lists of candidates published by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior.

- Runoff: A dummy for the runoff round.

- Round 1: A dummy for the first round.

- Vote-buying: A dummy variable for whether mass vote-buying was reported in the district in either round. This is constructed from reports by the National Campaign for Monitoring the Elections (Abdel Magid, 2005).

- Turnout Rate: The percentage of voters who cast a ballot out of the number of registered voters. The variable is based on data from Masoud (2014) and the official electoral results published by the Higher Electoral Commission of Egypt.

- MB protests: The log of the total number of protests by MB affiliates (peaceful and non-peaceful) over the five-year period preceding the election. It is constructed from protest data collected by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, using manual coding of the events based on their descriptions.

- NDP 1984: The vote share (in percentages) of the NDP's list in the parliamentary election of 1984. The data were obtained from Yasin and Helal (1986).

- MB coalition 1984: The vote share (in percentages) of the MB's electoral coalition's list in the parliamentary election of 1984. The data were obtained from Yasin and Helal (1986).

- Client. Prevalence: A survey-based measure of clientelism, standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, constructed from the sixth wave of the Afrobarometer. It is based on a 4-level question asking "how often voters are bribed in the country's elections".

A.2 Procedures for Collecting the Outcome Variables

The outcome variables are obtained from Abu-Taleb (2006). Since I rely on data from third-party source, it is critical to elaborate on the process of data collection. Abu-Taleb (2006) employs a definition of electoral violence that considers "all actions that involve harming and negatively affecting the electoral process, such as destruction of posters and campaigning material of an electoral contestant, forcefully circumventing a contestant's campaign and threatening their supporters, the employment of criminal actors for intimidation, death threats and violence using white arms, security force's interventions [to obstruct the voting process], sieges of polling stations, obstruction of voters attempting to cast their votes, harassment of judges, among other similar tactics that were used to negatively impact the electoral process" (333).

Reports about the incidents of violence were assembled from top daily and weekly Egyptian newspapers (al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Gomhuria, al-Wafd, al-Masry al-Youm, Nahdet Masr, al-A'sbo'o, al-Dostor, al-'Arabi) and reports by local NGOs that monitored the election (such as: Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, the Egyptian Center for Human Rights, Sawasia Center for Human Rights, the Egyptian Independent Committee for Monitoring the Elections, EACPE, and others).

It is important to note here that these diverse sources differ in their relationship to the regime. For example, al-Ahram is an official newspaper and a state institution funded by the government. Al-Wafd is a partisan newspaper produced by al-Wafd Party. Al-Masry al-Youm and al-Dostor are independent newspapers that did not shy from taking anti-regime positions. These diverse political orientations of

the data sources reduce concerns that reports of violence would be systematically biased against, or in support of, one political group (e.g., the regime) relative to others.

The mechanisms by which the organizations collected reports of violence were also diverse, lessening some potential measurement concerns. Monitors and reporters deployed in electoral districts presented the key source of information about incidents of violence. Unfortunately, we do not have an exact account of where reporters and monitors were deployed, leaving the possibility that some areas were better covered than others. However, three factors could ameliorate this concern. First, reports by some NGOs (see: Abdel Magid (2005)) include incidents from both urban and rural areas, suggesting that monitors were deployed across districts with variant characteristics. Second, national-level newspapers (such as al-Ahram) have a strong presence and offices across Egypt's governorates. Their coverage of the election included news from a diverse set of districts, urban and rural districts in both heavily and sparsely populated regions. Most importantly, incidents reported by newspapers and some organizations (e.g., the National Campaign for Monitoring the Elections) incorporated complaints from victims of violations. The complementarity between these two mechanisms of data collection should further increase our confidence in the data. On one hand, observations by monitors and reporters might bring violations unreported by victims to light. On the other hand, incorporating reports by those negatively affected by violence means that the data do not fully rely on the presence of observers in districts. Thus, even incidents in weakly monitored areas should make it into the dataset.

In addition, as reported by Abu-Taleb (2006), the researcher extracted details about each reported incident (including date, source, district, and description) systemat-

ically. This minimizes the possibility of double-counting certain events, which is a relevant concern when multiple data sources are consulted. Unfortunately, these detailed tables are not available for our analysis, and therefore I rely on the data aggregated from them.

A.3 Descriptions of Electoral Violence

Table 1 provides the distribution of different forms of electoral violence over the phases (P1, P2, P3) and the rounds (R1, R2) of the election, as well as the pre-election period. Some insights can be drawn from this presentation. First, physical violence against candidates (including murder, attempts of murder, threats, and physical attacks on candidates) is relatively rare and tends to occur more in the earlier phases of the election (primarily before the election itself). Similarly, acts that obstruct campaigning, often in the form of destruction of campaigning material, are relatively uncommon. Second, acts of infighting and bullying, often by armed supporters of candidates, represent a quarter of all violence. These acts often aim at terrorizing voters and spreading chaos in particular areas. As shown in the table, they are more concentrated in the earlier phases and rounds of the contest. In contrast, acts of violence and intimidation by police forces (either through sieges of polling stations or negative interventions in favor of certain candidates) gain more momentum in the later phases of the election. Finally, the most prevalent form of violence aims at obstruction of voting in polling stations, which might involve thugs preventing voters from reaching polls, physical attacks on polling stations, harassment of voters casting their ballot...etc. It is, thus, a broader category of disruptive actions around polling stations.

Table 1 – The Distribution of the Forms of Electoral Violence Presented in Percentages By The Phase and Round of the Election

	Murder/ Murder Attempt	Infighting/ Bullying	Physical Attacks on Candidates	Obstructing Campaigning	Police Intervention	Police Sieges	Obstructing Elections in a Polling Station
Pre-election	9	46.3	3	41.8	0	0	
P(1) - R(1)	2.1	46.9	4.7	5.7	6.8	1	32.8
P(1) - R(2)	0	55.6	0	1.6	12.9	4	25.8
P(2) - R(1)	2.2	37.1	3.9	0.8	3.1	9.6	43.3
P(2) - R(2)	0.5	20.9	0.5	0	2.2	23.1	52.9
P(3) - R(1)	0.6	19.6	1.2	0.6	2.3	23.1	52.6
P(3) - R(2)	0.7	5.8	0.2	0	0.2	50.1	42.9
Total	1.19	25.21	1.55	2.08	2.92	22.34	44.71

*Based on data from Abu-Taleb (2006). Murder/murder attempts are targeted towards candidates. Infighting/bullying is often a chaotic form of violence targeted at voters. Police interventions refer to negative interventions in favor of particular candidates, while sieges refer to police sieges of polling stations to obstruct voters from casting their ballots.

A.4 Examples of Electoral Violence from Different Districts

Below, I provide some examples of the different forms of violence that were reported by election observers and cited in Abu-Taleb (2006).

Violence Against Candidates

- In al-Bagour district (Menoufia governorate), an independent candidate survived an assassination attempt with gunfire.
- In Shubra al-Kheima district (Qalyoubia governorate), an independent candidate was attacked with white arms.
- In al-Khalifa district (Cairo), an independent female candidate received threats of acid attacks and death.
- In Ghorbal district (Alexandria governorate), an independent candidate was stabbed and immediately transferred to the hospital in a severe condition.
- In several districts (e.g., Tanta, Zefta, and al-Santa), campaign managers of Muslim Brotherhood candidates were kidnapped or arrested on their way to polling stations on election day,

Violence Against Voters

- In Shobra district (Cairo), supporters of NDP candidates attacked voters, especially women, to only allow supporters of NDP into polling stations.
- In Alexandria (various districts), 30 reports were made describing violence incited by thugs holding white arms to prevent voters from casting their ballots. As per some reports, the thugs were ex-convicts hired by NDP candidates to terrorize opposition voters.

- In Shubrakheet district (al-Beheira governorate), a woman died of suffocation due to tear gas fired by police forces against opposition voters.

- In Snoras district (al-Menoufia governorate), police forces prevented voters from casting their ballots in multiple polling stations, leading judges to resign in 62 polling station. Similar incidents were reported in other districts and governorates.

- In al-Hamoul district (Kafr al-Sheikh governorate), two people died from gunshots due to clashes between voters and police forces preventing them from reaching polling stations. The incident was attributed to the police's use of live ammunition in some districts.

- In several districts in the governorates of al-Sharqia, Daqahlia, Dammietta, and Kafr al-Sheikh, police forces shut down certain polling stations, but allowed only NDP supporters to cast their ballots

- In several districts, security forces collaborated directly with thugs to attack and terrorize voters.

- In several districts, the NDP hired female thugs and ex-convicts to harass female voters supporting the Muslim Brotherhood.

A.5 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables over the Two Rounds

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Electoral Violence	430	5.047	10.891	0	1	127
Voter Violence	430	4.874	10.794	0	1	127
State Violence	430	1.319	5.301	0	0	74
Non-state Violence	430	3.728	6.438	0	1	53
MB Running	430	0.612	0.488	0	1	1
New NDP	430	1.463	0.979	0	1	4
NDP Dissidents	430	0.147	0.373	0	0	2
Urban	430	84.984	9.294	65.439	83.671	99.861
Employment	430	95.786	1.510	91.437	95.866	99.297
Education	430	−0.033	0.979	−1.772	−0.118	3.151
Protest	430	0.137	0.464	0.000	0.000	4.025
Registered	430	11.820	0.409	9.816	11.905	12.782
Female	430	48.772	1.329	37.524	48.806	53.263
Incumbents	430	1.186	0.753	0	1	2
Candidates No.	430	13.828	11.854	2	10	53
Turnout	423	26.253	9.215	3.232	26.065	72.538
NDP 1984	430	71.533	9.159	46.667	72.366	100
MB Coalition 1984	430	16.610	8.788	0.000	15.016	44.403

Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables over the Two Rounds and the Pre-election Period

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Electoral Violence	652	3.429	9.132	0	0	127
Voter Violence	652	3.262	9.048	0	0	127
State Violence	652	0.870	4.349	0	0	74
Non-state Violence	652	2.560	5.488	0	0	53
MB Running	652	0.637	0.481	0	1	1
New NDP	652	1.437	0.898	0	2	4
NDP Dissidents	652	0.178	0.406	0	0	2
Urban	652	85.082	9.340	65.439	83.739	99.861
Employment	652	95.793	1.505	91.437	95.866	99.297
Education	652	−0.000	1.000	−1.775	−0.097	3.218
Protest	652	0.136	0.463	0.000	0.000	4.025
Registered	652	11.819	0.408	9.816	11.905	12.782
Female	652	48.771	1.325	37.524	48.805	53.263
Incumbents	652	1.293	0.736	0	1	2
Candidates No.	652	17.083	11.880	2	17	53
NDP 1984	652	71.502	9.170	46.667	72.366	100.000
MB Coalition 1984	652	16.644	8.789	0.000	15.467	44.403

Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables for the First Round

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Electoral Violence	222	4.752	6.658	0	2	37
Voter Violence	222	4.482	6.427	0	2	37
State Violence	222	0.856	2.060	0	0	15
Non-state Violence	222	3.896	5.253	0	2	25
MB Running	222	0.685	0.466	0	1	1
New NDP	222	1.383	0.720	0	2	2
NDP Dissidents	222	0.239	0.458	0	0	2
Urban	222	85.274	9.447	65.439	83.818	99.861
Employment	222	95.805	1.500	91.437	95.874	99.297
Education	222	−0.000	1.001	−1.772	−0.101	3.151
Protest	222	0.135	0.462	0.000	0.000	4.025
Registered	222	11.818	0.406	9.816	11.902	12.782
Female	222	48.771	1.321	37.524	48.805	53.263
Incumbents	222	1.500	0.657	0	2	2
Candidates No.	222	23.378	9.099	7	22	53
Turnout	222	28.242	9.961	3.232	28.958	72.538
NDP 1984	222	71.533	9.159	46.667	72.366	100
MB Coalition 1984	222	16.610	8.788	0.000	15.016	44.403

Appendix B Results of Moran's Test for Spatial Dependence

Below, I present the p-value of Moran's test for spatial dependence. I first run the test for the first and second rounds separately and aggregated. Here, we note that the null hypothesis is rejected for the first round and the 2-round aggregation. However, when the test is run for districts by the phase of the election, we fail to reject the null of no spatial dependency. Since each phase includes a set of governorates, incorporating governorate fixed effects and clustered standard errors should address the concern that spatial dependence might affect our estimates.

Data	**Moran's Test P-Value**
First Round	0.02
Second Round	0.196
Aggregated Two Rounds	0.021
Phase (1) Governorates	0.204
Phase (2) Governorates	0.358
Phase (3) Governorates	0.279

Appendix C The Relationship between the NDP Dissidents and Violence

In Table 5, I interact the measures for (New NDP) and (NDP Dissidents) for the two electoral rounds, separately. In the first round, competition with NDP dissidents is negatively correlated with violence, regardless of the presence of newly coopted NDP members. In the second round, in accordance with our theoretical expectations, the coefficient on (NDP dissidents) is still significantly negative. It, however, carries the opposite sign where new NDP members compete. This gives credence to the explanation for the sign shift proposed in the main text.

Table 5 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence - Interaction Effects between (NDP Dissidents) and (New NDP)

	(1) First Round	(2) Second Round
New NDP	-0.373^{+}	-0.533*
	(0.200)	(0.242)
NDP Dissidents	-0.291	-1.35*
	(0.626)	(0.653)
New NDP x NDP Dissidents	-0.184	1.56**
	(0.371)	(0.484)
MB Running	0.417	2.05***
	(0.293)	(0.311)
Urban (%)	0.092***	0.090*
	(0.020)	(0.035)
Employment (%)	0.161^{+}	0.085
	(0.091)	(0.244)
Education (sd)	-0.172	-0.399
	(0.148)	(0.265)
Protest (log)	-0.473***	-0.440
	(0.135)	(0.306)
Registered (log)	-0.140	0.235
	(0.373)	(0.784)
Female (%)	0.069	0.008
	(0.181)	(0.225)
Incumbents	-0.039	0.192
	(0.145)	(0.265)
Candidates No.	0.027**	0.159
	(0.010)	(0.224)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix D Alternative Explanations

D.1 Historical Popularity of the MB

I test whether our measurement of ideological opposition (MB Running) is simply the reflection of the historical popularity of the MB in a district. If true, then the interpretation of this variable is not solely tied to the particularities of the 2005 election and the political calculus of cooptation, but captures variation in the historical legacies of political opposition across districts.

I test this alternative explanation using electoral results from the parliamentary election of 1984. This election was held with a relative degree of openness, enabling us to assess the popularity of the MB more reliably with lesser concerns over the manipulation of electoral results. It came after a set of changes to the electoral system that introduced party lists, which prevented the participation of independent candidates unless they were part of some political coalition or under party banners. The fact that the NDP's coalition won only about 73 percent of the vote is an indicator of the degree of competitiveness in this election, unlike the subsequent competitions.

The MB did not run under its banner because it did not have its own political party. It joined al-Wafd party in a coalition, sponsoring a joint list. Nevertheless, the political realities of the 1970s and 1980s imply that the MB had more support than its partner, al-Wafd, especially after al-Sadat's Islamist incorporation policies in the 1970s that enabled the MB to rebuild its support base and infiltrate public life at a wider scale (Sallam, 2022). Though al-Wafd was a historically established party rooted in Egypt's pre-independence past, it was struggling to reinvent itself in a changing political environment. Thus, the electoral gains of this coalition are

often regarded as a signal of the MB's strength and popularity (Blaydes, 2010).

I employ the vote share of the MB coalition in 1984 as a measurement of the movement's historical support. Note that there is a degree of mismatch in electoral districts between the two elections, so I match the 2005 districts to where they were located in 1984. I also include a measurement of the NDP vote share as an additional control. These electoral results were obtained from Yasin and Helal (1986).

In Table 6, I use linear probability models to regress (MB Running) on the demographic controls and the historical support of the MB without election-specific controls (model 1), then with election-specific controls (model 2), for the first round of the election. We first see a negative correlation between MB support in 1984 and MB participation in 2005, which vanishes with the inclusion of political controls.[35] Generally, this rules out that the MB ran in 2005 in places where it had more historical political support.

In models (3) and (4), I use an additional variable of MB support, the number of protests (logged) by the MB, manually coded from ACLED dataset over the period (2000-2005). The MB's past mobilization could be another manifestation of its popularity and capacity, but we still see no significant correlation with the outcome.

As an additional check, I replicate Table 1 after including the 1984 electoral measures in Table 7, and report no change in our conclusions.[36] In Figure 1, I confirm this conclusion using different operationalizations of the outcome.

[35]Note that there is a risk of post-treatment bias in the models with political controls and historical measures.

[36]Even after dropping the political measures from 2005, we see no correlation between the 1984 measures and violence

Altogether, this suggests that our measurement of ideological opposition (MB Running) is tied to the specifics of the 2005 election, and cannot be fully explained by the historical legacies of political opposition.

Table 6 – Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Predictors of (MB Running) in the First Round - Controlling for the 1984 Electoral Results and Past MB Protests

	(1) Without Election Controls	(2) With Election Controls	(3) Without Election Controls	(4) With Election Controls
Urban (%)	0.002	-0.003	0.002	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Employment (%)	-0.019	-0.015	-0.018	-0.014
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Education (sd)	0.041	0.071	0.043	0.075
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.051)
Protest (log)	-0.001	-0.006		
	(0.056)	(0.058)		
Registered (log)	0.320***	0.287***	0.319***	0.282**
	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Female (%)	-0.028	-0.017	-0.028	-0.017
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
NDP 1984 (%)	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
MB Coalition 1984 (%)	-0.021*	-0.016	-0.021*	-0.016
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)
New NDP		0.133**		0.133**
		(0.041)		(0.040)
NDP Dissidents		-0.048		-0.047
		(0.067)		(0.067)
Incumbents		0.073		0.074
		(0.044)		(0.044)
Candidates No.		0.008*		0.008*
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Non-MB Protests (log)			-0.020	-0.005
			(0.079)	(0.068)
MB Protests (log)			-0.007	-0.046
			(0.224)	(0.196)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round. Models (1) and (3) exclude political controls related to the 2005 election. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence - Replicating Table 1 Controlling for the 1984 Electoral Results

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) First Round	(3) Second Round	(4) Pre-Election and Two Rounds
New NDP	-0.423***	-0.414*	-0.477*	-0.355**
	(0.117)	(0.177)	(0.235)	(0.113)
MB Running	1.15***	0.397	2.20***	1.04***
	(0.229)	(0.297)	(0.310)	(0.240)
NDP Dissidents	-0.351	-0.610**	0.574	-0.356
	(0.252)	(0.223)	(0.545)	(0.238)
Employment (%)	0.126	0.159+	0.117	0.140
	(0.120)	(0.086)	(0.247)	(0.118)
Education (sd)	-0.219	-0.222	-0.316	-0.094
	(0.176)	(0.157)	(0.245)	(0.179)
Urban (%)	0.077***	0.097***	0.087*	0.073***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.022)
Protest (log)	-0.381**	-0.441**	-0.354	-0.408**
	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.307)	(0.128)
MB Coalition 1984 (%)	-0.018	-0.023	0.049	-0.005
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.027)
NDP 1984 (%)	-0.008	0.003	0.004	0.003
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.031)
Registered (log)	-0.131	-0.129	0.037	-0.040
	(0.515)	(0.372)	(0.771)	(0.515)
Female (%)	-0.019	0.081	-0.014	0.073
	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.258)	(0.167)
Incumbents	0.093	-0.054	0.185	0.070
	(0.164)	(0.144)	(0.258)	(0.152)
Candidates No.	0.022+	0.026*	0.123	0.019
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.229)	(0.012)
Runoff	0.466			3.11***
	(0.372)			(0.374)
Round (1)				2.71***
				(0.246)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 1 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence towards Voters, by State Actors, and by Non-State Actors - Controlling for the 1984 Electoral Results



(a) Violence against Voters



(b) Violence by State Actors



(c) Violence by Non-State Actors

All models include governorate fixed effects and the same set of controls in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered for governorates. Confidence intervals are estimated at the 95 percent level. The model for the three rounds covers the first round, runoff, and the pre-election period.

D.2 Historical Popularity of the NDP

I next examine the relationship between the historical popularity of the NDP and (a) the nomination of new NDP candidates and, (b) the participation of NDP dissidents. In Table 8, I employ OLS analysis to regress the number of (NDP Dissidents) and (New NDP) candidates on the historical support of the NDP, measured as its vote share in the 1984 parliamentary election. The models are estimated with and without political controls from the 2005 election.

Although the historical support of the NDP does not predict fielding new candidates, it predicts the participation of dissidents. This might be a possible indication of a clientelistic culture in these districts where NDP dissidents run. We also see that these two outcomes are negatively correlated with education and employment. Thus, they may not only capture the cooptation capacity of elites, but also the prevalence of clientelism as a feasible electoral strategy in line with our second hypothesis.

Having said that, we still cannot reduce their full explanation to clientelistic culture. As we see in Table 1 and Table 7, their correlation with violence persists even after we control for these demographic or historical political characteristics of districts related to their indication of clientelism. It also persists after we directly control for vote-buying in Table 2. Thus, while we cannot rule out clientelistic culture as a partial interpretation, it is not the full explanation. Nevertheless, both interpretations align with our general argument on the role of cooptation potential.

Table 8 – OLS Regression Estimates of the Predictors of The Number of NDP Dissidents and New NDP Members Running in the First Round - Controlling for the 1984 Results

	(1) NDP Dissidents	(2) NDP Dissidents	(3) New NDP	(4) New NDP
Urban (%)	0.012	0.005	0.012	0.008
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Employment (%)	-0.004	-0.005	-0.075^{+}	-0.061^{+}
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.032)
Education (sd)	-0.087^{+}	-0.055	-0.233*	-0.217**
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.094)	(0.077)
Protest (log)	0.092^{+}	0.071	-0.028	-0.025
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.089)	(0.094)
Registered (log)	-0.176^{+}	-0.113	-0.040	-0.379*
	(0.099)	(0.079)	(0.203)	(0.159)
Female (%)	0.050	0.059	0.008	0.008
	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.048)
NDP 1984 (%)	0.020*	0.019*	0.004	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.024)	(0.015)
MB Coalition 1984 (%)	-0.012	-0.005	-0.014	-0.013
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.017)
New NDP		0.118*		
		(0.049)		
MB Running		-0.055		0.343**
		(0.077)		(0.116)
Incumbents		0.241***		-0.505***
		(0.053)		(0.059)
Candidates No.		0.007*		0.012
		(0.003)		(0.007)
NDP Dissidents				0.264**
				(0.094)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round. Models (1) and (3) exclude political controls related to the 2005 election. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

D.3 Legacies of Repression

We lack a direct historical measure of state repression at the district level. However, if we expect our results to be driven by districts with deeper legacies of regime repression and where the regime had often granted security forces impunity to use violence, we should expect our results to change once we drop such districts. During the regime's fierce campaign against Islamist militants in the 1980s and 1990s, Upper Egypt was the hot spot of the battle between the regime and Islamists. Violent militants resorted to southern Egyptian governorates to hide from security forces and launch surprising and bloody attacks on them. In return, security forces acted with a degree of impunity to find and kill Islamist terrorists. Such legacy might, thus, have persisted in how security forces use and tolerate violence, potentially extending to electoral contests.

In Table 9, I drop districts in Upper Egypt where such legacies are stronger. However, this test still does not alter our main results and conclusions.

Table 9 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence - Dropping Districts in Upper Egypt

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) First Round	(3) Second Round	(4) Pre-Election and Two Rounds
New NDP	-0.437**	-0.426*	-0.312	-0.387**
	(0.141)	(0.183)	(0.264)	(0.142)
MB Running	1.28***	0.398	2.32***	1.19***
	(0.326)	(0.424)	(0.427)	(0.316)
NDP Dissidents	-0.432	-0.634**	0.617	-0.470+
	(0.297)	(0.243)	(0.544)	(0.253)
Employment (%)	0.190	0.145+	0.304	0.212
	(0.130)	(0.081)	(0.242)	(0.129)
Education (sd)	-0.156	-0.175	-0.217	-0.083
	(0.153)	(0.138)	(0.292)	(0.154)
Urban (%)	0.068**	0.101***	0.077*	0.071**
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.038)	(0.024)
Protest (log)	-0.557***	-0.477***	-0.688	-0.560***
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.420)	(0.145)
Registered (log)	-0.217	-0.061	0.049	-0.230
	(0.541)	(0.387)	(0.678)	(0.568)
Female (%)	0.140	0.167	0.289**	0.199
	(0.153)	(0.198)	(0.111)	(0.151)
Incumbents	0.105	0.009	0.176	0.077
	(0.199)	(0.153)	(0.319)	(0.189)
Candidates No.	0.030**	0.029**	-0.012	0.025*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.288)	(0.012)
Runoff	0.770+			3.31***
	(0.418)			(0.377)
Round (1)				2.68***
				(0.295)

Note: Total number of districts is 166 in the first round and 152 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix E Robustness to Measurement

E.1 Urban Bias in Outcome Measurement

Urban bias is a potential concern with event data, if urban areas tend to receive more coverage than rural ones. Although I cannot directly evaluate this bias, I examine the extent to which this potential bias might be driving our results. Thus, I restrict the analysis to only highly urban districts where the probability that monitors exist (and events reported) should be comparable. In Figure 2, I replicate the analysis with various operationalizations of the outcome (i.e., total violence, violence against voters, violence by state actors, and violence by non-state actors) and using different thresholds of urbanization levels (75%, 80%, 90%). Across all models, our conclusions remain unchanged.

Figure 2 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence and Its Subcategories (towards Voters, by State Actors, and by Non-State Actors): Restricting Sample by Urbanization Level



(a) Total Violence



(b) Violence Against Voters



(c) Violence by State Actors



(d) Violence by Non-State Actors

All models include governorate fixed effects and the same set of controls in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered for governorates. Confidence intervals are estimated at the 95 percent level. The model for the three rounds covers the first round, runoff, and the pre-election period.

E.2 The Relationship between Violence Against Candidates and Voters

This section examines the relationship between violence against candidates and voters. It is important to note that violence against candidates represents only 3 percent of the total violence. This requires a cautious read of the following results.

In Table 10, I investigate this correlation by introducing violence against candidates as an independent variable and replicating the analysis in Table 1. Across all models, the relationship of interest is statistically significant and positive, suggesting that violence against voters increases in districts where candidates are also subject to violence. Table 11 confirms this same pattern using a binary indicator for candidate violence.

In Table 12, I further investigate the conditions underpinning this relationship. I interact the measure for violence against candidates with the independent variables of theoretical interest. The key finding here is that the relationship is weaker in urban districts and where Muslim Brotherhood candidates run. Thus, the complementarity between these two strategies weakens in districts where conditions conducive to more violence (particularly against voters) are more prevalent.

Having said that, we should be careful in drawing conclusions on violence against candidates from our data. As previously noted, the rarity of violence against candidates, especially relative to that targeting voters, imposes constraints on the statistical analyses we can implement and the robustness of inferences drawn from them. More importantly, the qualitative accounts of violence against candidates suggest a degree of randomness in many of such events. In some accounts, personal dis-

putes among candidates fuel this violence, which might not be strongly related to systematic political conditions. In fact, this is suggested by the analysis presented in Table 13, where I consider violence against candidates as an outcome. In column (1), I measure it as a count variable and use a negative binomial regression for estimation. In column (2), I define it as a dummy variable and use a linear probability model. Yet, the theoretically relevant variables (with the exception of protest in the first model) exhibit no significant correlations with the outcomes.

Table 10 – Negative Binomial Regression of the Relationship between Violence Against Candidates (Predictor) and Violence Against Voters (Outcome)

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) First Round	(3) Second Round	(4) Pre-Election and Two Rounds
Candidate Violence	0.615*	0.338*	1.13**	0.745***
	(0.262)	(0.137)	(0.418)	(0.212)
New NDP	-0.433***	-0.404**	-0.503+	-0.372**
	(0.125)	(0.147)	(0.271)	(0.119)
NDP Dissidents	-0.118	-0.504**	0.558	-0.112
	(0.274)	(0.191)	(0.517)	(0.223)
MB Running	1.33***	0.537*	2.05***	1.29***
	(0.196)	(0.211)	(0.318)	(0.179)
Urban (%)	0.070***	0.098***	0.076*	0.066**
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.020)
Employment (%)	0.085	0.153+	0.106	0.062
	(0.110)	(0.080)	(0.235)	(0.103)
Education (sd)	-0.202	-0.193	-0.293	-0.174
	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.231)	(0.131)
Protest (log)	-0.335*	-0.400*	-0.351	-0.350*
	(0.134)	(0.158)	(0.285)	(0.139)
Registered (log)	0.126	0.202	0.349	0.203
	(0.515)	(0.386)	(0.820)	(0.514)
Female (%)	-0.014	0.086	-0.089	0.035
	(0.190)	(0.203)	(0.195)	(0.188)
Incumbents	0.014	-0.091	0.073	-0.024
	(0.154)	(0.140)	(0.260)	(0.139)
Candidates No.	0.016	0.019*	0.205	0.013
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.224)	(0.012)
Runoff	0.541			3.92***
	(0.358)			(0.352)
Round (1)				3.46***
				(0.255)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 11 – Negative Binomial Regression of the Relationship between a Binary Indicator of Violence Against Candidates (Predictor) and Violence Against Voters (Outcome)

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) First Round	(3) Second Round	(4) Pre-Election and Two Rounds
Candidate Violence (binary)	0.933***	0.723**	1.13**	1.11***
	(0.257)	(0.239)	(0.418)	(0.195)
New NDP	-0.424***	-0.380*	-0.503+	-0.369**
	(0.123)	(0.151)	(0.271)	(0.117)
NDP Dissidents	-0.113	-0.440*	0.558	-0.118
	(0.274)	(0.194)	(0.517)	(0.240)
MB Running	1.28***	0.572*	2.05***	1.22***
	(0.205)	(0.227)	(0.318)	(0.195)
Urban (%)	0.067**	0.096***	0.076*	0.063**
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.021)
Employment (%)	0.097	0.162+	0.106	0.074
	(0.115)	(0.083)	(0.235)	(0.107)
Education (sd)	-0.180	-0.175	-0.293	-0.156
	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.231)	(0.137)
Protest (log)	-0.363*	-0.470*	-0.351	-0.373*
	(0.152)	(0.183)	(0.285)	(0.157)
Registered (log)	0.086	-0.089	0.349	0.169
	(0.516)	(0.309)	(0.820)	(0.517)
Female (%)	-0.029	0.063	-0.089	0.018
	(0.188)	(0.201)	(0.195)	(0.186)
Incumbents	0.016	-0.087	0.073	-0.018
	(0.153)	(0.137)	(0.260)	(0.140)
Candidates No.	0.017	0.022*	0.205	0.014
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.224)	(0.013)
Runoff	0.530			3.97***
	(0.377)			(0.358)
Round (1)				3.51***
				(0.251)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 12 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Violence Against Candidates (Predictor) and Violence Against Voters (Outcome) for the Two Rounds - Interaction Effects

Outcome: Violence Against Voters	
Candidate Violence	3.26
	(6.90)
New NDP	-0.363**
	(0.130)
NDP Dissidents	-0.018
	(0.279)
MB Running	1.71***
	(0.254)
Urban (%)	0.075***
	(0.019)
Employment (%)	0.044
	(0.104)
Education (sd)	-0.264+
	(0.142)
Protest (log)	-0.291+
	(0.163)
Registered (log)	-0.040
	(0.493)
Female (%)	0.007
	(0.183)
Incumbents	-0.027
	(0.152)
Candidates No.	0.024+
	(0.013)
Runoff	0.761*
	(0.374)
Candidate Violence*New NDP	-0.158
	(0.141)
Candidate Violence*NDP Dissidents	0.081
	(0.150)
Candidate Violence*MB Running	-0.949***
	(0.239)
Candidate Violence*Urban (%)	-0.022*
	(0.009)
Candidate Violence*Employment (%)	0.001
	(0.074)
Candidate Violence*Education (sd)	0.037
	(0.123)
Candidate Violence*Protest (log)	0.082
	(0.305)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 13 – Predictors of Violence Against Candidates using Negative Binomial Regression (Count Outcome) and Linear Probability Model (Binary Outcome)

	(1) Candidate Violence (Count-Neg. Binomial)	(2) Candidate Violence (Binary - LPM)
New NDP	-0.060	-0.014
	(0.172)	(0.011)
NDP Dissidents	-0.559	-0.064
	(0.441)	(0.040)
MB Running	0.016	0.031
	(0.432)	(0.035)
Urban (%)	0.041	0.004
	(0.031)	(0.004)
Employment (%)	0.181	0.009
	(0.197)	(0.014)
Education (sd)	-0.111	-0.008
	(0.227)	(0.041)
Protest (log)	-0.347*	-0.020
	(0.145)	(0.025)
Registered (log)	-1.03^{+}	-0.019
	(0.567)	(0.054)
Female (%)	0.182	0.023*
	(0.177)	(0.011)
Incumbents	0.392	0.032
	(0.297)	(0.024)
Candidates No.	0.047*	0.006
	(0.023)	(0.004)
Runoff	-0.113	0.024
	(0.709)	(0.084)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E.3 The Relationship between the MB and Violence

In Table 14, I interact the indicator (MB Running) with the variables (New NDP) and (NDP Dissidents). The interaction terms indicate that the MB's electoral pres-

ence is not always associated with more violence, but that the positive correlation between the MB's presence and violence is dependent on its competition with the regime's new candidates. In fact, where the MB faces the more politically experienced NDP dissidents, violence decreases.

Table 14 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence - Interaction Effects

Outcome: Total Violence	
New NDP	-0.666***
	(0.173)
NDP Dissidents	0.300
	(0.378)
MB Running	0.664
	(0.424)
MB Running*New NDP	0.452^{+}
	(0.231)
MB Running*NDP Dissidents	-0.884^{+}
	(0.494)
Urban (%)	0.065**
	(0.023)
Employment (%)	0.102
	(0.115)
Education (sd)	-0.137
	(0.185)
Protest (log)	-0.307**
	(0.118)
Registered (log)	-0.041
	(0.523)
Female (%)	-0.097
	(0.182)
Incumbents	0.085
	(0.150)
Candidates No.	0.006
	(0.009)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix F The Relationship between Clientelism and Electoral Violence

F.1 Electoral Violence and The Price of the Vote

Though estimating the feasibility and cost of clientelistic strategies is a major empirical challenge, the report by the National Campaign for Monitoring the Elections provides information about the highest price of the vote observed by monitors in 21 districts. We should expect electoral violence to rise in contexts where votes are more expensive. Figure 3 plots the number of electoral violence actions (summed over the two rounds) by the maximum reported price of the vote. Although this analysis is descriptive and only suggestive given the small sample size, it still adds to the plausibility of the positive association between electoral violence and the cost of clientelism.

Figure 3 – The Relationship between Electoral Violence and the Price of the Vote



Note: Electoral violence is the total number of actions related to electoral violence reported in the district. The price of the vote is the maximum reported price of the vote in the district in 2005 Egyptian pounds.

F.2 Clientelism and Electoral Violence: Turnout Patterns

As an alternative approach to understanding the link between clientelism and electoral violence, I consider turnout as a proxy for clientelism. This non-conventional strategy fits the Egyptian case. Voters' interest in Mubarak's elections was relatively low given their autocratic nature. As scholars of Mubarak's Egypt point out (Blaydes, 2010), the regime and independent candidates depended on their clientelistic machine to drive voters to the polls. Although the Muslim Brotherhood also relied on its provision of services to attract voters, its supporters tend to be more ideological. The MB's strategy capitalized on grassroots organizational structures that offer services more regularly and build support over the long run, rather than heavily depending on vote-buying on election day (Brooke, 2019, Masoud, 2014). Thus, controlling for the MB's electoral presence, turnout should proxy for clientelistic mobilization in favor of the regime.

Given that, we should see that the same demographic factors theoretically associated with clientelism drive turnout. We should also expect these factors to differ from those we found predicting violence. Accordingly, I regress the turnout rate (measured as the percentage of registered voters who cast their ballot) on the same set of controls included in Table 1 using OLS regression.[37] The most notable finding is the significant negative correlation between urbanization and turnout. As I previously argued, vote-buying and block-voting are more common in closely-knit rural constituencies. Hence, clientelism precedes violence in rural areas, while urban constituents face more electoral violence. Areas with worse employment conditions are also easier to mobilize, in line with the literature on clientelism. These two key

[37]The only exception is that we exclude the size of the voting population, as it is correlated with the turnout rate by definition.

findings do not change in model (2), when our main measure of electoral violence (logged) is included. In sum, these patterns indicate that districts that are successfully mobilized to the polls differ from those suffering electoral violence (even after we account for the correlation between violence and turnout), which adds to the plausibility of our claim that violent electoral strategies are a response to failed cooptation attempts through clientelistic means.

Table 15 – OLS Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Turnout

	(1)	(2)
Urban (%)	-0.402***	-0.399***
	(0.079)	(0.081)
Employment (%)	-1.42**	-1.41**
	(0.423)	(0.425)
Education (sd)	-0.767	-0.779
	(0.903)	(0.892)
New NDP	0.182	0.167
	(0.313)	(0.297)
NDP Dissidents	0.770	0.753
	(1.14)	(1.12)
MB Running	0.398	0.447
	(0.883)	(0.879)
Protest (log)	-1.05^{+}	-1.06^{+}
	(0.597)	(0.589)
Female (%)	-0.629	-0.627
	(0.456)	(0.457)
Runoff	-1.42	-1.40
	(1.58)	(1.60)
Incumbents	1.16**	1.16**
	(0.365)	(0.366)
Candidates No.	0.121*	0.122*
	(0.056)	(0.057)
Violence (log)		-0.064
		(0.375)

Note: Total number of districts is 423 for the two rounds, since turnout rates were not officially reported in 7 districts. The models include fixed effects for governorates. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

F.3 Clientelism and Electoral Violence: Using Survey-Based Measure of Clientelism

Another means to investigate the relationship between clientelism and violence is to construct measures of clientelism from survey data. In our case, there were no surveys conducted with relevant questions before 2005. The only survey available was conducted in 2015 as part of the sixth wave of the Afrobarometer. It asks respondents, "how often voters are bribed in the country's elections" (4-level scale).

Although the mass uprisings of 2011 changed the political landscape in Egypt, the clientelistic politics prevalent in Mubarak's era gradually made a return after 2013 with the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood and the comeback of politicians with former NDP ties. Perhaps this might suggest a continuity in clientelistic practices from Mubarak's era to post-2013 politics, with such political elites and dynasties leveraging their local networks for voters' mobilization. To explore this, I construct a measure of the prevalence of clientelism from the aforementioned question; a district-level average standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Then, I regress it on the measure of mass vote-buying from the 2005 election, along with the predictors of clientelism. Note that the survey covers only 62 percent of the electoral districts, significantly reducing our sample size and statistical precision.

Table 16 indicates that the prevalence of clientelism in 2015 is positively correlated with reported mass vote-buying in 2005. This suggests a continuity in clientelistic practices over the years. Albeit imprecisely estimated, we also find the prevalence of clientelism to be lower in more urban districts, bolstering its plausibility as an indicator of the ineffectiveness of clientelism.

Table 16 – OLS Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Prevalence of Clientelism (Survey-Based Measure)

	(1)	(2)
Vote-buying	0.686^{+}	0.614^{+}
	(0.352)	(0.336)
Urban (%)		-0.030
		(0.029)
Employment (%)		0.032
		(0.070)
Education (sd)		0.375
		(0.255)

Note: The outcome (prevalence of clientelism) is measured in standard deviations. The total number of districts is 136. The models include fixed effects for governorates. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Assuming the stability and continuity of clientelistic practices over time, we might use this survey-based measure of clientelism as an alternative predictor of intimidation. In columns (1)-(3) of Table 17, I replicate the analysis in column (1) of Table 1 with only the clientelism prevalence as a predictor (model 1), then adding political controls (model 2), and finally adding demographic controls (model 3). In models (4)-(6), the analysis is conducted with violence aggregated over the two rounds. Across all models, the clientelism variable is negatively correlated with the outcome, but noisily due to the considerable drop in sample size. Obviously, this analysis should be read with caution given the aforementioned issues. Nevertheless, at the minimal level, it still doesn't provide evidence for the opposite possibility that clientelism and violence are targeted towards similar districts.

Table 17 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Prevalence of Clientelism (Survey-Based) and Total Intimidation (Outcome) - Over the Two Separate Rounds and Aggregated

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Two Rounds	Two Rounds	Two Rounds	Aggregated	Aggregated	Aggregated
Client. Prevalence	-0.161	-0.049	-0.068	-0.185	-0.093	-0.096
	(0.115)	(0.137)	(0.143)	(0.124)	(0.159)	(0.155)
New NDP		-0.408***	-0.385**		-0.400*	-0.399*
		(0.114)	(0.122)		(0.189)	(0.197)
NDP Dissidents		-0.883**	-0.970**		-1.01	-1.09
		(0.307)	(0.341)		(0.627)	(0.689)
MB Running		0.912**	0.922**		0.630*	0.606*
		(0.310)	(0.318)		(0.264)	(0.277)
Protest (log)		-0.176	-0.495*		-0.106	-0.239
		(0.225)	(0.224)		(0.235)	(0.269)
Registered (log)		-0.857	-0.701		-0.575	-0.493
		(1.04)	(1.05)		(0.868)	(0.859)
Female (%)		-0.097	0.005			
		(0.158)	(0.178)			
Incumbents		0.135	0.128		0.142	0.158
		(0.210)	(0.215)		(0.321)	(0.301)
Candidates No.		0.045**	0.037*		0.084**	0.078*
		(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.031)	(0.034)
Runoff		0.977*	0.828+			
		(0.428)	(0.429)			
Employment (%)			0.047			-0.066
			(0.141)			(0.137)
Education (sd)			0.128			0.036
			(0.257)			(0.230)
Urban (%)			0.033			0.015
			(0.033)			(0.028)
Female					-0.062	-0.003
					(0.142)	(0.155)

Note: Total number of districts is 262 in models (1)-(3) and 136 in (4)-(6). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Altogether, the analyses of vote prices, turnout, and reported prevalence of clientelism provide additional support to hypothesis (2), suggesting that clientelistic and violent electoral strategies are substitutes.

Appendix G Replication of Table 1 using Different Model Specifications

G.1 Replication of Table 1 using OLS Regressions

Table 18 – OLS Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence (log)

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) First Round	(3) Second Round	(4) Pre-Election and Two Rounds
New NDP	-0.239***	-0.194*	-0.193*	-0.170***
	(0.048)	(0.091)	(0.081)	(0.041)
NDP Dissidents	-0.231+	-0.378*	0.475	-0.139
	(0.118)	(0.148)	(0.315)	(0.097)
MB Running	0.704***	0.322+	0.983***	0.500***
	(0.133)	(0.160)	(0.201)	(0.105)
Urban (%)	0.043***	0.056***	0.034+	0.033***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Employment (%)	0.072	0.119+	0.057	0.064
	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.120)	(0.041)
Education (sd)	-0.160+	-0.182	-0.136	-0.082
	(0.093)	(0.113)	(0.130)	(0.070)
Protest (log)	-0.148*	-0.188*	-0.079	-0.117*
	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.115)	(0.050)
Registered (log)	0.045	0.208	-0.007	0.003
	(0.264)	(0.250)	(0.399)	(0.206)
Female (%)	0.016	0.049	0.016	0.037
	(0.091)	(0.118)	(0.088)	(0.068)
Incumbents	0.014	-0.024	0.071	-0.011
	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.108)	(0.069)
Candidates No.	0.022**	0.021*	0.050	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.117)	(0.005)
Runoff	0.294			1.03***
	(0.214)			(0.184)
Round (1)				1.05***
				(0.122)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. Note that the outcome here is the log of the total number of actions of electoral violence. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

G.2 Replication of Table 1 using Poisson Regressions

Table 19 – Poisson Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) First Round	(3) Second Round	(4) Pre-Election and Two Rounds
New NDP	-0.369*	-0.315*	-0.251	-0.357*
	(0.158)	(0.151)	(0.193)	(0.158)
NDP Dissidents	-0.087	-0.349	0.680*	-0.093
	(0.257)	(0.243)	(0.336)	(0.251)
MB Running	1.30***	0.329	2.30***	1.26***
	(0.275)	(0.374)	(0.424)	(0.268)
Urban (%)	0.053*	0.076***	0.028	0.055*
	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.025)
Employment (%)	0.144	0.104	0.170	0.151
	(0.114)	(0.086)	(0.194)	(0.115)
Education (sd)	-0.267	-0.232	-0.279	-0.245
	(0.176)	(0.154)	(0.284)	(0.171)
Protest (log)	-0.299*	-0.391**	-0.199	-0.310*
	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.235)	(0.123)
Registered (log)	0.272	0.088	0.547	0.256
	(0.387)	(0.327)	(0.515)	(0.394)
Female (%)	-0.146	-0.013	-0.397	-0.110
	(0.228)	(0.208)	(0.309)	(0.222)
Incumbents	-0.041	-0.103	0.228	-0.041
	(0.170)	(0.158)	(0.264)	(0.165)
Candidates No.	0.017	0.024**	-0.236	0.016
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.236)	(0.011)
Runoff	0.740*			3.47***
	(0.350)			(0.390)
Round (1)				2.77***
				(0.244)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

G.3 Replication of Table 1 after Removing Governorate Fixed Effects

Table 20 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence - Without Governorate FEs

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) First Round	(3) Second Round	(4) Pre-Election and Two Rounds
New NDP	-0.202*	-0.167	-0.159	-0.188*
	(0.089)	(0.160)	(0.140)	(0.085)
NDP Dissidents	-0.093	-0.380	0.599	-0.055
	(0.236)	(0.233)	(0.631)	(0.204)
MB Running	1.24***	0.280	2.43***	1.11***
	(0.184)	(0.221)	(0.318)	(0.172)
Urban (%)	0.035*	0.022	0.081**	0.034*
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.014)
Employment (%)	-0.006	-0.081	0.002	0.012
	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.115)	(0.056)
Education (sd)	-0.128	0.039	-0.455	-0.064
	(0.163)	(0.184)	(0.289)	(0.144)
Protest (log)	-0.322	-0.293	-0.394	-0.356+
	(0.207)	(0.223)	(0.387)	(0.188)
Registered (log)	0.671**	0.409	0.782+	0.610**
	(0.255)	(0.304)	(0.465)	(0.233)
Female (%)	0.059	0.111	0.065	0.082
	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.156)	(0.066)
Incumbents	-0.059	-0.121	0.271	-0.043
	(0.127)	(0.162)	(0.223)	(0.115)
Candidates No.	0.030*	0.045***	-0.211	0.023*
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.208)	(0.011)
Runoff	0.569+			3.29***
	(0.323)			(0.310)
Round (1)				2.82***
				(0.204)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

G.4 Replication of Table 1 after Adding (Governorate x Round) Fixed Effects

Table 21 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence - (Governorate x Round) FEs

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) Three Rounds
New NDP	-0.332*	-0.296*
	(0.131)	(0.122)
NDP Dissidents	-0.140	-0.087
	(0.313)	(0.224)
MB Running	1.36***	1.18***
	(0.248)	(0.267)
Urban (%)	0.047+	0.043*
	(0.025)	(0.021)
Employment (%)	-0.017	0.018
	(0.112)	(0.086)
Education (sd)	-0.243	-0.145
	(0.178)	(0.148)
Protest (log)	-0.239+	-0.286*
	(0.134)	(0.117)
Registered (log)	0.474	0.389
	(0.410)	(0.306)
Female (%)	-0.028	0.020
	(0.136)	(0.102)
Incumbents	0.062	0.064
	(0.137)	(0.114)
Candidates No.	0.028+	0.023
	(0.015)	(0.014)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

G.5 Replication of Table 1 after Removing Outliers

Table 22 – Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Predictors of Electoral Violence - Outliers Removed

	(1) Two Rounds	(2) First Round	(3) Second Round	(4) Pre-Election and Two Rounds
New NDP	-0.393***	-0.401*	-0.334+	-0.325***
	(0.105)	(0.175)	(0.187)	(0.098)
NDP Dissidents	-0.376	-0.573*	0.254	-0.366
	(0.242)	(0.232)	(0.516)	(0.230)
MB Running	1.07***	0.415	1.72***	0.961***
	(0.230)	(0.291)	(0.276)	(0.235)
Urban (%)	0.063**	0.093***	0.066*	0.061**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Employment (%)	0.062	0.163+	-0.087	0.074
	(0.109)	(0.090)	(0.224)	(0.106)
Education (sd)	-0.142	-0.176	-0.171	-0.050
	(0.154)	(0.149)	(0.239)	(0.155)
Protest (log)	-0.350**	-0.455**	-0.293	-0.375**
	(0.121)	(0.144)	(0.267)	(0.124)
Registered (log)	-0.465	-0.141	-0.619	-0.390
	(0.436)	(0.369)	(0.694)	(0.452)
Female (%)	0.004	0.082	0.075	0.088
	(0.176)	(0.184)	(0.208)	(0.156)
Incumbents	0.096	-0.046	0.070	0.076
	(0.156)	(0.144)	(0.227)	(0.150)
Candidates No.	0.031**	0.028**	0.276*	0.028*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.136)	(0.011)
Runoff	0.495			3.12***
	(0.354)			(0.362)
Round (1)				2.73***
				(0.240)

Note: Total number of districts is 222 in the first round and 208 in the runoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered for governorates. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix H Sensitivity to Unobserved Confounders

Though our empirical analysis is limited to determining the factors associated with electoral violence rather than making causal claims about their role, it remains important to establish the robustness of our estimates to potential unobserved confounders. Following Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), I conduct a sensitivity analysis to understand how strong unobserved confounders would need to be to substantively alter our conclusions. Since the described procedure is better suited for OLS models, I implement the analysis using the estimates from the replication of Table 1 using OLS analysis, presented in Appendix G.1. For simplicity, I will also focus on our main model (1), which incorporates the two electoral rounds and constitutes the core of our discussion.

Table 23 – Sensitivity Statistics of the Main Explanatory Variables Following Cinelli and Hazlett (2020)

Outcome: *Total Acts of Electoral Violence (Log)*						
Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y\sim D\|\mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	c
MB Running	0.704	0.131	5.354	6.8%	23.6%	15.7%
New NDP	-0.239	0.047	-5.106	6.2%	22.7%	14.6%
NDP Dissidents	-0.231	0.116	-1.984	1%	9.5%	0.1%
Urban	0.043	0.009	4.492	4.9%	20.3%	12%
Protest	-0.148	0.067	-2.222	1.2%	10.6%	1.3%

Table 23 provides sensitivity statistics for the main variables of theoretical interest. The robustness value ($RV_{q=1}$) refers to the proportion of the residual variance in the outcome and the independent variable of interest that the unobserved confounder should explain to overturn or fully explain the estimated correlation. Across all main variables, this value is reasonably high, suggesting the robustness of our con-

clusions on the direction and magnitude of the relationships of interest. However, $RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.05}$, which similarly assesses the strength of the confounder that could diminish the variable's statistical significance, indicates that the coefficients on (NDP Dissidents) and (Protest) are more vulnerable to losing statistical significance. Figure 4, which plots the whole range of possible estimates that confounders with different strengths could cause, leads us to a similar conclusion. It illustrates that even a confounder with 5 times the explanatory power of the variable (Candidates No.), as a benchmark, would not be sufficient to nullify the outcome's correlation with MB Running, New NDP, and Urbanization. Yet, again, the coefficients on (NDP Dissidents) and (Protest) are sensitive to potential unobserved confounders. Altogether, this analysis establishes the robustness of our main findings, but indicates that our findings on the magnitude and significance -but not the direction- of the protest variable should be taken with more caution.

Figure 4 – Sensitivity Analysis of the Main Variables of Theoretical Interest



(a) New NDP **(b)** NDP Dissidents **(c)** MB Running



(d) Urban **(e)** Protest

Note: Sensitivity of point estimates with bounds. Sensitivity analysis including benchmark bounds derived from claims that confounding is 1 to 5 times "stronger" than (Candidates No.) in explaining residual variation in the outcome and the examined explanatory variable. The horizontal axis shows hypothetical values for the percentage of the residual variance of the independent variable explained by the confounder. The vertical axis shows hypothetical values for the percentage of the residual variance of the outcome explained by the confounder. The contour levels represent the adjusted estimates of the coefficient of interest. The bound points (diamonds) show the partial R2 of the unobserved confounder under the assumption that it is k times "as strong" as the observed covariate (Candidates No.). Their placement thus shows the maximum bias caused by confounding under each assumption on k (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5).