Constitutionally conforming interpretation in France
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France has a complicated history with judicial review. The French Revolution sought to prevent judges from reviewing the constitutionality of statutory law, as statutes were deemed to be ‘the expression of the general will’. During the Ancien régime, the Courts of appeal (then called Parlements) would quash from time to time royal laws when they found them to be repugnant to the Fundamental laws of the Realm; absent any supreme court, only the King could overturn the Courts’ decisions. The Revolutionaries found this practice inconsistent both with democratic principles and with the proper role of judges. Liberals throughout the eighteenth century had denounced arbitrary judicial decisions, especially in criminal matters, as those of ‘small tyrants’ and they wished to reduce the role of judges to that of a ‘mouthpiece of the law’. Since statutes were the expression of the general will, and since they were intended to annihilate the very discretionary powers of the courts, judges had no business putting their legitimacy into question. Hence the Law of 16-24 August 1790 on the judiciary provided that ‘The courts may not take any part, directly or indirectly, in the exercise of legislative power, nor may they prevent or suspend the execution of the decrees of the Legislative Body, sanctioned by the King, on pain of forfeiture’. These provisions are, somewhat surprisingly, still in force today.

Even if some Revolutionaries advocated a form of judicial review exercised by a special body, they remained a minority. True, the newly created Tribunal of Cassation (the ancestor of our Court of Cassation) reviewed from the outset the constitutionality of judicial rulings given by inferior courts, and throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries both the Court of Cassation and the Council of State (the highest administrative court) reviewed the constitutionality of rules laid down by the administration (actes administratifs). But, except for a handful of very peculiar instances, both supreme courts declined to review the constitutionality of statutes: in a famous 1936 case, the Council of State stated that ‘in the current state of French public law’ it had no competence to do so. This decision closed a decade-long debate on the suitability of judicial review in France sparked by Edouard Lambert’s important book Le gouvernement des juges.

France had to wait until 1958 for something like a constitutional court to be instituted: the Constitutional Council was born with the 1958 Constitution. However, at the time the Constitutional council, for all its merits, fell short of being a genuine constitutional court in the

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1 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen art 6.


3 Loi des 16-24 août 1790 sur l’organisation judiciaire, art 10.

4 See especially EJ Sieyès, ‘Discours du 2 et du 18 thermidor an III sur le jury constitutionnaire’ in P Bastid (ed), Les discours de Sieyès dans les débats constitutionnels de l’an III (Hachette 1939).


6 Ibid.

7 See eg 28 June 1918, Heyriès; CE, 11 July 1956, Amicale des Annamites de Paris.

8 CE Sect 6 November 1936, Sieur Arrighi.

9 E Lambert, Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux Etats-Unis (Giard 1921).
German or Italian mould – and some critics still argue that it is still the case today, given the appointment process of its members, the poorness of its reasoning and its excessive deference to the executive.

This complicated history explains the reasons behind the use of constitutionally conforming interpretation in France, which has always been framed in terms of legitimacy. Interestingly, far from being hailed as a way to exercise judicial restraint\(^\text{10}\) on the part of the Constitutional Council, conforming interpretation is often decried as an illegitimate way to rewrite what the legislature intended.

I. Institutional background

A. Constitutional adjudication in France (in a nutshell)

France has a somewhat complex court system. In a nutshell, there are two main court systems: on the one hand the judiciary (which adjudicates civil and criminal cases) and on the other hand the administrative courts. Each is headed by an apex court: the Court of Cassation and the Council of State. The Constitutional council\(^\text{11}\) does not sit atop these ‘ordinary’ courts. It is not a supreme court or a final court of appeals.

During more than 50 years, the only way to bring a statute for review before the Constitutional Council was through an a priori referral. The Council was called upon to review a statute between its adoption in Parliament and its promulgation by the President of the Republic.\(^\text{12}\) Only a handful of authorities were empowered to refer the matter to the Council: the President, the Prime minister, the Presidents of both houses of Parliament and (since 1974) 60 MPs or 60 Senators. The number of cases was therefore limited (roughly 10-15 constitutional cases per year).\(^\text{13}\) This system had its pros on cons. On the one hand, a priori review occurred before the statute entered into force, and a ruling by the Council did not disrupt existing legal situations arising from the statute; and, as far as constitutionally conforming intention is concerned, the interpretative alteration of the meaning of the statute resulting from such interpretation could be applicable to all cases falling under the statute thus interpreted, without any problem of legal certainty.\(^\text{14}\) On the other hand, if the statute was not deferred to the Council within the referral deadline (15 days), there was no way to put its constitutionality into question and it had to be applied by the courts until it was repealed by the legislature.

In 2008, the 1958 was extensively amended and a new procedure of a posteriori review was introduced: the *question prioritaire de constitutionnalité* (QPC). It is a kind of preliminary

\(^{10}\) Of course, partisans of judicial activism also criticise conforming interpretation for being too deferential…

\(^{11}\) In what follows, when I mention ‘the Council’ I will only refer to the Constitutional Council. The Council of State (the apex administrative court) will always be designated by its complete denomination.

\(^{12}\) For a limited range of statutes (organic laws), referral to the Council is obligatory. For ordinary statutes it is optional.

\(^{13}\) I will only refer to constitutional cases decided by the Council (judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes and treaties). I will not deal in this chapter with other adjudicatory functions exercised by the Council (in electoral law matters for instance).

\(^{14}\) In very specific instances the Council did review the constitutionality of already promulgated statutes in the course of reviewing later statutory provisions modifying them (Cons const 25 January 1985, no 85-187 DC, *Loi relative à l'état d'urgence en Nouvelle-Calédonie et dépendances*). This exceptional kind of review is called *new-caledonian review*, which refers to the aforementioned decision’s title.
referral, broadly in the mould of the German *konkrete Normenkontrolle* or the Italian *giudizi in via incidentale*. In a nutshell, a party to any trial or judicial proceedings may raise a QPC plea by which they intend to show that the statutory provision applicable to their case is unconstitutional. The judge may then decide to refer the QPC plea to its own apex court (the Court of Cassation or the Council of State) which in turn will decide whether to refer it to the Constitutional Council. When the Council concludes that the provision is repugnant to the Constitution, it repeals it, but it may postpone the entry into force of its own decision in order to give the legislature some time to modify the problematic features of the statute.

The entry into force of the QPC mechanism in 2010 has considerably increased the number of cases brought before the Constitutional Council: there have now been more QPC cases in 11 years than a priori cases over 70+ years, with the Council now adjudicating roughly 80 constitutional cases per year.

**B. Interpretative division of labour among courts**

The QPC reform has undoubtedly strengthened the position of the Constitutional Council as a constitutional court. However, one should not conclude that it nowadays enjoys the kind of authority as eg the German *Bundesverfassungsgericht*, especially with regard to ordinary courts. As we saw earlier, the Council does not have the power to review the decisions of ordinary courts. Moreover, the Council does have a monopoly on adjudicating the constitutionality of statutes, but it does not have sole interpretative power. It adjudicates only on the constitutionality of statutes (as well as treaties prior to ratification). Other judges rule on the constitutionality of administrative regulations and bylaws as well as of private law instruments. This entails a sometimes-uncertain division of interpretative labour between the Constitutional Council and the two apex courts, since the latter do not always have to defer to the interpretations offered by the former and they sometimes refuse to defer to the interpretations given by the Council.

As we shall see, the Council may review the Court of Cassation’s or the Council of State’s interpretation of a given statute in the course of the review of the statute itself (especially in a QPC decision, which bears on a statute which has already been applied and interpreted by ordinary courts), it has no power over these ordinary court’s rulings and judgments; it cannot quash or annul them. Its interpretations of the Constitution (eg the implicit constitutional

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15 This monopoly has been somewhat disputed with regard to statutes prior to 1958. The Council of State has ruled that administrative judges are empowered to review whether a pre-1958 statute has been implicitly repealed by the 1958 constitution. See CE Ass 16 December 2005, *Syndicat national des huissiers de justice*. However the Council has not applied this principle since 2005. Some inferior courts did so on occasion, notably the Administrative Appeals Court of Marseille (CAA Marseille 7 April 2008, no 05MA03258, *Compagnie Agricole de la Crau*); however, on appeal, the Council of State referred the matter to the Constitutional Council: see CE 15 July 2010, no 322419, *Compagnie Agricole de la Crau* and the subsequent decision by the Constitutional Council (Cons const 14 October 2010, no 2010-52 QPC, *Compagnie Agricole de la Crau*). Although the Council of State never officially reversed its 2005 decision, one may reasonably assume that the entry into force of the QPC mechanism has entailed the desuetude of that precedent.

16 See generally M Disant, *L'Autorité de la chose interprétée par le Conseil constitutionnel* (LGDJ 2010).

17 Cons const 6 October 2010, no 2010-39 QPC, *Mmes Isabelle B and Isabelle D*. 
principles it ‘deducts’ from the constitution’s text and other constitutional instruments)\textsuperscript{18} have but a persuasive authority and do not enjoy precedential binding force on ordinary courts.\textsuperscript{19}

Its rulings do enjoy \textit{erga omnes} authority\textsuperscript{20} (something like absolute \textit{res judicata}), but only insofar as they declare a given statute to be consistent or inconsistent with the Constitution. For instance, if the Constitutional Council declares a statute to be inconsistent with the Constitution, then ordinary courts are barred from applying it (unless the Council provides otherwise). But the interpretation of the Constitution which justifies its ruling does not enjoy such an authority, and ordinary judges are not obliged to defer to it in further cases: for instance, an administrative court reviewing the constitutionality of an administrative rule does not need to defer to the interpretation of the Constitution given by the Council in an earlier decision with regard to the constitutionality of a statute. And apex courts occasionally even develop constitutional principles which have never been recognised as such by the Constitutional Council, which means that there are in fact two or more sets of constitutional rules and principles in France which intersect broadly: the constitutional norms developed by the Constitutional Council, and the constitutional norms resulting from the interpretative activity of apex courts. For instance, in 1996, the Council of State ruled that a constitutional principle barred France to extradite a foreign national when the extradition was asked for political motives.\textsuperscript{21} The Constitutional Council never recognised such a principle (although it never denied such a principle existed either).

The Constitutional Council’s interpretations of the Constitution are, in sum, not binding; they only enjoy persuasive authority, because the authority of the Council’s decisions extend only to its particular ruling (\textit{dispositif}) on a given statute as well as to the very reasons (the \textit{motifs}) that strictly justify them.\textsuperscript{22} However, its interpretation of the statute under review is authoritative and binding on lower courts, insofar as it is strictly tied to its ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. In particular, its interpretative reservations, which are constitutionally conforming interpretations, do enjoy \textit{erga omnes} authority insofar as they are the very reason why the statute is declared consistent with the Constitution in the first place. \textit{But for this interpretation}, the statute would be struck down and there would be nothing left for the courts to apply. This is why both the Council of State\textsuperscript{23} and the Court of Cassation\textsuperscript{24} acknowledge the authority of the Council’s interpretative reservations as \textit{res judicata}, and the Council itself has ruled that they were \textit{res judicata}. 2015-527 QPC\textsuperscript{25}

But it happens that ordinary courts also indulge in constitutionally conforming interpretation: for instance, the Council of State (the apex administrative court) has interpreted

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[18] The constitutional corpus (\textit{bloc de constitutionnalité}) comprises not only the 1958 Constitution, but also the 1789 Declaration, the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution and the 2004 Environment Charter.
\item[19] See on this the forceful position of the Court of cassation (Cass Ass plén 10 October 2001, \textit{Breisacher})
\item[20] French Constitution art 62.
\item[21] CE Ass 3 July 1996, \textit{Koné}.
\item[22] Cons const 16 January 1962, no 62-18 L.
\item[24] See implicitly the \textit{Breisacher} case (above n 19); explicitly Cass com 25 January 2005, no 03-10.068; Cass civ (1) 22 March 2005, no 04-50024.
\item[25] See implicitly Cons const 12 January 2002, no 2001-455 DC, \textit{Loi de modernisation sociale}; explicitly Cons const 2 December 2004, no 2004-506 DC, \textit{Loi de simplification du droit}. This \textit{res judicata} character applies not only to the courts but also to Parliament itself, which is bound by a reservation: Cons const 24 January 2008, no 2008-567 DC, \textit{Loi relative aux contrats de partenariat}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
a statute in such a way as to make it compatible with the Constitution\(^{26}\) and it has also interpreted a treaty proviso in such a way as to make it compatible with a constitutional principle.\(^{27}\) In both cases, the Council of State had no other choice than to have recourse to a conforming interpretation, since it is not empowered to strike down unconstitutional statutes or treaties. However, it begs the question of whether these cases are compatible with the division of interpretative labour between ordinary courts and the Constitutional Council.

In what follows I will mainly focus on the Constitutional Council’s interpretative reservations. But the reader should keep in mind that ordinary courts in France have always claimed some interpretative leeway for themselves, even if they routinely defer to the authority of the Council. Since, as we shall see, the Council’s interpretative reservations are primarily directed at ordinary courts, their reception by the courts is a crucial element of their operation.

II. Interpretative reservations in the Constitutional Council’s jurisprudence

A. The formalism of interpretive reservations

The French Constitutional Council has evolved a very specific mechanism of constitutionally conforming interpretation, which is called ‘interpretative reservations’ (reserves d’interprétation). The Council declares a statute (or part of it) to be compatible with the Constitution under the reservation that it be interpreted in such-and-such way. This tool was first used in a very informal way, as part of the Council’s general reasoning, without being identified as such.\(^{28}\) However, from 1984 on, \(^{29}\) the Council has systematically identified its interpretative reservations as such in the two main parts of its decisions: the reasons or grounds (in French, les motifs) and the operative part of the ruling (le dispositif). Whenever the Council reviews a statutory provision, it basically has the choice between three kinds of decisions: a decision of conformity (the law is consistent with the constitution and can be applied without reservations); a decision of unconstitutionality; and a decision of conformity ‘with reservations’ (conformité sous réserve). These decisions are identified as such in the nomenclature of the Council’s decisions.

A decision of conformity ‘with reservations’ is typically structured as follows.

In the motifs (reasons, grounds) part of the decision, the Council briefly discusses the arguments put forward by the claimants as to why, according to them, the law is unconstitutional; then it usually starts a new paragraph (or a series of paragraphs) in which it explains why, unless interpreted in such-and-such way, the law would nevertheless be unconstitutional. It then concludes ‘subject to the reservations stated in paragraph X, article Y of statute Z conforms to constitutional principle P’.

Then, in the operative part of the decision, in which it hands down the proper ruling (le dispositif), the Council sums up the various statutory provisions it reviewed in the course of its

\(^{26}\text{CE Ass 14 December 2007, Département de la Charente Maritime.}\)

\(^{27}\text{See the Koné case (above n 21).}\)

\(^{28}\text{See eg Cons const 30 January 1968, no 68-35 DC, Loi relative aux évaluations servant de base à certains impôts directs locaux.}\)

\(^{29}\text{Cons const 11 October 1984, no 84-181 DC, Loi visant à limiter la concentration et à assurer la transparence financière et le pluralisme des entreprises de presse.}\)
motifs and gives them authoritative force: first, he lists the provisions which are unconstitutional; then the provisions which he declares to be conforming to the Constitution ‘with reservations’ (with a reference to the specific paragraph in which these reservations were stated); and last, the provisions which he declares consistent with, or conforming to, the Constitution.

Let me take an example (among many possible others!). Article 6 of the 1955 statute on the state of emergency allows the Minister of the Interior, when a state of emergency has been declared, to put certain individuals under house arrest, without trial or even the prior authorisation of a judge (see infra for more on the Council’s case law on this point). The duration of such a measure cannot exceed twelve months. However, the minister may extend it beyond twelve months for a duration which cannot exceed three months. But at the end of these three months, the minister may issue another extension and so on. In a 2017 decision, the Constitutional Council ruled on the constitutionality of such an extension scheme with regard to the constitutional freedom to come and go. In the motifs part of the decision, the Council established that on its face the renewal scheme infringes ‘on the liberty to come and go’ (para 14). Such an infringement is not per se unconstitutional, but it might be if the scheme does not comprise certain guarantees to the effect that its use will be proportionate to the dangerousness of the individual placed under house arrest. These guarantees were not provided for by the statute. However, the Council went out of its way to supplement the statute with an interpretive reservation. At paragraph 17 of its decision, the Council held that ‘beyond twelve months, a house arrest measure cannot, without excessively infringing on the liberty to come and go, be renewed unless: first of all, the behaviour of the individual in question constitutes a particularly serious threat to security and public order; secondly, that the administrative authority produces new or complementary elements; and finally, that in examining the situation of the individual in question, the total length of time of his or her placement under house arrest, the conditions of this placement and the complementary obligations under which this measure is issued are taken into account’. These sentences are nowhere to be found in the statute’s text; they are the result of an interpretation which aims to constrain the discretionary powers of the minister.

Then, in a further paragraph (para. 19), the Council explicitly identifies paragraph 17 as expressing an interpretive reservation: ‘Subject to the reservations established in Paragraph 17, the contested provisions (…) are not contrary to the freedom to come and go’.

Finally, the decision closes on the dispositif, in which the decision is announced through articles. The Council, in the third article of the dispositif, gives formal binding force to the reservation expressed in paragraph 17 and identified as such in paragraph 19:

Article 3. – Subject to the reservations established in Paragraph 17, the following are constitutional:
- the eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth Subparagraph and the other provisions of the thirteenth Subparagraph of Article 6 of Law number 55-385 of 3 April 1955 relating to states of emergency.

There is therefore a certain amount of formalism to the way interpretative reservations are formulated. Ordinary judges and other law-applying organs must be able to identify

30 In the a priori review, the number of provisions reviewed can be quite high, since a whole statute is referred to the Council; in the a posteriori QPC review, usually only a small number of provisions (or even only one) are usually submitted to the Council for review.
31 Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence. This statute has been modified many times since 1955.
32 Cons const 16 March 2017, no 2017-624 QPC, M. Sofiyan I.
precisely the interpretative reservation as such and to ascertain its meaning and scope. There must be no room for doubt, at least in principle (even if, as we shall see in the last part of this paper, such doubts are in practice inevitable). Judges are not expected go out of their way to look for the ratio decidendi of the Council’s decision: this ratio is clearly stated in both the motifs (grounds) and the dispositif (ruling). If the interpretative reservation is not clearly stated in both parts of the decision, it has no authority and it does not bind the lower courts. This raises the question of ‘implicit’ reservations, and the way ordinary judges deal with them.

B. Implicit reservations

1. The authority of implicit reservations

It sometimes happens that in the course of his reasoning on the constitutionality of a given statutory provision, the Council gives a specific interpretation of that provision, without explicitly identifying it as an interpretative reservation, either in the grounds (motifs) or in the ruling (dispositif). Quite often it seems that this interpretation is a constitutionally conforming one, because the ensuing declaration of conformity seems (even if loosely) tied to it. However, it is not expressly identified as a reservation; given the formalism explained above, it would seem that such interpretations are not subject to res judicata and that ordinary courts are free to disregard them. However, in practice, ordinary courts routinely defer to these implicit reservations, thereby recognising at least their persuasive authority and even treating them as authentic reservations.

Let me take two examples. In 1997, the Constitutional Council held that a statutory provision (article 3 of statute under review) which gave police officers the right to confiscate the passports and the travel documents of illegal foreign nationals was not unconstitutional, as it was consistent with the constitutional freedom to come and go (derived from article 2 of the 1789 Declaration). The Council nevertheless added that this provision had ‘the sole purpose of ensuring that the alien in an irregular situation will be in possession of the document so that he can be made to leave the country; he may under no circumstances be prevented from exercising his right to leave the country or his other freedoms and fundamental rights’. In other terms, the Council gave a purposive interpretation of the statutory provision under review. It then added ‘the passport or other travel document may be withheld solely for such time as is strictly necessary for the administrative authority, subject to review by the administrative courts, which in certain circumstances may order a stay of execution’. At no point do these conditions appear in the text of the statute; they are the mere product of the Council’s creative interpretation. However the Council does not clearly identify this interpretation as an interpretative reservation, which is all the more surprising since it expressly identifies as such other reservations concerning other provisions of the same statute. The dispositif does mention the existence of reservations concerning article 3 of the statute, but nowhere are these reservations clearly identified as such in the motifs. And a reservation, in order to be authoritative, must, as we saw, be identified as such in both the motifs and the dispositif.

33 Cons const 22 April 1997, no 97-389 DC, Loi portant diverses dispositions relatives à l'immigration.
Nevertheless, the Council of State chose to treat it as an authentic reservation, on par with the other reservations clearly identified as such in the Constitutional Council’s decision. In a 2006 ruling, the Council of State held that ‘the conformity with the Constitution of the [statutory provision resulting from article 3 of the 1997 law] was accepted by the Constitutional Council in its decision no. 97-389 DC of 22 April 1997 only insofar as the sole purpose of this text is ‘to guarantee that the foreigner in an irregular situation will be in possession of the document that will ensure his or her effective departure from the national territory’. The Council of State then restated the other conditions set by the Constitutional Council in its decision, and it went out of his way to remind the reader that ‘both the administrative authorities and the judge are bound by the interpretive reservations set out by the Constitutional Council’. The Council of State chose therefore to treat this implicit reservation as an authentic one.

In my second example, the Council of State deferred to an implicit reservation without even recognising it as such. In 2015, the Constitutional Council ruled that when a state of emergency had been declared, the Constitution did not bar the Minister of the Interior from putting certain individuals under house arrest; the statutory provision empowering the Minister to do so was therefore constitutional. However the Council added ‘the administrative courts are charged with ensuring that such a measure is suitable, necessary and proportionate with the goal pursued’. This implicit ‘directive’ interpretive reservation (see infra) was not identified as a reservation in either the motifs or the dispositif. In 2017, the Council of State decided to ‘defer’ to this interpretation without treating it as a reservation: ‘As the Constitutional Council took note (a constaté) in its decision n° 2015-527 QPC, it is up to the administrative courts to ensure that the administrative police measures prescribed pursuant to these provisions are suitable, necessary and proportionate with the goal pursued’. The Council of State implies that the administrative courts, of which it is the apex court, would have exercised such a proportionality review anyway, with or without the Constitutional Council’s decision – which only ‘takes note’ of it. However, the Council of State pays lip service to the persuasive authority of the Council’s interpretation.

2. Ricocheting reservations

Nothing illustrates better this ambiguity in the status of implicit reservations as the problem of ‘indirect reservations’ or ‘ricocheting reservations’. Let us suppose a statutory provision A which is virtually identical (or closely resembling) to an earlier provision B. Provision A is deferred to the Constitutional Council for review and it formulates an interpretative reservation regarding provision A’s meaning or application. This reservation is identified as such in the motifs and the dispositif, and it is therefore binding on ordinary courts. But does it bind the courts’ interpretation of provision B, which was not under review in the Council’s decision?

34 CE ord 26 June 2006 no 294505.
35 Cons const 22 December 2015, no 2015-527 QPC, Cédric D.
36 CE ord, 25 April 2017, no 409677.
In 2002\textsuperscript{38}, the Council was called upon to rule on the constitutionality of a couple of statutory provisions, according to which University panels deciding on the conferral of experience-based credits to students should be ‘composed in such a way as to contribute to a balanced representation of women and men’. In an earlier statute (the 9 May 2001 Law on professional equality between men and women), the legislature had used the exact same formulation with the regard to the composition of boards and panels of many kinds (e.g., civil service entrance examination boards). In its 2002 decision, ruling on the 2002 law, it held that the provisions were constitutional,\textsuperscript{39} with the reservation (expressed both in the \textit{motifs} and the \textit{dispositif}) that ‘they only set an objective of balanced representation between women and men; they are not intended to, and cannot have the effect of, giving precedence to considerations of gender over those of competences, aptitudes and qualifications’. And the Council explicitly mentioned the fact that the provisions under review replicate the formulations used in the earlier 2001 statute. This raised the question whether ordinary courts were bound by the reservations to the extent that it applied to the 2001 statute (as far as the 2002 statute was concerned, the answer was beyond doubt).

In a 2007 case,\textsuperscript{40} the Council of State had to apply the 2001 statute, and especially the statutory provisions therein included concerning the ‘balanced representation’ of men and women on civil service entrance examination boards. The question was whether a jury composed of only one third of women was contrary to this law. The Council of State ruled that it was not the case, because the law had to be interpreted as ‘setting out an objective of balanced representation between women and men, which is not intended to, and cannot have the effect of, giving precedence to considerations of gender over those of competences, aptitudes and qualifications’. The astute reader will notice that this sentence is a mere copy-paste of the Constitutional Council decision regarding the 2002 statute. But nowhere in the Council of State’s judgment is the Constitutional Council’s 2002 decision expressly quoted or even cited. It is as if the Council of State has developed this constitutionally conforming interpretation on its own.

This shows that ‘ricocheting reservations’ are not binding on ordinary courts. Only the \textit{motifs} and the \textit{dispositif with regard to the statute under review} enjoy binding authority: since the 2001 statute was never referred to the Constitutional Council, the authority of the reservation expressed about the 2002 statute cannot ricochet onto the 2001 one. However, the fact that the Council of State replicated in its own ruling the Constitutional Council’s reservation shows that it deferred to its persuasive authority. Nowadays, ordinary courts are all the more incentivised to defer to the persuasive authority of ricocheting reservations since, thanks to the new \textit{QPC} proceedings, the Council can now review the courts’ own statutory interpretations, which was not the case in 2007.

C. Types of interpretative reservations

Very early on, French scholars have sought to elaborate a typology of interpretative reservations analogous to some extent to the classification of the decisions of the Italian

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Cons const 12 January 2002 (above n 25)
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Under article 6 of the 1789 Declaration.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} CE Sect 22 June 2007, \textit{Lesourd}.
\end{itemize}
Constitutional Court. 41 Louis Favoreu 42 distinguished between constructive, neutralising and directive reservations. More sophisticated classifications have been proposed; for instance, Thierry Di Manno has distinguished between seven species or subspecies of interpretative decisions. 43 But for the present purposes, Favoreu’s classification will do, as it is now the most widely received and criticised.

Constructive reservations are constitutionally conforming interpretations which either add a new norm to the one issued in the statute’s text or substitute it with another. The point is that the original norm lacks something in order to be constitutional, and that it needs therefore to be either supplemented or replaced with another one. Let me take an example. Article L.3341-1 of the Public Health Code provides that ‘any person who is found in a state of intoxication in a public place shall be removed by the police at its own expense to the nearest police or gendarmerie station, or to a secured room where it shall be held until it has recovered its senses’. In a 2012 decision,44 the Council ruled that these provisions were consistent with the constitutional principle prohibiting arbitrary detention as well with the freedom to come and go. However, when the intoxicated individual is suspected to have committed the felony, in which case they must be arrested and put in custody by the police (garde à vue) as soon as they have recovered their senses. The duration of the custody is limited to 24 hours, but it may be extended up to 48 hours or even 144 hours depending on the type of felony or crime. The problem was that if the duration of the ‘removal’ of the intoxicated person was cumulated with the duration of the ensuing custody, the total duration of the deprivation of freedom could exceed the maximum provided by the law, therefore raising a problem of constitutionality. This is why the Council issued a constructive reservation by which it ‘created’ a new norm providing that the duration of the ‘removal’ of the intoxicated person should be deducted from the duration of the official custody, even if the police were unable to read them their rights before and until the person had recovered their senses.

Neutralising interpretations are constitutionally conforming interpretation which remove from the statutory norm the elements which raise an issued of constitutionality. Therefore, the norm’s intended (or unintended) unconstitutional effects are somehow made impossible by the Council’s interpretation. The law is allowed to enter into force or to remain in force, but on the condition that its constitutionally problematic effects be neutralised. Here again, an example is in order. In 2017, the Constitutional Council struck down 45 – twice – a law which created a crime of ‘habitually accessing terrorist websites’; it found that this statutory provision infringed the freedom of expression and communication in a way which was neither necessary, suitable, nor proportionate. In 2020, the Council was confronted with a very close issue, but framed in different terms. Article 321-1 of French Criminal Code provides that receiving, that is concealment, retention or transfer of a thing which is obtained from a crime or a felony, is itself a criminal offence. Article 421-2-5 of the same code provides that ‘the act

41 For a very nice overview of the Italian Court’s jurisprudence regarding interpretative decisions, see V Barsotti, PG Carozza, M Cartabia and A Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context (OUP 2016) 84.
44 Cons const 8 June 2012, no 2012-253 QPC, M.Mikael D.
45 Cons const 10 February 2017, no 2016-611 QPC, M. David P.; Cons const 15 December 2017, no 2017-682 QPC, M. David P.
of directly provoking terrorist acts or publicly endorsing these acts’ is criminal offence. Taken separately, both provisions are constitutional (indeed, the latter had explicitly been held constitutional by the Council in an earlier decision). However, taken together, in combination, they had been interpreted by the Court of Cassation as creating an offence of ‘receiving (or concealment) of acts endorsing terrorism’. For instance, if you had on your laptop or on a USB stick a video with a message glorifying Al-Qaeda, you could be charged with such an offence, since you would be concealing a ‘thing’ (a video) obtained from a crime (the very act of glorifying Al-Qaeda). One can easily spot the paradox: watching that video online was permitted per the 2017 decisions mentioned above; but downloading it on your computer was illegal. Unsurprisingly the Council declared in 2020 that this offence was unconstitutional. However, it could not strike down the laws under review (as it had done in 2017) because taken separately both laws were perfectly constitutional. The unconstitutional criminal offence was the result of the interpretation of the Court of cassation of both laws as combined. The Council issued a neutralising reservation: after stating that ‘the offence of concealing an apology for acts of terrorism infringes freedom of expression and communication in a way that is not necessary, appropriate and proportionate’, in line with the 2017 precedents, it added that the Article 421-2-5 ‘cannot therefore, without infringing this freedom, be interpreted as punishing such an offence’. With this reservation (identified as such in the decision), the Council removes in effect a whole criminal offense from the legal order. One interesting thing about that decision is that the norm removed does not immediately originate from the text of the statutory provision; it is the result of the interpretation by ordinary criminal courts (notably the Court of cassation).

**Directive reservations** prescribe a certain behaviour or conduct to the authorities tasked with the application of the statute. Such reservations may be directed at judges of course, but also at administrative authorities, or even the legislature. An interesting example is a 2018 decision concerning a 2017 statute expanding the powers of administrative authorities in order to fight terrorism. This decision contains several directive reservations. For instance, the law authorises police authorities to establish ‘secure perimeters’; in order to enter these perimeters (for instance a square, a couple of streets or blocks, etc.), showing a photo ID can be required, and citizens are required to submit to security frisking, visual inspections and luggage and vehicle search. One problematic aspect of this provision (among many others) was that it gave police officers the possibility of being assisted by private security agents working for private companies. This was problematic with regard to article 12 of the 1789 Declaration, which the Council interpret as prohibiting the ‘delegation to private individuals of the competence of the administrative policing powers inherent in the exercising of ‘law enforcement’ necessary to guarantee rights’. In order to avoid striking down the law insofar as it seemed to provide for such a delegation, the Council issued an interpretative reservation by which it directed the police authorities to ‘to take measures to ensure that the effectiveness of checks over these [private security agents] shall be ensured by judicial police officers’.

This typology of interpretative reservations has been criticised. For instance, Alexandre Viala has pointed out that many interpretative reservations, cannot be neatly classified under

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46 Cons const 18 May 2018, no 2018-706 QPC, M. Jean-Marc R.
47 Cons const 19 June 2020, no 2020-845 QPC, M. Théo S.
49 Cons const 10 March 2011, no 2011-625 DC, LOPPSI II.
any of these categories. Some reservations may be described as both constructive and neutralising.\(^{50}\) Moreover, as Viala pointed out, all interpretative reservations can be described as ‘directive’.\(^{51}\) Since the Council is not a supreme court and since it does not adjudicate concrete cases, interpretative reservations are the only way for the Council to control the way courts are to apply the statute under review. Therefore, Viala argues, all reservations are to some extent directive, since they prescribe the correct interpretation of the statute to be made by ordinary courts (as well as administrative authorities, and the legislature itself). Viala’s book on reservations was written before the QPC mechanism existed, when constitutional review was exercised a priori, before the statute under review was promulgated; reservations were therefore a way to fixate the meaning, scope and/or application of a yet-to-be-applied statute. The new QPC referral mechanism has, if anything, reinforced this directive nature of reservations. Since QPC cases – like all preliminary referrals – arise out of ‘real cases’ (with real litigant, before real judges), the Council is uniquely positioned to check (and modify) the way judges interpret and apply statutory provisions, which, \textit{ex hypothesi}, are already in force. The use of interpretative reservations is not only that of a ‘canon of avoidance’; it increases the authority of the Council over judicial interpretations, even more so since, as we saw earlier, reservations can be used to give a constitutionally conforming interpretation not only of the statute, but of an already existing judicial interpretation of the statute (see above the case about ‘receiving of acts endorsing terrorism’). By enhancing the collaboration and the dialogue between ordinary courts and the Council, the QPC referral mechanism has strengthened the Council’s interpretative authority, and the directive nature of its reservations.

D. The legitimacy of interpretative reservations

As I hinted in the introduction, ever since the Revolution the French version of constitutionalism has not been very friendly to judges and to judicial law-making. It rests on what may called a ‘mouthpiece ideology’, according to which judges may never create law, as they must always be the mouthpiece of existing law. This resulted in article 5 of the French Civil code, which prohibits judges ‘to pronounce judgment by way of general and regulatory dispositions’. Even if this ‘mouthpiece ideology’ has been widely challenged for a long time now,\(^{52}\) it still remains commonplace both in legal teaching and among legal practitioners. In sum, almost everybody knows that judges make law to some extent, but many still pretend they don’t.

As for constitutional adjudication, the issue ought to be framed is slightly different terms. From the very outset, the Constitutional council was not considered to be a real court in

\(^{50}\) See the examples given by A Viala, \textit{Les reserves d’interprétation dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel} (LGDJ 1999) 74-76

\(^{51}\) Ibid 84.

the first place. Its progressive, yet incomplete, transformation into a court is quite recent, partly thanks to the entry into force of the new QPC referral. Therefore, its legitimacy was always understood in very narrow terms. Constitutional review of statutes was not conceived as a way for the Council to enforce a set of superior principles and values against the will of the legislature. As Kelsen-inspired scholars Charles Eisenmann and Louis Favoreu argued, the role of the Council was one of a railroad switch, indicating which statutes could go ahead (on the statutory track so to say) and which should take the form of a constitutional amendment. An unconstitutional statute was nothing but a statute needing to be adopted as, or preceded by, a constitutional amendment lifting the constitutional obstacle. Indeed, on at least two occasions, constitutional amendments were passed to reverse a decision by the Council.

Of course, declaring a statute unconstitutional, and repealing it or preventing it from being promulgating is far from insignificant. As Kelsen himself argued, constitutional courts do take part in the legislative power, since repealing a statute is as politically loaded as making a new one. However, Kelsen insisted that constitutional courts are only negative legislatures: they cannot enact new laws; they can only remove existing laws. In the apocryphal words of law professor and once member of the Council Georges Vedel, ‘the Council holds an eraser, it does not hold a pencil’. From that point of view, constitutionally conforming interpretation, in the form of interpretative reservations, proves to be highly problematic legitimacy-wise, because it seems that in issuing reservations, the Council precisely uses a pencil, in that it re-writes to some extent the statutory provision under review. In altering the meaning of the text, the Council changes the content of the norm this text expresses. Of course, the Council has always held it is not vested ‘with any general power of appraisal and decision-making similar to that vested in Parliament’. But it sometimes seems that it exercises something close to such a power whenever it issues a reservation – and therefore that it acts as some kind of ‘positive’

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55 Georges Vedel equated this to a ‘lit de justice’ on the part of the constituent power (G Vedel, ‘Schengen et Maastricht’ (1992) *Revue française de droit administratif*, 173). This in turn raises the question of judicial review of constitutional amendments themselves, which I will not delve into here.
58 I have argued that Kelsen’s theory of the negative legislature is far more subversive and far-reaching than what the eraser-and-pencil metaphor implies, but I won’t rehearse my arguments here: see M Carpentier, ‘Le juge constitutionnel et la pertinence de la théorie du législateur négatif’ in S Mouton (ed), *Le juge dans le constitutionnalisme modern* (Varenne/LGDJ 2022).
59 This apocryphal formula has been attributed to Vedel by former president of the Council Robert Badinter. See R Badinter, ‘Du côté du Conseil constitutionnel’ (2002) *Revue française de droit administrative* 207, 209.
60 Cons const 15 January 1975, no 74-54 DC, *Loi relative à l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse* ; Cons const 11 June 2020, no 2010-2 QPC, *Mme Vivianne L*.
legislature.\(^{62}\) This raises the question of the democratic legitimacy of such judicial law-making by which the Council substitutes the democratically enacted norm with another norm of its preference.

This has an air of paradox: one would think that ‘striking down’ a democratically enacted statute would be considered more problematic than issuing a conforming interpretation. And sure enough, in many recent instances, the alleged ‘activism’ of the Council in striking down various statutes has been decried, some even calling for a French notwithstanding clause in the Canadian mould.\(^{63}\) But it still remains that the ‘railroad tracks’ theory makes it, somewhat paradoxically, more acceptable to strike down a statute – insofar as the constituent power can still reverse the Council’s decision – than to alter the statute’s meaning in order to make it express another norm than the one intended by the legislature (or resulting from the ordinary meaning of the text). In other words, the canon of avoidance seems to be more problematic than the very thing it aims to avoid.

One of the key features which explains this suspicion surrounding interpretative reservations is the Council’s very loose reasoning both in general, and in the specific case of reservations. One would usually expect a constitutional court which wishes to engage in constitutionally conforming interpretation to proceed the following way: first, explain why the ‘ordinary’ interpretation of the statute is constitutionally problematic, for instance because applying the ‘triple test’\(^{64}\) shows that it disproportionally infringes on a constitutionally protected right; then, show how another interpretation is able to salvage the constitutionality of the statute (eg by making such infringement proportionate). The Council does proceed this way most of the time, as we saw earlier. However, it happens quite often that the Council goes the other way around. First it establishes that the statute is constitutional, then it goes on the indicate that it ought to be interpreted in such-and-such way. Such was the case of the Mikaël D. decision referred to above, about intoxicated people being kept in ‘secure rooms’: first the Council established that this was not unconstitutional, given the short duration of time during which the person is kept in such a secure room; then the Council went on to give a reservation about the overall time of the custody (see above). And even when the Council uses the ‘natural’ order in its reasoning, it does so in a somewhat muddled way. Rather than stating explicitly why the statute would be unconstitutional but for its interpretive reservation, it just states that the statute would be unconstitutional but for the reservation. The reasons are usually not given, or at least not in a complete and detailed way.\(^{65}\) This raises the question whether interpretative

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64 The Council has applied since 2008 a somewhat watered-down version of the German-inspired triple test of proportionality: see Cons const 21 February 2008, n 2008-562 DC, Loi relative à la rétention de sûreté; Cons const 10 June 2009, no 2009-580 DC, Loi favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet.

reservations are really an instance of constitutionally conforming interpretation or rather a way for the Council to ‘enact’ its preferred interpretation under the guise of the Constitution.

Nevertheless, reservations have staunch defenders. For instance, Alexandre Viala\(^6\) has claimed that interpretative reservations are legitimate in at least two respects. First, its ‘conciliatory’ feature, beyond the mere upholding/striking down switch, allows the Council to put an end to the political debate which presided over the passing of the law: it satisfies both the majority (and the government) and the opposition, since the law is both upheld and (sometimes radically) altered; and it elevates a political debate to a resolution of a conflict of competing constitutional principles. Second, as the French ‘realist theory of interpretation’\(^6\) teaches, judicial interpretation always entails the judicial (re-)creation of a norm. The directive feature of reservations (see supra) and their character of res judicata allow the Council to ensure that the way ordinary judges will interpret the statute in a coherent and objective way, as well as consistent with the Constitution.

III. New issues

The new QPC referral system has not modified the dynamics of constitutionally conforming interpretation in France. If anything, as we saw earlier, it has enhanced their efficacy – albeit not necessarily their legitimacy – in that they have been used as a way to strengthen the grip of the Council on judicial interpretations of statutes: reservations raised in a QPC decision allow the Council to substitute the ordinary courts’ interpretation of the statute under review with its own interpretation.

However, the creation of the QPC mechanism has raised new issues, which were hardly foreseeable when the Council merely exercised a priori review. Like all preliminary referrals, QPC proceedings arise from concrete cases litigated before ordinary courts. The Council’s decision (be it one of conformity with reservations or one of unconstitutionality) will have repercussions on these cases – and the other cases being litigated at the time of the decision. This has specific repercussions in the case of interpretative reservations, which raises specific issues and gives rise to new uses of reservations. Although these issues are both too technical and too context-specific to be quite useful for a comparative study such as the one undertaken in this book, I will briefly sketch them out in the remainder of this chapter.

A. Can the Claimant seek an Interpretative Reservation?

The usual way to bring a constitutional case before a court is to claim that such and such statutory provision is repugnant to the Constitution. Such is the way in France too. For instance, litigants may attempt to bring a QPC before the Council only inasmuch as they claim that a

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\(^6\) Viala (n 50) 155

‘statutory provision infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution’.\textsuperscript{68} People do not usually refer to the Council a statute with the intention of having that statute declared constitutional; one does not ask a judge to exercise judicial review on a law that one thinks conforms to the Constitution.

However, litigants might wish to raise a QPC plea in order to have the Council issue an interpretative reservation, rather than strike down the statute. This is both understandable and highly problematic. It is understandable insofar as reservations are \textit{de facto} used by the Council in order to alter the meaning and the scope of an existing law. It may therefore be more profitable to the claimant to have the law remain in force, but with an altered meaning or scope, rather than have it repealed altogether. Sometimes a litigant prefers that a different law be applied to his case rather than there being no applicable law at all. From this point of view, it is much less costly to ask the Council to issue a reservation than to have it strike down the statute, then lobby the legislature in order to make them pass new legislation.

However, such a strategy is highly problematic. First, as a procedural matter, litigants must argue, in their QPC plea, that the statute is unconstitutional, and they must give reasons for that unconstitutional character. The claimant cannot just claim that the statute should be interpreted in such-and-such way. Repeal of the statutory provision is the only relief that the claimant may seek before the Council. Second, as a matter of principle, to seek directly a reservation before the Council amounts to asking the Council to change the law. It amounts to treating the Council as a co-legislator, which seems to be highly incompatible with the French conception of the legitimacy of judicial review in general and of interpretative reservations in particular.

In practice, litigants who wish to have the Council issue a reservation have no choice but to claim in their written submissions that the statutory provision is unconstitutional; however, during oral proceedings, their counsels may invite the Council to issue a reservation rather than to repeal the law. In a couple of instances,\textsuperscript{69} the Council has allowed such a move to go forward. The circumstances were highly specific. In a previous decision, the Council had issued a reservation which, on its face, did not cover the claimant’s situation. However, the claimant wished to have the reservation extended so as to cover their own case. The case was especially tricky since the previous decision of the Council was \textit{res judicata}, which, in principle, should have prevented the claimant from challenging the statute anew, since it had already been declared constitutional (albeit with reservations). Nevertheless, the Council held that there was a difficulty in ascertaining the scope of a previously issued interpretative reservations, which constituted a change of circumstances allowing for a new challenge; and it accepted to extend the scope of its first reservations to cover the cases brought before it.

B. The retroactive effect of reservations

\textsuperscript{68} French Constitution art 61-1.

\textsuperscript{69} Cons const 7 July 2017, no 2017-642 QPC, M. Alain C.; Cons const 7 July 2017, no 2017-643/650 QPC, M. Amar H. These intricate cases were about highly technical issues in tax law; I beg the reader’s forgiveness for not getting into the specifics.
In the a priori review, interpretative reservations bear on a statute which is not yet in force.\textsuperscript{70} Therefore, their effects are necessarily *ex nunc*, since their own operation depends on the entry into force of the statute which they interpret. The same does not hold for reservations issued within the course of a QPC decision. Indeed, a constitutionally conforming interpretation of a statutory provision which has already entered into force changes the meaning of the provision, and therefore, the operation of the law it interprets. Therefore, it is only natural to assume that the effect of such interpretations must be retroactive, for otherwise the past unconstitutional effects of the law would be preserved. Moreover, the ‘mouthpiece ideology’ studied earlier entails that when a judge *appears* to create a law (in this case: to give a certain normative meaning to a certain legislative provision), what she does in fact is declaring pre-existing law. In that sense, interpretative reservations are deemed to have a declaratory function, and not a constitutive one;\textsuperscript{71} therefore, they must be retroactive. It is as thought the only norm applicable was always, and had always been, the one resulting from the Council’s interpretation, and *not* the one resulting from either the ordinary meaning of the law or past judicial interpretation (on the part of ordinary courts).

The problem of course is that, as ever, the notion that judicial law-making is merely declaratory proves to be a fiction which can give rise to several intricate problems in real life. Let there be a provision A enacted in $t_1$, which has always received interpretation I\textsubscript{1} at the hand of ordinary courts\textsuperscript{72} so that the norm expressed by A is N\textsubscript{1}. Let us now suppose that in $t_2$ the Council rules that A is constitutional insofar as, that is, with the reservation that, it receives interpretation I\textsubscript{2} so that the norm it expresses is in fact N\textsubscript{2}. Since I\textsubscript{2} has retroactive force, it entails that the *real* norm in force from $t_1$ onwards was indeed N\textsubscript{2} and not N\textsubscript{1}. This in turn may entail very tricky problems in terms of legal certainty as well as in terms of legitimate expectations. What if, before $t_2$, people have relied on N\textsubscript{1} and, obviously, not on N\textsubscript{2}? What if N\textsubscript{2} is the result of a constructive or neutralising reservation, whose violation would entail, for instance, the annulment of thousands of criminal proceedings?

For this reason, the Council has bent, on occasion, the retroactivity of its reservations. Let me take an example from 2010.\textsuperscript{73} When someone has been ordered into pre-trial detention, they can ask at any moment the investigating judge to be set free; if the judge refuses, the matter is automatically brought before the ‘juge des libertés et de la détention’ (‘liberties and detention judge’). However, the detained person is not informed of the reasons why the investigating judge denied her motion, and she cannot respond to them. The Council found that this infringement of the adversarial principle was proportionate; however, it ruled that the detained person must be informed of the reasons given by the investigating judge (as well as the opinion of the prosecutor’s office). A retroactive application of this constructive reservation could have

\textsuperscript{70} There have been exceptions, especially in the context of new-caledonian review (see above n 14) which I will not delve into here. See eg Cons const 24 October 2012, no 2012-656 DC, *Loi portant création des emplois d’avenir.*


\textsuperscript{72} For the present purposes it does not matter whether this interpretation results from the ordinary understanding of the provisions or whether it is a creative interpretation on the part of judges.

had the effect of quashing thousands of orders by the liberties and detention judges. This is why the Council ruled that this reservation should only be applicable to motions filed after the Council’s decision was published.\footnote{In other cases (especially in tax law matters), the Council ruled that the reservation would be applicable only to proceedings introduced before the Council’s decision: Cons const, 26 June 2015, no 2015-473 QPC, Epoix P.; Cons const 15 December 2015, no 2015-503 QPC, M. Gabor R.}

C. Interim Reservations

The last issue is perhaps the most paradoxical: constitutionally conforming interpretations being issued, albeit in an interim fashion, in the course of a decision \textit{striking down} a statute.

There are some instances in which the statutory provision under review is too unconstitutional to be interpreted in a constitutionally conforming way; in such a case, the Council declares it to be unconstitutional, and repeals it. However, it may be the case that repealing the law with immediate effect proves, in turn, not to be desirable: for instance, because the absence of any law on such-and-such matters would be constitutionally problematic – e.g. the criminal procedural laws on custody are unconstitutional insofar as they do not provide that a lawyer should be present at all times, but repealing laws on custody altogether would violate the constitutional aims of preventing breaches of the peace and seeking out offenders. It may also be the case that what makes the law unconstitutional is not that it does too much, but too little, or because it lacks something to be fully constitutional (e.g. think of a law that grants a benefit to person A, but not person B who is in the same situation, and, for this reason, amounts to an unlawful difference of treatment).

In such instances, the Council does issue a declaration of unconstitutionality, but crucially does not repeal the statute with immediate effect. Rather, it postpones the entry into force of its own decision to a later date. If at that date, Parliament has not legislated anew in order to ‘cure’ the statute from its unconstitutional character, the statutory provision disappears. The goal of this mechanism is to ensure that the legislature gets a second chance, so to say, and has the opportunity to amend the statute in order to make it consistent with the Constitution. In the interval between the date on which the Council gives its decision and the date on which the law is amended by the Constitution or the date on which – if the legislature fails to act – the statute disappears, the operation of the statute remains intact. The law remains fully in force and may still be applied to cases arising from it.

In some cases, however, the Council does not want to leave the operation of the unconstitutional law intact. This is why it typically issues what is now called \textit{‘reserves transitoires’} (interim reservations),\footnote{See Cons const 6 June 2013 no 2014-400 QPC, Société Orange S.A.} that is a reservation that applies to all cases arising from the operation of the law after\footnote{Con. const 2 March 2018, no 2017-694 QPC, M. Ousmane K. \textit{et autre}} (and even sometimes prior to)\footnote{Cons const 2 February 2018, no 2017-688 QPC, M. Axel N.} the Council’s decision. The Council acts as a transitional legislature: it sets down interim rules as to how the cases arising from the operation of the law must be dealt with until the legislature takes action. For instance, in 2018, in a famous case,\footnote{Cons const 6 July 1018, no 2018-717/718 QPC, M. Cédric H. \textit{et autre}.} the Council reviewed a statute that made it a crime to facilitate the
illegal entry, movement, or residence of a foreign national in France. This provision had an exemption built into it which covered some kinds of humanitarian assistance (regarding residence) but not others (entry and movement). The Council held that the statute was repugnant to the constitutional principle of fraternity (which the Council ‘discovered’ or ‘invented’ for the occasion) insofar as it did not provide for another exemption with regard to humanitarian facilitation of movement (but not entry), that is, insofar as it still made it a crime in all circumstances – even humanitarian ones – to help an illegal foreign national move within the French territory. So the limited scope of the exemption was the cause of its unconstitutionality. However, the Council had to postpone the entry into force of the repeal of the statute, since an immediate repeal would have the unfortunate effect of removing all exemptions from the statute. But the Council nevertheless issued an interim reservation which instructed criminal courts not to apply the law to people who had helped foreign illegal nationals moving from one point to another of the French territory.

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Constitutionally conforming interpretation in France owes many of its somewhat intricate features to France’s complicated history with judicial review. During a long time, judicial review of statutes was non-existent. When the Constitutional council was eventually created, it was not meant to become a full-fledged constitutional court; rather it was a mere ‘railroad switch’ guarding the legislature against constitutional derailing. This resulted in a somewhat complex division of interpretative labour between the Council, which is not a supreme court, and ordinary courts, a division if which constitutionally conforming interpretation is a key element. The Council’s interpretative reservations being res judicata, they allow the Council to have a grip on ordinary courts’ interpretative practices that it would otherwise not ordinarily have. This entails a certain dose of formalism in the issuing of reservations, in that the courts must be able to identify without doubt which part of the Council’s decision amounts to a reservation and must therefore be considered binding on them. However, this very formalism reinforces the similarities between reservations and legislative enactments, which raises delicate questions regarding the legitimacy of constitutionally conforming interpretation.

At the end of the day, the issues surrounding interpretative reservations are yet another symptom of the pathologies of the French conception of constitutional adjudication. The questionable composition of the Council; its ties with the executive; the paucity of the reasoning displayed in its decisions; the procedural difficulties in ensuring impartial proceedings before it; all these issues show that the Council still falls short of being a full-fledged constitutional court in the German or the Italian mould. Despite the QPC, the Council still has a long way to go. Of course, no sensible person can deny that the Council nowadays holds a pencil as well as an eraser, but, except in a few remarkable instances, it has so far used both the pencil (reservations) and the eraser (strikes down) in a very cautious – timid, even – way. It is not a small paradox that the Council, one the weakest constitutional courts of Europe, is perhaps one of those whose ‘activism’ is the most decried and whose legitimacy is the most called into question.