

1 **How stable are Australian farmers' climate change risk perceptions? New evidence of**
2 **the feedback loop between attitudes and behaviour**

3
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5
6 **Abstract**

7 The exact relationship between people's climate change attitudes and behaviour is a topic that
8 engages policy-makers and researchers worldwide. Do climate change attitudes influence
9 behaviour or is it possible that behaviour can change attitudes? This study uses a unique
10 repeated survey dataset of 275 farmers (irrigators) in the southern Murray-Darling Basin from
11 2010-11 to 2015-16, to explore the dynamic relationship between climate change attitudes and
12 farm adaptation behaviour. Farmers who had an increased risk exposure (expressed through
13 higher debt, larger irrigated areas, greater share of permanent crops, and located in areas with
14 higher temperatures and less rainfall) were more likely to agree climate change posed a risk.
15 Whilst farmers became more accepting towards climate change over the time-period, a
16 significant percentage of these attitudes were unstable. We suggest one reason for this
17 instability is due to the presence of reverse causality (a feedback loop) between attitudes and
18 behaviour. Namely, new evidence was found that farmers who agreed climate change was a
19 risk in 2010-11, were more likely to undertake farm decisions to reduce that risk (e.g.
20 changing crop mix, reducing irrigated area and consequently selling water entitlements) –
21 which had the impact of negatively feeding back and reducing their stated climate change
22 concerns in 2015-16. Conversely, farmers who were originally deniers were more likely to
23 undertake somewhat riskier farm-production decisions (e.g. increasing water utilisation rates
24 and irrigation areas) – which consequently had the impact of positively increasing their
25 climate change risk perceptions in 2015-16.

26 **Keywords:** Irrigators; Murray-Darling Basin; climate change attitudes; climate change risk
27 perception; endogeneity.

28
29 **Introduction**

30 Farming is both vulnerable to changes in climate and a significant source of greenhouse gas
31 emissions, prompting increasing calls for coordinated adaptation and mitigation initiatives to

32 help protect global resource supply chains (Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012; Garnaut 2011;
33 Lim-Camacho et al. 2017). Given the success of such initiatives will depend on the
34 participation of agricultural communities and individual farmers, it is crucial to understand
35 how climate change attitudes influence farmer adaptation and mitigation behaviours (Haden et
36 al. 2012; Arbuckle et al. 2013).

37 Australia has often been described as the ‘front line of the battle for climate change adaptation’
38 (Palutikof 2010, p. 219) and, indeed, Australian farmers face considerable and mounting
39 pressures from earlier seasons, longer droughts, more erratic rainfall and higher temperatures
40 (Garnaut 2011; Kiem and Austin 2013; Austin et al. 2020a; Wheeler et al. 2020b). However,
41 Australian climate change policy has been roundly criticised, and many believe it has stymied
42 action for the past decade (Burke 2016; Cheung and Davies 2017; Garnaut 2011). Some have
43 suggested that the National Party of Australia (which traditionally has represented graziers,
44 farmers and rural voters) has had a disproportionate impact on Australian climate policy
45 (Cheung and Davies 2017; Crowley 2017).

46 Studies have consistently found that, compared to Australian farmers, the general public are
47 much more accepting of climate change science and that climate change is occurring (Hogan et
48 al. 2011; Wheeler et al. 2013). For example, in 2019, 77% of the Australian public accepted
49 climate change was occurring, 12% did not and 11% were unsure (Australia Institute 2019).
50 This contrasts with Australian farmers’ attitudes; with many studies in the past decade finding
51 only around a third of farmers accepted that climate change was happening (Hogan et al. 2011;
52 Raymond and Spoehr 2013; Wheeler et al. 2013).

53 The psychological and environmental literature has long studied how environmental attitudes
54 can influence behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen 1991); while more recent literature
55 has studied how behaviour can influence attitudes (Albarracin and Wyer 2000; Nauges and
56 Wheeler 2017) and the link between risk perceptions, a sense of control and attitudes (Lo and
57 Chow 2015; Slovic 1987, 2000; Wilson et al. 1993). Van Raaij (1981) was one of the first to
58 outline complex feedback loops between economic conditions, perceptions, and behaviour.
59 Other research has pointed out that attitudes are often not the major driver of environmental
60 behavioural change, and sometimes not even linked to behavioural change at all (Kollmuss and
61 Agyeman 2002).

62 There has also been a huge increase in research that has tried to identify the characteristics that
63 predict people’s climate change attitudes (Hornsey et al. 2016; van der Linden 2014), with some

64 of this research focussing on farmers' climate change attitudes (e.g. Hogan et al 2011; Raymond
65 and Spoehr 2013). The fungibility of climate change attitudes, and how they change (or flux)
66 over time has been noted in many synopses of public attitudes (e.g. Australia Institute 2019).
67 However, tracking attitudes towards climate change over a long period of time, and attempting
68 to explain why views have changed, is rare in the literature (indeed, we have not found any
69 examples of this).

70 Within Australia, the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) (an area of significant agricultural,
71 environmental, recreational and indigenous importance) provides a much-cited example of an
72 area that will need to adapt to changing rainfall and temperature patterns, as well as
73 significant reductions in the water that has been allocated for irrigation use (Kiem and Austin
74 2013; Zuo et al. 2016; Wheeler et al. 2020b). The basin, which spans four states and one
75 territory, is an area where the MDB Plan was fully legislated in 2012. This plan represents
76 one of the largest returns to environmental water from a reduction in consumptive use. This
77 water is sourced from willing sellers through buyback of licences and upgrading on- and off-
78 farm infrastructure (see Grafton 2019 and Wheeler et al. 2017, 2020a for more detail). As
79 well as being subject to considerable water and regulation policy change, the water allocated
80 to irrigation has fluctuated widely over the past fifteen years – particularly during the
81 Millennium drought of the 2000s. There is ongoing controversy over the impact that climate
82 change will have on irrigators' water allocations, the environment, agricultural production and
83 future viability of the irrigation industry (Wheeler et al. 2017, 2020a). Irrigators most exposed
84 include those relying on permanent crops and larger shares of irrigation, and those utilising
85 higher percentages of the water allocated to them, and many of them have had to adapt to both
86 lower rainfall and lower water allocations in the past couple of decades (Grafton 2019).
87 Increased uncertainty and stressful conditions have increased the level of distress among the
88 general and rural population, as evidenced from a set of studies conducted recently in non-
89 metropolitan New South Wales (Austin et al. 2018, 2020a, 2020b).

90 We created a panel dataset (i.e. repeated observations from the same respondents) from two
91 surveys of the same MDB irrigators in 2010-11 and 2015-16, to try to understand how and
92 why farmers' climate change risk perceptions have changed over time, and if there is a
93 feedback loop between attitudes and behaviour. More precisely, the evidence for this
94 feedback loop is established by investigating the following three questions:

95 *Question 1: Can we characterise farmers who, in 2010-11, agreed that climate change posed*
96 *a risk to their region, versus those who did not perceive a climate change risk or were not*
97 *sure?*

98 *Question 2: Have farmers' climate change risk perceptions evolved over time? Did farmers,*
99 *who did not perceive a climate change risk in 2010-11, agree that climate change was a risk*
100 *in 2015-16, and/or vice versa?*

101 *Question 3: Are farmers' climate change risk perceptions associated with major farm*
102 *production decisions made on the farm between the two surveys? Can we detect a feedback*
103 *relationship between risk perceptions and behaviour?*

104 We hypothesise that there may be a feedback loop between climate change risk perceptions
105 and farmer behaviour, in the sense that actions undertaken by farmers between the two
106 surveys may have altered their exposure to risk and hence their perception of the risk posed
107 by climate change. We focus specifically on major production decisions which included
108 buying and selling of land and water entitlements, increasing or decreasing irrigated area,
109 changing crop mix, improving irrigation infrastructure, and utilising solar and battery
110 technology for irrigation water pumping.

111

112 **Literature Review of Farmers' Climate Change Attitudes**

113 Farmers' stated attitudes towards climate change were often influenced by how the questions
114 were asked. For example, farmers were more likely to agree with the statements that the
115 climate is changing (or occurring) than they were in regards to statements that climate change
116 is caused by human activity (Raymond and Spoehr 2013). In an early study among farmers in
117 the US, Diggs (1991) revealed that 30-41% of farmers (n=432) agreed with the question 'is
118 the climate changing'. This proportion has steadily increased over time; with later US studies
119 generally finding between half and two-thirds of American farmers agreeing that climate
120 change is now occurring (Safi et al. 2012; Arbuckle et al. 2013, 2015; Niles et al. 2013;
121 Campbell et al. 2019). Elsewhere, it has also been found that: 55% of Danish farmers
122 (n=1053) in 2014 agreed that global change was occurring (Woods et al. 2017); 70% of
123 Chinese farmers (n=1133) agreed climate change posed a risk to their livelihoods (Zhai et al.
124 2018); two-thirds of Iranian farmers (n=350) stated global warming is taking place (Azadi et
125 al. 2019); 48% of Scottish farmers (n=550) agreed that average annual temperatures will
126 increase in the future (Barnes et al. 2013); and just over half of New Zealand farmers (n=490)

127 agreed that the global climate was changing (Niles and Mueller 2016). In particular, Niles and
128 Mueller (2016) investigated how the presence of irrigation infrastructure was associated with
129 climate change perceptions, and found evidence to suggest that the presence of infrastructure
130 potentially positively influenced perceptions that annual rainfall had increased over time.

131 Within Australia, Hogan et al. (2011; Table 11) reported that belief in climate change varied
132 from 27-42% across different types of farmers (comfortable non-adaptors, cash poor longer-
133 term adaptors and transitioners, as identified by cluster analysis using twenty climate change-
134 related latent variables) in 2008 (n=3993). A small survey of Victorian farmers (n=90) found
135 that 70% believed that the climate is indeed changing (Rogers et al. 2012); while Wheeler et
136 al. (2013) provide the only specific survey of irrigators (that we know of) – they found that
137 32% of MDB irrigators in 2010-11 (n=946) believed climate change posed a risk for their
138 region.

139 Farmer views regarding the main causes of climate change (e.g. human versus non-human
140 induced) were more divergent than the presence of climate change itself. Farmers were less
141 likely to believe that climate change is human induced (e.g. see US studies by Arbuckle et al.
142 2013; Campbell et al. 2019; Rejesus et al. 2013; Safi et al. 2012). Within the Australasia
143 region, a survey of 292 farmers in South Australia by Raymond and Spoehr (2013) found that
144 39% agreed that human-induced climate change existed. Rogers et al. (2012) found 68% of
145 Victorian farmers agreed that human activity was influencing climate change, and Niles and
146 Mueller (2016) also found the majority of New Zealand farmers agreed. In a study of 823
147 rural residents in New South Wales, Austin et al. (2020a) highlighted that major concerns
148 about climate change related to: i) suffering under climate change; ii) causes of climate
149 change; iii) extremes of climate change; and iv) leadership and action to address climate
150 change.

151 In terms of understanding the socio-demographic characteristics associated with farmers'
152 climate change attitudes, a range of studies have found that female farmers are more likely to
153 acknowledge the existence of climate change and hold more scientifically accurate knowledge
154 (Smith et al. 2014; Hamilton et al. 2015; Zamasiya et al. 2017). Similarly, higher education
155 levels among farmers were found to be associated with believing in climate change,
156 recognising the role of human activity within climate change, and the perception of climate
157 change risks (Barnes et al. 2013; Raymond and Spoehr 2013; Wheeler et al. 2013; Hamilton
158 et al. 2015). Wheeler et al. (2013) and Hamilton et al. (2015) found that lower farmer age was
159 significantly associated with believing in climate change, while Rejesus et al. (2013) found

160 the opposite result. As discussed above, localised effects of climate change were found to be a
161 major influence on farmer attitudes, with Mase et al. (2017) highlighting a significant positive
162 correlation between a farmer noticing more variable weather and belief in anthropogenic
163 climate change. Further results from California (Niles et al. 2013), China (Shi et al. 2019) and
164 Nigeria (Ayanlade et al. 2017) also indicate the large majority of farmers recognised
165 fundamental changes in climatic conditions.

166 Other notable positive influences on climate change attitudes included a farmer having: a
167 successor (Barnes et al. 2013; Wheeler et al. 2013); higher on-farm income (Raymond and
168 Spoehr 2013); off-farm employment (Rejesus et al. 2013); higher concern about future
169 impacts (Arbuckle et al. 2013; Niles and Mueller 2016); and democratic political affiliation
170 (Smith et al. 2014). In terms of water availability, Haden et al. (2012) found that perceived
171 changes in water availability had significant effects on Californian farmer intentions to adopt
172 climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies. Furthermore, Wheeler et al. (2013) found
173 that Australian farmers' acceptance of climate change risk was statistically significantly
174 associated with having received fewer water allocations – during both the current season and
175 over the previous five years. Finally, and returning to the prominence of agriculture within the
176 landscape of climate change, Hogan et al. (2011) concluded that an ability to cope with
177 change, social connectedness and readiness to use information constructively, all positively
178 influenced farmer interest in (and capacity to adapt to) climate change.

179 *Risk perceptions and climate change*

180 There has been an increasing focus in the climate change attitudinal literature on the
181 relationship between a sense of control and climate change concerns. Slovic (1987, 2000) first
182 proposed that individuals' risk perceptions are affected by their ability to control such risks,
183 and this ability was highly associated with their financial resources. Indeed, a sense of control
184 has been found associated with both country and individual household wealth (Lo and Chow
185 2015), and that wealth and income determine the level of risk people are willing to take (Lo
186 2016). Higher income and resources could lead to an increased sense of control about the
187 world and future outcomes, a reduced sense of personal vulnerability and, therefore, reduced
188 concern about climate change issues. In a study of households across eleven OECD countries
189 on the relationship between climate change concerns and water and energy mitigation
190 behaviour, Nauges and Wheeler (2017) found that while it was true that climate change
191 attitudes positively influenced specific household mitigation actions, the relationship was

192 more complex in the sense that adoption of mitigation behaviour negatively fed back on
193 households' climate change concerns. This effect was more likely to occur in
194 'environmentally-motivated' households, and for mitigation behaviour that was high cost and
195 lower diagnostic in nature (e.g. putting solar panels on the house, rather than actions such as
196 turning off lights more often). In addition, Wheeler et al. (2013) found that farmers in the
197 MDB who agreed climate change posed a risk to their region were not planning to expand
198 their farm, but they were planning to change their crop mix; adopt new efficient irrigation
199 infrastructure; decrease their irrigated area; and buy more water entitlements (albeit these last
200 two actions were insignificant). Reverse causality (a feedback loop) between attitude and
201 behaviour was found for farm actions that involved implementing strategies to deal with
202 current or future water shortages (changing crop mixes, adopting more efficient infrastructure,
203 selling land and decreasing irrigated area). Reverse causality was not found for the impact of
204 climate change perceptions on other types of farm behaviour (e.g. such as selling water
205 entitlements, buying farm-land or increasing irrigation area). Such results suggest the flexible
206 nature between risk perceptions and adaptation behaviour. This study only looked at future
207 farm adaptation at one point in time, it did not study the relationship between actual
208 implemented farm actions and climate change beliefs, nor how beliefs or farm behaviour
209 changed over time. Nauges and Wheeler (2017) recommended that additional experiments, or
210 panel datasets that follow people's concerns and behaviour over time, would be needed to
211 explore this relationship further and to investigate in particular the presence of a lag between
212 experiencing concern and implementing mitigation behaviour, and vice versa.

213 Hence, of key interest to this study is the relationship between farm action and climate change
214 beliefs, and how attitudes can change over time, depending upon both a) personal and local
215 environment conditions; and b) farm actions undertaken within the time-period. To date, the
216 literature has focussed on cross-sectional (e.g. one year) snapshots of farmers' (and public)
217 attitudes at particular points in time, and the associations of those beliefs with a set of
218 locational, farm and socio-demographics. Wilson et al. (1993) discussed a possible feedback
219 phenomenon between behaviour (actions) and perceptions in a study of US dairy farmers' risk
220 perception and management tools. Along the lines of van Raaij (1981)'s framework showing
221 complex feedback loops between economic conditions, perceptions, and behaviour, Wilson et
222 al. (1993) argued that farmers' actions undertaken to manage risk in the past, by altering the
223 sources of variability, may have changed their current perception of risk. However, this
224 assertion could not be formally tested since the dairy farmers were surveyed only once. Austin

225 et al. (2020b) explained the variability of New South Wales rural residents' attitudes to
226 drought by the possibility 'that people have started to adapt (e.g. changes to household
227 budget, farming practices or lifestyle) to drought or that government funding has become
228 available' (Austin et al. 2020b: 14). Niles and Mueller (2016) have provided one indication of
229 how a sense of control in agriculture (namely the presence of irrigation infrastructure) was
230 associated with farmers' views that annual rainfall had increased over time; while Wheeler et
231 al. (2013) and Nauges and Wheeler (2017) provided evidence of some reverse causality
232 between climate change risk perceptions and behaviour. This study seeks to extend the
233 literature by investigating the same farmers' climate change attitudes and behaviour over a
234 period of five years, using a unique survey dataset, during which 275 Australian farmers were
235 surveyed twice (2010-11 and 2015-16).

236

237 **Data and Case Study Area**

238 The empirical analysis that follows combines data from two telephone surveys of irrigators
239 living in three states of the southern Murray Darling Basin (MDB): New South Wales (NSW),
240 South Australia (SA) and Victoria (VIC). The three regions cover various industries: annual
241 crops such as rice and cereal in NSW (Murray and Murrumbidgee River regions); livestock
242 production and dairy in VIC (Goulburn–Murray Irrigation District and Murray River regions);
243 and perennial crops such as citrus, wine grapes, fruit and nuts in SA (Riverland). The first
244 telephone survey was conducted in 2010-11 (n=946); and the second was conducted in 2015-
245 16 (n=1000).¹ The surveys were randomly sampled from a given irrigator population and are
246 regarded as representative. For example, average age, industry and farm size are similar to
247 ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics) and ABARES (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and
248 Resource Economics and Sciences) irrigation farm surveys (Zuo et al. 2016). Information was
249 collected on farmland; irrigation infrastructure; intentions and plans for the past five years and
250 next five years; socio-demographic characteristics; climate change risk perceptions; and a
251 range of values and attitudes. Our focus is on farmers' perception of climate-related risk,
252 which we measure through their answer to the following question: "Do you believe that
253 climate change poses a risk to your region?" Possible answers were: i) no, ii) yes, iii) unsure,
254 or iv) don't know. From now on we combine the "unsure" and "do not know" together under

¹ Irrigators were randomly sampled from irrigator organisations and commercial farming lists. The first survey had a total response rate of 30% (or 37% which included those who agreed to be surveyed at a later date, but were not called back given sample sizes were reached); while the second survey had a response rate of 51% (or 73% including call-backs).

255 an “unsure” label. The term “climate change” was not specifically defined to the survey
256 participants so we are not able to distinguish whether farmers’ risk perceptions were formed
257 from their current knowledge about climate change in general or from their observation of
258 changes in (local) weather patterns. The understanding of how their climate-related
259 perceptions were built is outside the scope of this research.

260 In this article, we study 275 irrigators who answered both telephone surveys. Since we are
261 primarily interested in the (possible) change in the same respondent’s climate change risk
262 perception between 2010-11 and 2015-16, it is important to check that it was the same person
263 (and not different household members on the same farm) interviewed in both years.² Given
264 that the name of the respondent was not recorded for ethical reasons, the criteria we used to
265 establish it was the same respondent during both surveys were if the respondent’s: a) gender
266 was the same; and b) age between the two survey rounds varied between 4 and 6 years. Table
267 A1 in the Appendix includes statistics on the key characteristics such as geographical
268 location, farm size, farm income, respondent’s age, education, gender, industry, and water
269 ownership for the panel sample of 275 irrigators – as well as the full sample of 946 irrigators
270 in 2010-11. The comparisons suggested that the panel sample and the full sample were not
271 statistically significantly different in terms of these key characteristics and therefore attrition
272 bias was unlikely.

273

274 **Methods**

275 For the descriptive statistics, the independent two sample t-test was used to compare the mean
276 of continuous variables and proportion test for binary variables between two groups, i.e.
277 agreed that climate change posed a risk to their region (“Yes” answer) vs. others (“No” or
278 “Unsure” answer) and climate change risk denier (“No” answer that climate change posed a
279 risk) vs. others (“Yes” or “Unsure” answer).

280 The independent t-test, assuming the variances of the two groups are equal, has a null
281 hypothesis that the difference between the two groups is zero. Suppose Group A (e.g.,
282 believer) and Group B (others) are the two groups to compare; the t-test statistic value can be
283 calculated as follows:

² For example, if we were interested in modelling a farm characteristic such as water extracted rather than a personal characteristic, a larger panel dataset would have been available (e.g. 338 farms used in Wheeler et al. 2020a).

284

$$t = \frac{m_A - m_B}{\sqrt{\frac{s^2}{n_A} + \frac{s^2}{n_B}}}$$

285 where m_A and m_B represent the means of groups A and B respectively, n_A and n_B represent
286 the sizes of groups A and B respectively, and s^2 is an estimator of the common variance of
287 the two samples which can be calculated as:

288

$$s^2 = \frac{\sum(x - m_A)^2 + \sum(x - m_B)^2}{n_A + n_B - 2}$$

289 For binary variables, a proportion test with a null hypothesis that the proportions of the two
290 groups are equal is employed. Let \widehat{P}_A be the observed proportion in Group A and \widehat{P}_B be the
291 observed proportion in Group B. A test of the difference between the two proportions used an
292 asymptotically normally distributed test statistic expressed as:

293

$$z = \frac{\widehat{P}_A - \widehat{P}_B}{\sigma}$$

294 where σ is the standard error of $\widehat{P}_A - \widehat{P}_B$.

295 In order to investigate our third research question, Probit regression models were used to model
296 changes in irrigators' climate change risk perceptions between 2010-11 and 2015-16. Two types
297 of changes were investigated including: 1) from 'believer' in 2010-11 to 'denier' or 'unsure' in
298 2015-16; and 2) from 'denier' in 2010-11 to 'believer' or 'unsure' in 2015-16.

299 The following equation was estimated for each of the changes:

$$300 \quad \text{Change}_{k^*} = X\beta + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

301 where: $k=1,2$ respectively for change 1) and change 2), Change_{k^*} is a latent variable ranging
302 from $-\infty$ to ∞ , X is a vector of independent variables including major farm production
303 decisions between 2010-11 and 2015-16, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ε is a
304 classical error term. The observed binary variable for change is 1 if $\text{Change}_{k^*} > 0$ and 0 if
305 $\text{Change}_{k^*} \leq 0$. Two distributions of ε are commonly assumed: ε is assumed to be distributed
306 normally with $\text{Var}(\varepsilon) = 1$ – the binary probit model; and second, ε is assumed to be
307 distributed logistically with $\text{Var}(\varepsilon) = \pi^2/3$ – the binary logit model.³ Models were checked
308 for any serious multicollinearity (i.e. no variance inflation factors above five, and absolute

³The two approaches are similar in terms of comparing the marginal effects of regressors (Amemiya 1981).


309 correlation coefficients above 0.7), and robust standard errors were used. Independent
310 variables in Equation (1) are defined in Table A3 in the Appendix.

311

312 **Results: climate change risk perceptions**

313 We first study the responses to the climate change risk question: “Do you believe that climate
314 change poses a risk to your region?” Figure 1 shows the distribution of the three possible
315 answers among the sample of farmers (n=275) across the five years. Note, Table A2 in the
316 Appendix presented the results for the full sample of farmers and similar distributions are
317 observed.

318 **Figure 1. Distribution of farmers’ climate change risk perceptions for their region**
319 **(n=275)**



320

321

322 The perceived risk induced by climate change has strengthened among the 275 farmers
323 between 2010-11 and 2015-16. Over the five-year interval, the number of farmers who
324 believed that climate change *did not* pose a risk to their region decreased from 49% (135
325 farmers) to 34% (94 farmers). In contrast, there was a 13% increase (from 33% to 46%) of
326 farmers who *do* believe climate change poses a risk to their region, and a 2% increase of
327 farmers who stated they were unsure. Such an increase in farmers’ climate change risk
328 perceptions was similar to the trend in views of the general Australian public, with 64%

329 agreeing that climate change was occurring in 2012, and 77% in 2019 (Australia Institute
330 2019).

331

332 **Results: insights on the three main questions**

333 *Question 1: Can we characterise farmers who, in 2010-11, accepted climate change posed a*
334 *risk to their region, versus those who did not perceive climate change as a risk or were not*
335 *sure?*

336 Table 1 illustrates the mean characteristics of farmers in 2010-11 across the entire sample, and
337 for sub-groups of farmers classified based on their climate change risk perception. We
338 distinguish between those who believed climate change posed a risk in 2010-11 (i.e. the 91
339 farmers who answered “Yes” to the climate change question) and those who disagreed (i.e.
340 the 135 “No” farmers). The “Yes” group characteristics are compared to the sample
341 remainder (namely 184 farmers) including: a) those who disagreed that climate change posed
342 a risk (the deniers); and b) those who were unsure. The “No” group characteristics are
343 compared to the sample remainder of 140 farmers who answered “Yes” or were unsure.
344 Variables for which mean tests were found statistically significant at the 1, 5 or 10% level are
345 in bold.⁴

346 We observed some significant differences across MDB states: in the group of deniers (last
347 column, “No” answer in Table 1), there is a (significantly) higher representation of farmers
348 operating in VIC and a (significantly) lower representation of farmers living in SA, compared
349 to the rest of the sampled population. These discrepancies, in terms of climate change risk
350 perceptions across the three states, are most likely related to the type of industry farmers are
351 engaged in. Deniers had the lowest percentage of land planted with permanent crops (grapes
352 or fruit trees). Indeed, in SA permanent crops dominate our panel dataset, since 79% of land
353 was planted with either grapes or fruit trees in 2010-11 (on average over the 275 farmers);
354 while permanent crops covered an average of 13% of the land owned by Victorian farmers
355 and 14% in NSW.

356

⁴ We ran a simple Probit regression on the group of 275 farmers to try and identify significant explanatory variables to explain the probability of believing climate change poses a risk in 2010-11 (the “Yes” farmers). Results confirm the outcome of our mean tests in general. We also find that those farmers who are not indebted are less likely to agree with climate change risk.

357 **Table 1. Farmers' average characteristics and climate change risk perceptions in 2010-**
 358 **11**

	<i>2010-11 Full sample (n=275) Freq. (%) or mean</i>	<i>2010-11 "Yes"^a (n=91) Freq. (%) or mean</i>	<i>2010-11 "No"^b (n=135) Freq. (%) or mean</i>
State: NSW	98 (36%)	34 (37%)	43 (32%)
VIC	108 (39%)	33 (36%)	65 (48%)***
SA	69 (25%)	24 (27%)	27 (20%)*
Education level:			
Below year 10	46 (17%)	9 (10%)**	31 (23%)***
Year 10-12	140 (51%)	43 (47%)	72 (53%)
Tafe and equiv.	38 (14%)	18 (20%)**	15 (11%)
Uni. and equiv.	51 (19%)	21 (23%)	17 (13%)**
Male	0.90	0.87	0.91
Age (years)	55.4	54.4	56.0
Environ. group member (0/1)	0.27	0.32	0.26
Farm size (ha)	506	465	594^c
Irrigated size (ha)	153	195*	126
Irrigated land in permanent crops - grape & fruit trees (%)	30.0	35.1	22.8***
Irrigated broadacre land (%)	24.7	23.9	26.1
Irrigated pasture/grazing land (%)	35.1	28.3*	41.1**
Total volume of high entitlement water held (ML)	297	322	300
Mean end allocation previous 5 years ^d	52.2 (264 obs.)	53.8 (87 obs.)	50.5 (130 obs.)
Water utilisation rate (%) ^e	55.7	58.4	55.4
Net farm income (\$1,000)	33.8 (247 obs.)	31.5 (84 obs.)	35.8 (119 obs.)
Off-farm income (% of total income)	38.9%	37.8%	40.2%
Debt to equity ratio	0.40	0.49***	0.35**
Likelihood of successor (yes=1)	0.38 (261 obs.)	0.28** (87 obs.)	0.43* (130 obs.)
Mean annual temperature (°C, 1982-2011)	23.2	23.3	23.1**
Annual total rainfall (mm, previous year)	402	395	411*
Mean annual total rainfall (mm, 1982-2011)	365	366	368
Standard dev. annual temp. (°C, 1982-2011)	0.69	0.70	0.69
Standard dev. of annual rainfall (mm, 1982-2011)	110	111	111
Mean annual rainfall percentile (2006-2011)	36.3	36.1	36.1

359 Notes: ^a*, **, *** indicate statistical significance from the two-sample t-test for equal means (at the 10, 5 and
 360 1% level, respectively) of the difference between the mean of the variable for 2010-11 believers ("Yes" column)
 361 and the mean for the rest of the farmers. No indication indicates "non-statistically significant".
 362 ^b*, **, *** indicate significance (at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively) of the difference between the mean for
 363 2010-11 deniers ("No" column) and the mean for the rest of the farmers. No indication indicates "non-
 364 statistically significant".
 365 ^c significant at the 11% level.
 366 ^d weighted by security ownership.
 367 ^e Defined as the water extracted by irrigators as a percentage of the water allocated/received for a given year,
 368 taking into account entitlement reliability. It can be significantly influenced by using much larger volumes
 369 through purchased water, than water received from entitlements owned. Hence, water utilisation rates were
 370 capped to 100%, indicating these irrigators used 100% of their own water entitlements.

371

372 Conversely, deniers had a higher percentage of land in pasture and grazing compared to the
373 believer group. Farmers who have engaged primarily in permanent cropping are significantly
374 less represented in the denier group, therefore are more likely to agree climate change poses a
375 risk. It is known that farmers having permanent crops are more exposed to the risk of drought,
376 since these crops have to be irrigated for the trees (and the investment) to be preserved over
377 future years (Wheeler et al. 2020a). The risk faced by farmers planting annual crops is not as
378 pressing in the sense that a major drought would only affect production in the current year/s –
379 and farmers also usually have the choice between growing an annual crop each year or not
380 (Nauges et al. 2016).

381 In line with attitudes found among the general population and other farming surveys, we
382 observe that farmers with lower education are more likely to be in the denier group (Barnes et
383 al. 2013; Wheeler et al. 2013; Hamilton et al. 2015, Nauges and Wheeler 2017). The average
384 mean temperature over the last 30 years was found to be significantly (p -value <0.05) lower
385 among deniers locations (albeit the difference between means very small), and total rainfall in
386 the previous year – which is found significantly (p -value <0.10) higher among deniers farm
387 locations. This supports literature (e.g. Mase et al. 2017) that suggests local environmental
388 conditions play a part in influencing climate change risk perceptions.

389 There is an almost statistically significant difference in average farm size (at the 11% level)
390 for those farmers who did not believe climate change posed a risk in 2010-11. Farm size was
391 larger on average for deniers than in the rest of the sampled population, which may again be
392 linked to the type of industry farmers are engaged in. However, believers had a significantly
393 statistically larger irrigated area than all other farmers. While there was no statistically
394 significant difference in net farm income, water utilisation rate or off-farm income for either
395 believers or deniers, believers had statistically significantly higher debt to equity ratios –
396 while deniers had statistically significantly lower debt to equity ratios. Finally, we observed
397 that there are a significantly higher proportion of farms with an identified successor among
398 the denier group. This is not really surprising since deniers, due to their perception that
399 climate change is not posing a risk, most likely have more positive expectations about the
400 future than farmers who are believers.

401 Other than education, irrigators' climate change risk perceptions seem to be driven by their
402 capital exposure to the risk of drought, as well as their capacity to mitigate any consequences
403 in terms of debt to equity levels. Those having a larger share of their land planted with grapes

404 or fruit trees – hence being more exposed to the risk of crop failure (and more exposed to the
 405 risk of losing a long-lived asset) – are more likely to believe climate change is posing a risk.

406 *Question 2: Have farmers’ climate change risk perceptions evolved over time? Did farmers,
 407 who did not perceive climate change risk for their region in 2010-11, perceive it as a risk in
 408 2015-16, and vice versa?*

409 Table 2 describes the evolution in risk perceptions between 2010-11 and 2015-16.

410 **Table 2. Matrix of farmers’ climate change risk perceptions across time (n=275)**

		<i>2015-16</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Unsure</i>	
<i>2010-11</i>	<i>No</i>	71 53%	36 27%	28 20%	135 100%
	<i>Yes</i>	13 14%	71 78%	7 8%	91 100%
	<i>Unsure</i>	10 20%	20 41%	19 39%	49 100%
	<i>Total</i>	94 34%	127 46%	54 20%	275 100%

411
 412 Among the 275 farmers, 161 (59% of the sample) perceived risk in a similar manner in 2010-
 413 11 and in 2015-16. A total of 71 farmers in Table 2 (26% of the sample) believed climate
 414 change would not pose a risk to their region in 2010-11 and kept the same opinion in 2015-16
 415 (“No”- 2010-11 and “No”- 2015-16). The same number of farmers (71, or 26% of the sample)
 416 believed in 2010-11, and still believed in 2015-16, that climate change posed a risk to the
 417 region (“Yes”- 2010-11 and “Yes”- 2015-16). Only 19 farmers (7%) declared being unsure in
 418 both years.

419 We are primarily interested in the 118 farmers (43% of the sample) whose perceptions about
 420 climate change risk changed over the five-year interval: these include 36 respondents who,
 421 initially, did not believe climate change posed a risk for their region but, five years later,
 422 changed their mind and stated the opposite. Among the deniers in 2010-11, another 28
 423 became unsure in 2015-16. Interestingly we also observe that 20 farmers, who believed
 424 climate change posed a risk in 2010-11, changed their minds in 2015-16 by answering “No”
 425 or “unsure” in 2015-16.

426 Table 3 classified farmers who had changed their minds about climate change risk into two
 427 groups: 1) 20 farmers who originally perceived climate change posed a risk in 2010-11 and
 428 then changed their mind in 2015-16 (either to denial or unsure); and 2) 64 farmers who

429 believed climate change did not pose any risk in 2010-11 and then changed their mind in
430 2015-16 (hence answering “Yes” or “Unsure”). In each column we report the variable mean
431 of either group 1 or 2 and the variable mean for the rest of the farmers inside parentheses.

432 Group 1, which includes the 20 farmers (versus the rest) who believed climate change posed a
433 risk in 2010-11 and no longer believed this in 2015-16, has a significantly lower proportion of
434 males and a significantly lower net farm income than the rest of the population. Group 2,
435 which includes the 64 farmers (versus the rest) who perceived climate change a greater risk
436 after the 5-year interval (from denier to believer or unsure), has more of the low-educated
437 farmers than the rest of the population. Farmers in Group 2 also recorded a higher net farm
438 income and a lower share of land in permanent crops (both measured in 2010-11) than the rest
439 of the population. Finally, farmers in Group 2 experienced a much larger decline in rainfall in
440 the previous year than the rest, which may contribute to the switch from denier in 2010-11 to
441 believer in 2015-16. While acknowledging the relatively small sample size, this suggests that
442 – although climate change is a long-term concept – farmers may link it to short-term climatic
443 fluctuations over the period of just a few years.

444 In the following section, we seek to better understand the characteristics identified in Table 3,
445 by considering why risk perceptions may have changed after farmers modified their exposure
446 to risk by undertaking long-term/investment decisions – implying significant structural
447 changes on the farm.

448

449
450

Table 3. Profile of farmers depending on the change in their climate change risk perception

	<i>Group One – Believer that climate change posed a risk in 2010-11 to Otherwise in 2015-16^a</i>	<i>Group Two – Denier that climate change posed a risk in 2010-11 to Otherwise in 2015-16^b</i>
Male	0.75 (0.91)**	0.89 (0.90)
Age (years) in 2010-11	54.6 (55.5)	54.5 (55.7)
Low education in 2010-11 ^c	0.65 (0.68)	0.75 (0.65)^e
Env group membership in 2010-11	0.30 (0.26)	0.30 (0.26)
Farm size (ha) in 2010-11	287 (523)	608 (475)
Net farm income (AU\$ 1,000) in 2010-11	21.0 (35.0)**	40.2 (32.0)*
Land in permanent crops in 2010-11 (1 if permanent cropping is present on the farm; 0 otherwise)	40.0% (29.2%)	20.3% (33.0%)**
Likelihood of successor in 2010-11	0.32 (0.38)	0.42 (0.36)
Total volume of high entitlement water held in 2010-11 (ML)	381 (290)	286 (300)
Mean end allocation previous 5 years in 2010-11 ^d (%)	54.8 (52.0)	50.0 (52.9)
Water utilisation rate in 2010-11 (%)	55.9 (55.7)	55.5 (55.8)
Difference between rainfall (mm) in 2014-15 and rainfall in 2009-10	-147 (-142)	-163 (-136.0)***
Long term rainfall percentile of previous five years in 2015-16	56.3 (55.2)	54.3 (55.6)**
# of farmers	20 (compared to the other 255 farmers in brackets)	64 (compared to the other 211 farmers in brackets)

451 Notes: ^a *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively) from the two-sample
452 t-test for equal means of the variable for farmers in Group 1 and the mean for the rest of the farmers. No
453 indication indicates “non-statistically significant”. ^b *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (at the 10, 5 and
454 1% level, respectively) from the two-sample t-test for equal means of the variable for farmers in Group 2 and the
455 mean for the rest of the farmers. No indication indicates “non-statistically significant”. ^c Dummy variable that
456 takes the value 1 if farmer’s education level is year 12 maximum, and 0 otherwise. ^d Weighted by security
457 ownership. ^e Mean difference is significant at the 15% level of significance.
458

459 *Question 3: Are farmers' climate change risk perceptions associated with major farm*
460 *production decisions made on the farm between the two surveys? Can we detect a feedback*
461 *relationship between perceptions and behaviour?*

462 As has been found previously in the literature (e.g. Nauges and Wheeler 2017), we
463 hypothesise climate change risk perception could be endogenous and subject to a feedback
464 loop, in the sense that actions undertaken by farmers between the two survey periods may
465 have altered their exposure to risk and hence their perception of the risk posed by climate
466 change. Taking farmers' original climate change belief as a base, we compared farmers'
467 significant production decisions made between 2010-11 and 2015-16. We focussed on farm
468 major production choices (all binary variables), and also the change in total irrigated area
469 (continuous decision expressed in percentage terms).

470 Farmers who agreed climate change posed a risk to their region in 2010-11 were more likely
471 to sell land between 2010-11 and 2015-16 (18% of believers versus 8% of deniers/unsure).
472 Believers, as at 2010-11, were also more likely to sell water entitlements between 2010-11
473 and 2015-16 (40% of believers versus 29% for deniers/unsure). The difference was
474 statistically significant at the 10% level. On the contrary, those who did not perceive climate
475 change as a risk in 2010-11 were more likely to buy water entitlements over the next five
476 years (probability of 20% for deniers versus 12% for believers/unsure, with the difference
477 statistically significant at the 10% level). In line with the purchase of water entitlements, we
478 observed that deniers in 2010-11 increased their irrigated area significantly more than
479 believers/unsure (this is reflected in the variable that measures the change in irrigated area).

480 Figures in Table 4 suggest two categories of farmers may coexist: the first category being
481 believers in 2010-11 who decided to disinvest by selling land and water entitlements. These
482 farmers presumably saw (irrigation) farming as a risky activity, and we know they considered
483 climate change a risk factor. They reduced their risk exposure by lowering the scale of their
484 farming activities and hence their irrigation farming dependence. We do not see any
485 statistically significant evidence that these farmers planned to exit and sell the farm (although
486 believers were relatively more likely to have said they were thinking of leaving the farm in
487 2010-11). It must be noted that our panel dataset includes everyone who continued farming,
488 so this is not the best test for farm exit.

489

490

491 **Table 4. Relationship between climate change risk perceptions in 2010-11 and major**
 492 **production decisions over the next five years**

<i>Between 2010-11 and 2015-16, irrigators' major production actions:</i>	<i>2010-11 Strong believer ("Yes only")</i>	<i>2010-11 "No" or "Unsure"</i>	<i>Mean test p-value</i>	<i>2010-11 Strong denier ("No only")</i>	<i>2010-11 "Yes" or "Unsure"</i>	<i>Mean test p-value</i>
Sold farm-land (0/1)	0.18	0.08	**	0.08	0.14	<i>n.s.</i>
Bought farm-land (0/1)	0.20	0.22	<i>n.s.</i>	0.22	0.21	<i>n.s.</i>
Sold water entitlements (0/1)	0.40	0.29	*	0.30	0.34	<i>n.s.</i>
Bought water entitlements (0/1)	0.14	0.17	<i>n.s.</i>	0.20	0.12	*
Increased irrigated area (0/1)	0.23	0.19	<i>n.s.</i>	0.24	0.19	<i>n.s.</i>
Decreased irrigated area (0/1)	0.34	0.22	**	0.25	0.26	<i>n.s.</i>
Change in irrigated area (%) ^a	31	280	<i>n.s.</i>	348	57	**
Improved irrigation efficiency (0/1)	0.79	0.81	<i>n.s.</i>	0.81	0.79	<i>n.s.</i>
Changed crop mix (0/1)	0.53	0.53	<i>n.s.</i>	0.53	0.52	<i>n.s.</i>
Utilised solar and battery technology (0/1)	0.36	0.28	<i>n.s.</i>	0.31	0.30	<i>n.s.</i>
Change in water utilisation rate	16.50	22.71	<i>n.s.</i>	25.85	15.65	**
Climate Change Actions (e.g. tree planting; soil management; timing changes; canopy/shed for plant/shelter) (0/1)	0.07	0.07	<i>n.s.</i>	0.06	0.07	<i>n.s.</i>
# of farmers (275 in total)	91	184		135	140	

493 Notes: ^a Computed as (irrigated area in 2015-16 take irrigated area in 2010-11)/irrigated area in 2010-11. The
 494 change can be either negative or positive. There were 21 farms that had zero irrigated area in 2010-11 but
 495 positive irrigated area in 2015-16. Hence their percentage change in irrigated area was not defined and they are
 496 not included in the calculation of the variable named "change in irrigated area".

497
 498 The second group includes deniers in 2010-11. In the following five years, deniers increased
 499 their farm-irrigated area and purchased more water entitlements. It seems these farmers hoped
 500 to continue farming in the future, but wanted to be better protected against drought risk
 501 through increased water entitlements. This may illustrate water entitlement trade is partly
 502 driven by differences in risk perception and risk management strategies (as suggested in
 503 Nauges et al. 2016). Group 1 farmers (the believers) disinvest in farming and send water
 504 entitlements to the second group of farmers (the deniers) who aim to continue farming
 505 activities, albeit with reinforced protection against drought.

506 Finally, we test our feedback hypothesis: namely that changes in climate change perceptions
507 from 2010-11 to 2015-16 could have been driven, among other factors, by major farm
508 decisions undertaken during this time-period, in particular production decisions including:
509 buying and selling of land and water entitlements; increasing or decreasing irrigated area;
510 changing crop mix; improving irrigation infrastructure; tree planting; soil management;
511 changing timing of practices, and utilising solar and battery technology for irrigation water
512 pumping.⁵ We used the two groups of farmers to test the research questions. The main
513 hypothesis tested was that farmers who were (or were not) originally concerned about climate
514 change risk may have changed their mind after undertaking various production decisions that
515 decreased (or increased) their exposure to climate change risk. We hypothesise that selling
516 land, decreasing irrigated area and consequently selling water entitlements, decreasing water
517 use percentage, changing crop mix, and utilising solar and battery technology leads to a
518 reduced risk exposure. Reducing risk increases farmers' sense of 'control' and hence
519 decreases the likelihood that they perceive climate change as a risk. Conversely, farm actions
520 such as purchasing land, increasing irrigated area and consequently increasing water
521 entitlements, increases risk exposure and hence the likelihood that climate change is perceived
522 as a risk. If there is evidence for the above two hypotheses, it would suggest that climate
523 change perception and behaviour influence and feed back on each other, and that farmers' risk
524 perceptions are influenced by their risk exposure.

525 We ran two Probit models to analyse the change in climate change risk perceptions between
526 2010-11 and 2015-16. Independent variables included combinations of nine actual farm
527 production actions between 2010-11 and 2015-16 and also controlled for a range of
528 demographic, socio-economic and farm level characteristics. The nine farm production
529 actions were defined as dummy variables: 1) selling land; 2) purchasing land; 3) selling water
530 entitlements; 4) purchasing water entitlements; 5) increasing irrigated area; 6) decreasing
531 irrigated area; 7) changing crop mix; 8) improving irrigation infrastructure; 9) utilising solar

⁵ Unfortunately we had limited information on tree planting, soil management and other types of 'softer' farm adaptation behaviour because only farmers who answered they had a climate change risk plan were asked to provide more information on what they were doing as part of this plan. Given this, although a wide range of variables was included in the full regression modelling shown in Table A4 in the Appendix, it was not statistically significant and it limits any ability to fully infer insights. One such hypothesis is that more 'softer' farm adaptation behaviour (unlike other major production decisions) will not feed back negatively on climate change attitudes, due to the fact such behaviour is more diagnostic, knowledge-based and lower financial cost in nature (similar to findings in Nauges and Wheeler, 2017, regarding different types of household behaviour). Indeed, the coefficients in Table A4 provide some support that this type of farm adaptation behaviour has a positive feedback impact on climate change attitudes (but the results were not statistically significant and larger sample sizes will be needed).

532 and battery technology for pumping irrigation water; and 10) climate change plan action (e.g.
533 tree planting, soil management etc). Pre-testing of the independent variables suggested that
534 the farm actions of water entitlement trade and irrigation area had interaction effects.

535 Therefore, in the reported models, two interaction terms were created between selling water
536 entitlements and decreasing irrigated area, and purchasing water entitlements and increasing
537 irrigated area.

538 Since the sample size of 275 irrigators is relatively small, the statistical power of our analysis
539 may be low, which suggests a higher probability of failing to detect a statistically significant
540 difference when such a difference actually exists (also called a type II error). Power
541 calculations were undertaken for the variables of most interest to the study—climate change
542 risk perception between 2010-11 and 2015-16, and irrigators’ production decisions regarding
543 water entitlements and irrigated area. Although our sample size is relatively small, for the
544 purpose of our analysis, the statistical power is sufficient or close to sufficient (i.e. above or
545 close to 0.80).⁶ In line with best practices in the literature (Gabaix and Laibson 2008), a
546 parsimonious model was estimated using the nine actual farm production actions between
547 2010-11 and 2015-16 if they are statistically significant (0.10 level) and only the statistically
548 significant (0.10 level) control variables, such as education, state location, succession status,
549 etc. However, for robustness check, another model using the full list of independent variables
550 was estimated as well and reported in Table A4 in the Appendix.

551

552

⁶ In our sample, there are 140 irrigators who did not sell water entitlements and did not reduce irrigated area, and 25 irrigators who did both. The proportion of group 1 (from Yes to otherwise) for the 140 irrigators is 0.04 while the proportion of group 1 for the 25 irrigators is 0.24. The power of a two-sided test to detect a statistically significant difference between the two proportions, assuming a 0.05 significance level is 0.85, which is above the usual 0.80 default level, suggesting the probability of committing a type II error is 0.15. Similarly, there are also 190 irrigators who did not buy water entitlements and did not increase irrigated area, and 19 irrigators who did both. The proportion of group 2 (from No to otherwise) for the 190 irrigators is 0.20 while the proportion of group 2 for the 19 irrigators is 0.48. The power of a two-sided test to detect a statistically significant difference between the two proportions, assuming a 0.05 significance level is 0.76, which is close to the usual 0.80 default level, suggesting a type II error probability is 0.24.

553
554

Table 5. Estimated coefficients of parsimonious probit models for change in climate change risk perception between 2010-11 and 2015-16

	<i>Group One:</i>		<i>Group Two:</i>	
	<i>From 'Yes' to otherwise</i>	<i>Delta-method</i>	<i>From 'No' to otherwise</i>	<i>Delta-method</i>
	<i>Marginal effect</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Marginal effect</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>
Sold farm-land in last 5 years	-	-	-0.192**	0.090
Bought farm-land in last 5 years	0.169***	0.045	-	-
Neither sold water entitlement nor reduced irrigated area (reference group) in the last five years	-	-	-	-
Only reduced irrigated area	0.016	0.043	-	-
Only sold water entitlements	0.080**	0.035	-	-
Sold water entitlements and reduced irrigated area	0.146***	0.039	-	-
Neither bought water entitlement nor increased irrigated area (reference group) in the last five years	-	-	-	-
Only increased irrigated area	-0.001	0.034	0.002	0.067
Only bought water entitlements	-0.185***	0.071	0.079	0.088
Bought water entitlements and increased irrigated area	-0.123**	0.062	0.187**	0.084
Changed crop mix in last five years	0.104***	0.032	-	-
Improved irrigation infrastructure in last 5 years	0.136**	0.064	-	-
NSW state (SA and VIC reference group)	-	-	-0.192***	0.059
Low education dummy in 2015-16 ¹	0.114***	0.035	-	-
Successor dummy in 2015-16 ¹	-0.128***	0.030	-	-
Permanent crop dummy in 2015-16 ¹	0.062**	0.029	-	-
Net farm income (\$1,000) in 2015-16 ¹	-0.001***	0.0002	0.0006*	0.0003
Debt to equity ratio in 2015-16 ¹	-0.092**	0.044	-	-
Total high security water entitlement (ML) in 2015-16 ¹	0.0001***	0.00004	-0.0002**	0.0001
Change in water utilisation rate in last 5 years	-	-	0.001**	0.0005
Mean rainfall percentile in the last 5 years (20km around farm)	0.009***	0.003	-	-
Observations		275		275
Wald Chi-2 statistics		39.08***		24.41***
Pseudo R ²		0.38		0.08
% of correct predictions		94		79

555 ¹ Variables in 2010-11 were also tried and results were similar for most. Since succession plan had 14 missing
556 values in 2010-11, all these variables in 2015-16 were used instead. For model results with the full list of
557 independent variables, refer to Table A4 in the Appendix. The models reported here were kept as parsimonious
558 as possible.

559 ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

560

561 Findings from the first (Group 1) Probit model (shown in Table 5) suggest that irrigators were
562 more likely to change their original climate change risk perception from “Yes” to otherwise
563 (including no and unsure) five years later if they bought farmland (with an increasing
564 probability of 0.17), decreased irrigated area and meanwhile sold water entitlements (with a
565 probability of 0.15), changed crop mix (with an increasing probability of 0.10), and improved
566 irrigation infrastructure (with an increasing probability of 0.14). Irrigators were also less
567 likely to change their original climate change risk perception from “Yes” to otherwise five
568 years later if they bought water entitlements but did not increase irrigated area (with a
569 decreasing probability of 0.19), or bought water entitlements and meanwhile increased
570 irrigated area (with a decreasing probability of 0.12). This suggests support for decreased risk
571 exposure from farm action - resulting in a weaker belief in climate change, or for increased
572 risk exposure resulting in a stronger climate change risk perceptions. Other statistically
573 significant results include farmers with low education were more likely to have switched from
574 a believer to a denier/not sure, and those who had a succession plan in place were less likely
575 to have switched from being a believer to denier/not sure. Higher net farm income and higher
576 debt to equity levels - which suggest higher risk exposure from increased debt levels - are
577 associated with a lower likelihood in switching from a believer to otherwise. A higher rainfall
578 in the farm’s location (decreased risk exposure) in the last five years was found to increase the
579 likelihood in switching from a believer to otherwise.

580 Results of the second (Group 2) Probit model in Table 5 suggest that irrigators were more
581 likely to change their original climate change risk perception from “No” to otherwise if they
582 increased irrigated area and also consequently bought more water entitlements (with an
583 increasing probability of 0.19), had an increased water utilisation rate and did not sell
584 farmland – during the five years between 2010-11 and 2015-16. These results indicate that
585 overall increased irrigation risk exposure from farm action means farmers were more likely to
586 change from being a denier towards believing climate change poses a risk or being unsure.
587 Although caution is recommended due to the small sample size, our results suggest that
588 farmers’ climate change perceptions may be influenced by farm production decisions that
589 impact their risk exposure. But it is also important to note that it is possible that other
590 variables beyond those able to be included in our regression models could also impact
591 farmers’ perceptions of climate-related risk.

592

593

594 **Discussion**

595 Although there has been much research in the literature on understanding the drivers of both
596 consumers' and farmers' climate change beliefs (Austin et al. 2020a; Hornsey et al. 2016;
597 Raymond and Spoehr 2013; van der Linden 2014), nearly all of this work has used snapshots
598 of observed behaviour and beliefs at one point in time, making it difficult to study their
599 dynamics within a specific population. There has also been increasing literature that has
600 highlighted the complex relationship between attitudes and behaviour, and that undertaking
601 climate change adaptation and mitigation action can sometimes feed back negatively on
602 climate change attitudes (Nauges and Wheeler 2017; Wheeler et al. 2013). This study has
603 extended the literature by using a panel dataset of the same 275 Australian farmers over a
604 five-year period to explore and understand: a) the extent, stability and influences associated
605 with farmers' climate change perceptions; and b) how farmers' climate change risk
606 perceptions are associated with major farm changes – and to further test the potential
607 feedback (endogenous) relationship between attitudes and long-term farm behaviour.

608 Overall, it was found that MDB farmers' perceptions towards climate change became more
609 accepting over the five-year period (from 33% agreeing that climate change posed a risk to their
610 region in 2010-11 to 46% in 2015-16). This is a positive sign for policy-makers trying to
611 encourage increased farm adaptation, in the face of a hotter and more variable climate future.⁷
612 Our analysis in this paper supports the role that farmer characteristics (e.g. education, has a
613 farm successor) and farm characteristics (e.g. location, farm size, irrigated area, industry
614 (permanent versus annual crops), debt, and climate conditions (temperature and rainfall)) play
615 in driving climate change perceptions. The interplay between risk exposure and perceptions is
616 revealing: MDB farmers in higher debt, with greater permanent crops, in areas that have had
617 higher temperatures and less rainfall, were all more likely to accept climate change poses a risk
618 to their region (similar to results found by Mase et al. 2017).

619 This study found some evidence that farmers who went from believers in 2010-11 to
620 deniers/unsure in 2015-16, were more likely during the five years to change crop mix,
621 upgrade irrigation infrastructure, reduce irrigated area and consequently sell water
622 entitlements. We suggest this decreased their overall risk exposure and hence *negatively* fed

⁷Indeed, there is evidence in the past couple of years of increased action by farmers towards climate change, given that Australia has seen the creation of the following groups such as Young Carbon Farmers and Farmers for Climate Action. The country has also had the first ever rally on climate change by farmers in Canberra in 2018, national adverts in 2018 on the need for climate change action by farmers and since 2016 the National Farmers Federation have taken increasingly stronger positions on the need to reduce carbon emissions.


623 back on their stated climate change concern in 2015-16. Indeed, there may be some link
624 between the presence of upgraded irrigation infrastructure (increasing the ‘sense of control’)
625 and lessening climate change beliefs, as suggested by the findings of Niles and Mueller
626 (2016). This study found evidence to suggest that the presence of infrastructure potentially
627 positively influenced farmer perceptions that annual rainfall had increased over time. Niles
628 and Mueller (2016) proposed these perceptions were important, with regards to how the
629 presence of infrastructure influenced how people perceived and responded to climate change.
630 The identification of a significant increase in water extraction of up to 28% by Wheeler et al.
631 (2020a), from subsidising irrigation infrastructure in the southern MDB, indicates one such
632 negative consequence of government policy.

633 Similarly, climate change deniers in 2010-11 were more likely in the following five years to
634 increase irrigated area and consequently purchase water entitlements – plus increase their
635 water utilisation rate, which in turn increased their overall risk exposure. This then
636 correspondingly *positively* fed back on their stated climate change attitudes in 2015-16, and
637 they became more concerned about the risk of climate change. Our findings echo Wilson et al.
638 (1993)’s analysis of risk perception and management decisions of US dairy farmers as an
639 outcome of complex feedback loops between perceptions and behaviour (van Raaij, 1981). It
640 also complements recent findings by Austin et al. (2020b) on the dynamics of drought-related
641 attitudes and adaptive capacity in the NSW non-metropolitan population. However, to the best
642 of our knowledge, this is the first time a link between farm action and farmer attitude has been
643 shown from any behavioural data over a period of years.

644 In regards to the relationship between attitudes and major farm production decisions, our main
645 findings regarding the dynamics and relationships of exposure, perceptions and actions are
646 summarised in Figure 2, which shows a feedback loop happening between attitudes and
647 behaviour. We argue that this feedback from actions to perceptions is one reason to explain
648 the instability in climate change perceptions. In our panel data sample, 43% of surveyed
649 farmers did not have the same climate change perceptions five years later, and – although
650 more farmers were likely to switch to agreeing that climate change posed a risk – it was also
651 true that some reversed their former statement that climate change was occurring. Our
652 findings also demonstrated that change in local weather conditions partly explained the
653 change in climate-related risk perception.

654

655 **Figure 2. Key summary of relationship between climate change (CC) risk perceptions,**
 656 **risk exposure and changed farm behaviour**



657
 658 Notes: ^aIn particular, bought water entitlements and also increased irrigated area
 659 ^bIn particular, sold water entitlements and also decreased irrigated area
 660

661 Whether farmers do or do not accept climate change, they all have to deal with the uncertainty
 662 of weather and, indeed, farmers have been managing uncertainty for a very long time. The
 663 question is how we can help farmers adapt the most to a changing climate in the future,
 664 understanding that there is a complex link between perceptions and behaviour. Given that the
 665 term ‘climate change’ can be so polarising, education campaigns to change farmers’ perceptions
 666 will probably not provide the desired results – although it is clear from our results that higher
 667 farmer education in general is associated with more stability in climate change perception.
 668 George et al. (2019) recommended a focus on education, extension on risk management and
 669 developing best management practices for dealing with extreme climatic events. We also
 670 recommend an implementation of policies that improve farmers’ risk-management and
 671 decision-making, by focusing on how adaptation to weather variability can increase
 672 profitability and strengthen the farm’s viability. Similar to household behaviour (Nauges and
 673 Wheeler 2017), a portfolio of policies, regulation, targeted incentives and information is
 674 needed. Indeed, different populations of farmer cohorts may need a different mix of policies.

675 Farming policy should be more strategic and forward thinking, with subsidies removed for
676 inputs and outputs that can distort farmers' decision-making (e.g. Wheeler et al. 2020a for
677 comments on irrigation infrastructure subsidies) – and reward farmers for good land practice
678 (e.g. greater use and implementation of soil carbon markets and land stewardship). Many
679 farmers are already making significant investment in planning for climate change on their farm,
680 and the challenge for policy-makers is how to maximise such behaviour going forward.

681 The limitations of our study include the relatively small sample size (n=275), and the fact it
682 only covers five years of farm data and attitudes. The small sample size also did not allow us
683 to break up the data into typologies of farmers (e.g. traditional farmers versus environmentally
684 friendly farmers versus corporate/profit minded farmers), nor industries for further analysis.
685 We also had limited information on more diagnostic and knowledge forms of farmer
686 adaptation behaviour (tree planting, changes of practices etc) – where with further data it
687 would be very interesting to test for the existence of a negative (or indeed even a positive)
688 feedback loop with climate change perceptions. The surveys were done in two very different
689 climatic years, which, although this was controlled for in our modelling, may have had an
690 impact on climate change risk perceptions. Further research in this space on the feedback loop
691 between attitudes and behaviour for both consumers and farmers across developed and
692 developing countries may be warranted, through a variety of different methods such as
693 experimentation, repeated survey analysis and in-depth qualitative analysis.

694

695 **Conclusion**

696 The exact relationship between people's climate change attitudes and behaviour is a topic that
697 is very important for climate change policy worldwide. Do climate change attitudes influence
698 behaviour or is it possible that behaviour can change attitudes? If the influence is just one
699 way, then education to try and change climate change attitudes may be one of the most
700 effective ways of encourage adaptation to climate change. However, if there is a feedback
701 loop between behaviour and attitudes, then more sophisticated policy instruments may be
702 needed. There is emerging literature highlighting this complex relationship between attitudes
703 and behaviour, and that undertaking climate change adaptation and mitigation action can
704 sometimes feed back on climate change attitudes. However, the majority of the current
705 literature that has studied these relationships have focussed on cross-sectional analysis (one-
706 off surveys at a point in time). This study has extended the literature by using a panel

707 (repeated survey of the same irrigators) dataset of 275 MDB farmers, over the time-period of
708 2010-11 to 2015-16, to examine the evidence for the existence of a feedback loop. It does so
709 by exploring three main questions: 1) understanding farmers' climate change risk perceptions
710 and the characteristics associated with their perceptions; 2) identifying how farmers' risk
711 perceptions have evolved over time and how stable those risk perceptions are; and 3)
712 identifying if climate change risk perceptions are associated with major farm action long-term
713 changes.

714 It was found that farmers became more accepting of climate change risk in their region over
715 the time-period (those agreeing increased from 33% to 46%). However, climate change
716 perceptions were not stable: 41% of surveyed farmers in our panel dataset did not have the
717 same climate change perception five years later, and although more farmers were likely to
718 change to agreeing that climate change posed a risk, it was also true that some farmers
719 reversed their former statement that climate change was occurring. This variability in attitudes
720 is one reason why it has been found that attitudes are often not the major driver of behavioural
721 change.

722 This study found new evidence of the feedback loop between perceptions and behaviour in
723 Australia. Namely, farmers who believed at the start of the time-period that climate change
724 was a risk, were more likely to undertake decisions that reduced their risk exposure overall
725 (e.g. changed crop mix; upgraded irrigation infrastructure; and reduced irrigated area and
726 consequently sold water entitlements). This correspondingly negatively fed back on their
727 climate change concern (i.e. they became less concerned about the risk of climate change).
728 Conversely, non-believers who increased their risk exposure over the time-period (e.g.
729 increased water utilisation; increased irrigated land and consequently bought water
730 entitlements) were more likely to change their mind afterwards and believe that climate
731 change posed a risk.

732 Given these findings, and the similarities noted between our study and farmers' climate
733 change perceptions in other developed countries, it is important that policy-makers worldwide
734 understand the complex relationship between attitudes and behaviour, and how various
735 policies to change behaviour can impact negatively (or positively) on attitudes. Going
736 forward, policies that improve farmers' risk-management and decision-making by focusing on
737 how adaptation to weather variability can increase profitability and strengthen the farm's
738 viability will be highly important; and a portfolio of policies, regulation, targeted incentives
739 for good land management and information is needed.

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886

Table A1. Key characteristics of the full sample and panel sample in 2010-11

	Full sample (n=946)	Panel sample (n=275)
State: NSW	33% [30%, 36%]	36% [30%, 42%]
VIC	38% [35%, 41%]	39% [34%, 45%]
SA	29% [26%, 32%]	25% [20%, 31%]
Education level:		
Below year 10	16% [14%, 19%]	17% [13%, 22%]
Year 10 to year 12	52% [49%, 55%]	51% [45%, 57%]
Tafe and equiv.	12% [10%, 15%]	14% [10%, 18%]
Univ. and equiv.	19% [17%, 22%]	19% [14%, 24%]
Gender (male = 1)	88% [86%, 90%]	90% [86%, 93%]
Age (years)	55.0 [54.3, 55.7]	55.4 [54.2, 56.7]
Likelihood of successor (yes=1)	36% [32%, 39%]	38% [32%, 43%]
Environ. group member (yes=1)	26% [23%, 28%]	27% [21%, 32%]
Farm size (ha)	471 [410, 533]	506 [400, 613]
Irrigated size (ha)	144 [125, 163]	153 [120, 186]
Irrigation Land in permanent crops - grape and fruit trees (%)	31.6 [28.7, 34.5]	30.0 [24.7, 35.3]
Irrigation land in broadacre crops	23.3 [21.1, 25.6]	24.7 [20.3, 29.0]
Irrigation land in grazing and pasture	35.0 [32.2, 37.7]	35.1 [30.1, 40.0]
Total volume of high entitlement water held (ML)	294 [259, 329]	297 [250, 344]
Net farm income(AU\$1,000)	30.4 [28.5, 32.3]	33.8 [30.2, 37.5]
Off-farm income (% of total income)	40.1 [37.6, 42,7]	38.9 [34.3, 43,6]
Debt to equity ratio	0.42 [0.39, 0.44]	0.40 [0.35, 0.44]

889 Note: The 95% confidence intervals are in square parentheses, which overlap each other between the
890 full sample and panel sample, suggesting they do not differ statistically significantly with regard to
891 any of the characteristics above.

893

Table A2. Distribution of farmers' perception on risk posed by climate change

894

in 2010-11 and 2015-16 (full sample)

	2010-11		2015-16	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
No	455	48	352	35
Yes	304	32	435	44
Unsure	187	20	213	21
Total	946	100	1,000	100

895

896

Table A3. Summary statistics for all variables in the probit models of Table A4 (n=275)

	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>Dependent variable</i>					
Group One: From 'Yes' to otherwise	275	0.073	0.260	0	1
Group Two: From 'No' to otherwise	275	0.233	0.423	0	1
<i>Independent variable</i>					
Sold farm-land in last 5 years	275	0.113	0.317	0	1
Bought farm-land in last 5 years	275	0.215	0.411	0	1
Neither sold water entitlement nor reduced irrigated area (reference group) in the last five years					
Only reduced irrigated area	275	0.167	0.374	0	1
Only sold water entitlements	275	0.233	0.423	0	1
Sold water entitlements and reduce irrigated area	275	0.091	0.288	0	1
Neither bought water entitlement nor increased irrigated area (reference group) in the last five years					
Only increased irrigated area	275	0.149	0.357	0	1
Only bought water entitlements	275	0.091	0.288	0	1
Bought water entitlements and increased irrigated area	275	0.069	0.254	0	1
Changed crop mix in last five years	275	0.527	0.500	0	1
Improved irrigation infrastructure in last 5 years	275	0.804	0.398	0	1
Utilised solar and battery technology in last 5 years	275	0.098	0.298	0	1
VIC state (NSW reference group)	275	0.393	0.489	0	1
SA state (NSW reference group)	275	0.251	0.434	0	1
Age in 2015-16	275	60.553	10.662	25	84
Male gender dummy in 2015-16	275	0.898	0.303	0	1
Low education dummy in 2015-16	275	0.167	0.374	0	1
Environmental group membership dummy in 2015-16	275	0.196	0.398	0	1
Successor dummy in 2015-16	275	0.378	0.486	0	1
Farm size (ha) in 2015-16	275	701.043	1962.424	0	20193.83
Permanent crop dummy in 2015-16	275	0.342	0.475	0	1
Irrigated area (ha) in 2015-16	275	267.464	625.786	0	8000
Total high security water entitlement (ML) in 2015-16	275	251.891	370.592	0	2000
Net farm income (\$1,000) in 2015-16	275	81.226	79.781	0	250
Debt to equity ratio in 2015-16	275	0.313	0.402	0	3
Mean end allocation % in last 5 years	275	0.856	0.278	0	1
Change in water utilisation rate in last 5 years	275	20.658	43.449	-100	100
Mean rainfall percentile in the last 5 years (20km around farm)	275	55.276	4.359	44	66
Climate Change Actions–Have undertaken actions in response to climate change risk in 2015-16: planting trees; installing canopy/shed for plant/livestock shelter; soil management; or changing timing of agricultural practices (1=yes, 0=no)	275	0.07	0.25	0	1

898 **Table A4. Estimated marginal effects of Probit models for change in climate change risk**
899 **perception between 2010-11 and 2015-16, with full list of independent variables**

	<i>Group One:</i>		<i>Group Two:</i>	
	<i>From 'Yes' to otherwise</i>		<i>From 'No' to otherwise</i>	
	<i>Marginal effect</i>	<i>Delta-method Std. Err.</i>	<i>Marginal effect</i>	<i>Delta-method Std. Err.</i>
Sold farm-land in last 5 years	-0.026	0.037	-0.247***	0.085
Bought farm-land in last 5 years	0.176***	0.049	-0.015	0.066
Neither sold water entitlement nor reduced irrigated area (reference group) in the last five years				
Only reduced irrigated area	0.028	0.042	-0.035	0.069
Only sold water entitlements	0.090***	0.033	-0.104	0.065
Sold water entitlements and reduced irrigated area	0.154***	0.037	0.048	0.090
Neither bought water entitlement nor increased irrigated area (reference group) in the last five years				
Only increased irrigated area	0.013	0.035	0.004	0.069
Only bought water entitlements	-0.153**	0.068	0.062	0.089
Bought water entitlements and increased irrigated area	-0.122**	0.060	0.190**	0.095
Changed crop mix in last five years	0.111***	0.031	-0.0003	0.049
Improved irrigation infrastructure in last 5 years	0.133**	0.067	0.020	0.068
Utilised solar and battery technology in last 5 years	0.033	0.036	-0.041	0.083
VIC state (NSW reference group)	0.049	0.048	0.253***	0.071
SA state (NSW reference group)	0.005	0.047	0.214**	0.088
Age in 2015-16 ¹	0.0001	0.002	0.0002	0.002
Male gender dummy in 2015-16 ¹	0.009	0.042	-0.021	0.079
Low education dummy in 2015-16 ¹	0.116***	0.035	0.085	0.066
Environmental group membership dummy in 2015-16 ¹	-0.058	0.045	0.036	0.056
Successor dummy in 2015-16 ¹	-0.132***	0.036	-0.105**	0.055
Farm size (ha) in 2015-16 ¹	-0.000001	0.00001	0.00001	0.00002
Permanent crop dummy in 2015-16 ¹	0.085**	0.039	-0.120*	0.068
Irrigated area (ha) in 2015-16 ¹	-0.00003	0.00005	-0.000003	0.00005
Total high security water entitlement (ML) in 2015-16 ¹	0.0001***	0.00004	-0.0002***	0.0001
Net farm income (\$1,000) in 2015-16 ¹	-0.001**	0.0002	0.001*	0.0003
Debt to equity ratio in 2015-16 ¹	-0.094**	0.041	0.096	0.066
Mean end allocation % in last 5 years	-0.060	0.051	-0.018	0.104
Change in water utilisation rate in last 5 years	0.0003	0.0004	0.001*	0.001
Mean rainfall percentile in last 5 years (20km around farm)	0.010**	0.004	-0.001	0.007
Climate Change Actions (e.g. tree planting; soil management; timing changes; canopy/shed for plant/shelter)	-0.073	0.057	0.056	0.092
Observations		275		275
Wald Chi-2 statistics		68.71***		42.82**
Pseudo R ²		0.42		0.14
% of correct predictions		94		79

900 ¹ Variables in 2010-11 were also tried and results were similar for most. Since succession plan had 14 missing
901 values in 2010-11, all these variables in 2015-16 were used instead.

902 ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

903