*A DUTY OF FORGETTING BOMBERS OR ICONOCLASM ? A FRENCH EXAMPLE FOR THE
EROSTRATE RULE*

*-   DEVOIR D'OUBLI POUR LES TERRORISTES OU ICONOCLASME ? L'EXEMPLE
FRANÇAIS DE LA REGLE D'EROSTRATE -*

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SUMMARY COULD THE EROSTRATE RULE BE APPLIED TO TERRORISTS IN FRANCE: AN OBLIGATION TO FORGET THEIR NAMES? SUCH INDIVIDUALS ARE PRESENTED BY THE MEDIA AS ICONIC PERSONALITIES (EVIL FOR MANY, BUT EXAMPLES TO FOLLOW FOR SOME). MAYBE SIMPLE FACTS (MALE, 42, OR INITIALS) WOULD SUFFICE IN ORDER TO PREVENT HAGIOGRAPHIC EXTRAPOLATION BY FOLLOWERS? IT WOULD DEFINITELY BE BENEFICIAL, IN THE SENSE THAT THE RELIGION WOULD NOT BE APPARENT, NO NAME, NO ORGANIZATION. AN ANONYMOUS ACT OF TERRORISM DOES NOT MOTIVATE OTHERS BECAUSE OTHERS WOULD NOT KNOW WHAT TO BE MOTIVATED FROM. HOWEVER, THEORETICALLY, IT IS TANTAMOUNT TO TAKING AWAY SOMEONE'S IDENTITY AND REDUCING THEM TO THEIR BIOLOGY (MALE, 42) OR INITIALS (A.B.). SO MAYBE THE ETHICS OF IT BECOME MORALLY AMBIGUOUS. ALTHOUGH, THERE IS CERTAINLY A BENEFIT THAT THEY CANNOT BE REVERED. BUT THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE STATE HAS THE POWER TO REMOVE SOMEONE'S NAME FROM PUBLIC AND TO WHAT EXTENT COULD IT GO? WILL ALL CRIMINALS' NAMES BE REMOVED EVENTUALLY? THEN WHO GETS TO DECIDE? EVENTUALLY, ANYONE OUTSIDE THE PRESCRIBED SOCIETAL MORAL CODE POTENTIALLY CAN LOSE HIS OR HER IDENTITY.

RESUME LA REGLE EROSTRATE POURRAIT-ELLE ETRE APPLIQUEE AUX TERRORISTES EN FRANCE : L'OBLIGATION D'OUBLIER LEUR NOM ? CES PERSONNES SONT PRESENTEES PAR LES MEDIAS COMME EMBLEMATIQUES (DIABOLIQUES POUR BEAUCOUP, MAIS EXEMPLES A SUIVRE POUR D'AUTRES). LIVRER DE SIMPLES ELEMENTS (SEXE, AGE, OU INITIALES) POURRAIT-IL EMPECHER UNE DERIVE HAGIOGRAPHIQUE PAR DES ADEPTES ? CE SERAIT SUREMENT BENEFIQUE DE NE PAS VOIR APPARAITRE LA RELIGION, NI LE NOM, NI L'ORGANISATION. UN ACTE DE TERRORISME ANONYME NE MOTIVERAIT PAS D'AUTRES PERSONNES CAR CES PERSONNES NE SAURAIENT PAS PAR QUOI ETRE MOTIVEE. CEPENDANT S'IL EST EQUIVALENT DE CONFISQUER L'IDENTITE DE QUELQU'UN OU DE LE REDUIRE A SA BIOLOGIE (SEXE, AGE) OU A SES INITIALES (A.B.), L'ETHIQUE DE LA DEMARCHE DEVIENT MORALEMENT AMBIGUË. IL Y A UN AVANTAGE A EMPECHER UNE IDEALISATION, MAIS LE PROBLEME EST QUE SI L'ÉTAT AVAIT LE POUVOIR DE RETIRER DE LA CONNAISSANCE DU PUBLIC LE NOM DE QUELQU'UN, JUSQU'A QUEL POINT POURRAIT-IL ALLER ? EST-CE QUE TOUS LES NOMS DES CRIMINELS POURRAIENT ETRE RETIRES ? QUI DECIDERAIT ? ET

Introduction

To show or not to show? To see or not to see? As ever, the professional must weigh the pros and cons of sharing information: show a dead body because it has a didactic interest [1], hide it because this visibility might offend modesty or its memory [2]. In a similar context, we described the fair limitation that should be the rule regarding the visibility of the victims of the attacks, building on the recent wave of dramatic events in Paris (January—November 2016) [3] and the assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara (December 2016). In the same way that there is a scientific integrity [4], there is media integrity. A vicious circle seems to have appeared toward acts of terrorism in France, in which the authors of these actions are generally disintegrated people with elements placing them in a position of weakness in relation to global society (frequently a defect of socio-economic support). Is not that make their game to ensure their extreme advertising in the days following the attack, all media? Does this not stoke the fire? Should the media not have a vision for the longer term, policy — in the sense of polis, the city, that is to say the ''common good'' of Bergson — that fights violence? This questioning is legitimate. It questions the responsibility of journalists: the risk of inadvertently being involved in the mechanics of propaganda for terrorist groups. Communication about the crime and the perpetrators is clearly part of the disciplinary field of criminalistics. Logically, ethical reflection must settle on this practice, as for all social practices. Because the consequences are not trivial: any action with assumed short-term benefits (or conducted in ''doing good'') may be deleterious remotely. In this case, we will consider primarily the gain of a picture or a name relative to simple information.

Say nothing (censor), i.e. no transparency

We have already drawn attention to this problem of extreme visibility of bloody (and therefore violent) images of victims of attacks [3]. In 2016, the French media — we have the opportunity — are, for the most part, (and despite some excesses like in any profession) rather alert and responsible. They have, forthe most part, not waited forthe hypothetical standard anonymization of terrorists, and some have even anticipated it by advocating — rightly — a

moral reflection or obligation. This would correspond to not satisfy the jihadist organizations do not play the same media game. By merely giving initials of terrorists' names, few blurred images and strict facts, information would be the same and — above all — victims would be more respected. Have not some terrorists left their identity cards prominently to be a source for information dissemination and, in their eyes, a posthumous glorification of sorts? A secondary effect might be encouraging a new generation of terrorist apprentices? If the media makes it impossible to identify the killers, then this will be a way to ensure that no one can identify with them, therefore one who wants to die with glory knows he will die in total anonymity. Neither terrorists nor madmen deserve perverse glory of being elevated to a monster. Their actions are all too human: cowardly and deceitful. The ''stardom'' of executioners, indeed, gum disorder or image of victims — by backlash — feel forgotten or undervalued that is like a second terrorist act in their eyes. Most important here is therefore not to legislate or even to decide but — above all — to ask the question: how to process information and to face with out adding, without a ''starification'' (i.e. glorification of individuals through media device)? Had Warhol not said that everyone would have his fifteen minutes of fame? Why would terrorists derogate in this artistic rule? Highlighting their image, it provides the terrorist with warrior status of hero, and one participates in this race to fame, a narcissistic staging desirable that can decide the transition to the act among the undecided. The echo (the largest possible) given to crimes is part of the larger terrorist strategy, which aims to instill fear and intimidate governments designated as enemies. ''Posting a picture of a terrorist on front page of a newspaper edition, it not only enlightens indecently someone who should never have come out of darkness, but especially encourages all unbalanced in search of belonging and awareness to rock in the bloody madness'' [5]. Accordingly, must an institutionalized anonymity be established? René Girard has shown this mimetic dimension of violence, in general, and terrorism, in particular. A theory based on the work of contemporary authors of the wave of anarchist attacks in France in the late 19th/early 20th cen tury theory of ''crowd psychology'' guided by the principle of suggestion and contagion [6]; theory of ''laws of imitation'' in ''crowds and sects with criminal perspective'' [7]; etc. The risk is that of a morbid contagion of an escalation of terror, a sort of terrorist chain reaction. This type of information could indeed participate in increasing the sense of insecurity for the population, especially when there is a constant repetition in the media. Under the pretext of transparency, it causes another terrorism, an emotional one. Such context could be considered as a factor facilitating the revelation of pathological psychiatric conditions (psychosis, for example) [8], but also deleterious economic effects (global and massive decline in attendance of tourist sites deemed ''dangerous'' as department stores, for example). The

information is not made in accordance with a purpose, but based on an attitude: transparency. However, in this case, it strikes the purpose. How much transparency feeds adverse effects? When is the transparency? These are the questions to ask. There are other precedents of ''radio silence'' on terrorist acts: on the impulse of Marshall McLuhan [9], the Italian media have largely decided not to publish the releases of the Red Brigades after their violent actions. . . Silencing this information, construct a duty of oversight of bombers, would be a kind of continuation of the damnatio memoriae ritual, this post-mortem sentence to oblivion passed by the Senate of Rome against highest individuals with policies judged to be malicious (mainly fallen emperors Caligula, Nero, Commodus, Heliogabalus, etc.): cancellation of honors, pounding name on public monuments, declaration of his birthday as unlucky day, upsetting and mutilation of statues, etc. [10]. This is nothing more than a continuation of the sentence to oblivion even the name Erostrate, the incendiary of the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus, in 356 BC., for religious infamy.

Say all (no change), i.e. acting transparency

Conversely, it can be argued that putting a name to a picture, permits to understand, design and even ''mourn'', in the words of socially devoted, several acts. In the words of Charles Peguy: ''You always say what you see. Above all, always, what is more difficult, is what is seen'' (hence the need to be helped in this process by analysts). The information obligation does not yet exist for the media! They have a duty to inform, they have the obligation to respect the law and therefore not to disclose false or even secret information (which singularly happens in terrorist acts), but we have to remember that they do not have legal or constitutional obligation to inform. Because they make a moral duty, it is only to professional ethics to regulate this issue. Would show a terrorist photography helps convey a message a priori essential to the public: the youthful face of evil? Information before everything: hide information would already make the game for terrorists by changing the democratic process of information dissemination (as Albert Camus said, ''Not to name things is to add to the world of evil''). History and (recent) news shows that man's inhumanity is a recurring fact. Denying that barbarism has a human face will not help to eradicate this barbarism. One should not say the name, but what is not seen does not disappear. It is encysted. To take a picture of psychopathological childhood fears [11], is a ''monster in the closet''. After the WW2 Liberation, the communication on the major figures of Nazism was reduced (spontaneously?

Or under the pressure of a professional and/or political censure?), to avoid giving them a resonance. . . but in the 1960s (with the Eichmann trial, for example), it was understood to rather show them as they were. At the risk of recurrent that claim to these ''historical'' characters. Another analogy with World War II can be made: according to historians of Nazism, to avoid a repeat of history, again, it seems more useful to look at the torturers (path, trajectory) than the victims: rather Goebbels than Anne Frank. The anonymization could also have a perverse effect: that feed conspiracy theories and even denial. Hiding name and face of the bombers could cast doubt on the veracity of the facts, and could fuel a conspiracy theory (at the expense of transparency), poison the debate and ultimately benefit political extremism. . . A complete and exhaustive information seems inherent to the concepts of modern democracy. With the emergence of other media like Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, etc., terrorist organizations will any way work around this possible ban and communicate their own information (claim, glorification of ''martyrs'') without any limit. The terrorists despise journalists and media. They no longer need conventional information providers, they have their own media via the Internet, their own news agencies, producing their own bodies: the so-called ''jihadosphere''. They are fully integrated into the communication society [12,13]. Because indeed, what does a terrorist seek? Being in a major national or international newspaper? It is not certain. Is their psychiatric or psychological background that of megalomania and narcissism? Not easy to ascertain. The aims are primarily ideological, political and religious, with the ultimate goal, after their violent action, the paradise of Allah [14,15].

Conclusion

In this case, it seems to carve up a situation by taking it as a fact that one would seek truth at all costs (the truth is beyond human standards — humanists — the society). What we then ask for is distancing between the Right and Just. Do we look for excuses for the perpetrators of attacks? To look at it from a perspective of humanism, are there not some who tend to withdraw from a form of responsibility [16]? This reflection involves geo-political and anthropological notions: mainly those of state secrecy (with the limits given to the free flow of information for the protection of society and public liberties, and the fight against rumors) and the state of emergency (with substantial changes in the course of justice and police action, relatively to the state of peace). The anthropological theme of stain and dirt is also at the center of these concerns, since it is a matter of leaving behind the shadowy part of some (in reality, of

each one of us, i.e. a projection on certain individuals identified as dangerous). The recent affair of secret emails (Hillary Clinton) and actions on social networks (Donald Trump's tweets) clearly shows the power of images as perverse and disruptive agents in democratic processes (in this case, the US presidential elections of 2016). . . The problem is that of the ethics of responsibility that will impose vis-à-vis ourselves an individual ethics that we have forgotten. A defense of the social bond between every one, some people escaping this link by social death [17], marginalization or too rigid application of standards [18]. These patent individualities continue and accelerate, eventually giving credit for any speech, whether progressive or extremist. Do we not lose in circumstances, then, that is missing in the social link (the ''good life with and for each other, in just institutions'' of Paul Ricoeur)? There is no hierarchy of values (everything becomes comparable). The main problem is the lack of sociability. These ''social sentiments'' are the foundations of the Republic since the French Revolution [19]. Here we see in practice, ''the harsh reality is that it is not enough just to think the revolution, develop new ideas, but also to confront the real amount that is in what people call the impossible'' [20]. Here we find the continuation of what Gilbert Durand has shown on the role of the image and its prohibition by certain cultures and religions: Byzantine period of the 8th—9th centuries [21], Protestant reform of the 16th century, French Revolution (with an extension to the profanation of the tombs and the mutilation of the corpses [22]), and the Hebrew and Muslim prohibition of all figuration of animated beings (with its current extreme developments in the Near and Middle East). Are we now in a new iconoclastic crisis focused not on the religious figures, but on the contrary on those who try to alter the human condition? Some anthropologists and ethicists have already set up a reflection on standardization, stigma and ''racialization'' [23]. The ethical aim is that of a reversal of the fear of difference (and the associated stigma) in a fraternal welcome and solidarity, without multi-speed human dignity, across biological, psychological or socio-economic criteria.

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Disclosure of interest

The authors declare that they have no competing interest.

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