eprintid: 50728
rev_number: 6
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/05/07/28
datestamp: 2025-04-16 09:49:55
lastmod: 2025-04-16 09:49:55
status_changed: 2025-04-16 09:49:55
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Gagnepain, Philippe
creators_name: Martimort, David
creators_idrefppn: 158132904
creators_idrefppn: 070009635
creators_affiliation: Université Paris 1  Panthéon-Sorbonne;Paris School of Economics
creators_halaffid: 301309
creators_halaffid: 1002422;441569
title: Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: We explore empirically the impact of the market sharing collusive practices that were implemented in the French public transportation industry between 1994 and 1999. We build a structural model of bidding markets where innovating firms compete for the market and have the ability to spread the benefits of their innovation through all markets on which they are active. Each local competitive environment shapes the distribution of the prices (the bids) paid by public authorities to transport operators. We recover empirically the distribution of prices and innovation shocks and we show that collusive practices had overall a limited impact on prices. Firms were in reality more interested in avoiding significant financial risks inherent to the activity, as well as the high cost of preparing a tender proposal. As a by-product, we perform a counterfactual analysis that allows us to simulate how an increase in firms’ innovation reduces prices significantly.
date: 2025-03-31
date_type: published
publisher: TSE Working Paper
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/130478
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: Bidding Markets
keywords: Market Sharing
keywords: Collusion
keywords: Innovation
keywords: Public Transport
language: en
has_fulltext: TRUE
subjectsJEL: JEL_D44
subjectsJEL: JEL_K21
subjectsJEL: JEL_L9
view_date_year: 2025
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
series: TSE Working Paper
volume: 25-1631
place_of_pub: Toulouse
pages: 30
institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
department: Toulouse School of Economics
book_title: TSE Working Paper
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:130478
harvester_local_overwrite: department
harvester_local_overwrite: date
harvester_local_overwrite: pending
harvester_local_overwrite: subjectsJEL
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_halaffid
harvester_local_overwrite: institution
harvester_local_overwrite: place_of_pub
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oai_lastmod: 2025-04-02T08:19:39Z
oai_set: tse
site: ut1
citation:   Gagnepain, PhilippeIdRef <https://www.idref.fr/158132904> and Martimort, DavidIdRef <https://www.idref.fr/070009635>  (2025) Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry.  TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1631, Toulouse     
document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50728/1/wp_tse_1631.pdf