RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Gagnepain, Philippe
A1 Martimort, David
T1 Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry
YR 2025
FD 2025-03-31
VO 25-1631
SP 30
K1 Bidding Markets
K1 Market Sharing
K1 Collusion
K1 Innovation
K1 Public Transport
AB We explore empirically the impact of the market sharing collusive practices that were implemented in the French public transportation industry between 1994 and 1999. We build a structural model of bidding markets where innovating firms compete for the market and have the ability to spread the benefits of their innovation through all markets on which they are active. Each local competitive environment shapes the distribution of the prices (the bids) paid by public authorities to transport operators. We recover empirically the distribution of prices and innovation shocks and we show that collusive practices had overall a limited impact on prices. Firms were in reality more interested in avoiding significant financial risks inherent to the activity, as well as the high cost of preparing a tender proposal. As a by-product, we perform a counterfactual analysis that allows us to simulate how an increase in firms’ innovation reduces prices significantly.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50728/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/130478