RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104930
A1 Auriol, Emmanuelle
A1 Dahmani-Scuitti, Anaïs
T1 Decentralization in Autocraties
JF European Economic Review
YR 2025
FD 2025-02
VO vol. 172
K1 Autocracy
K1 Decentralization
K1 Democartization
AB In a model featuring two regions—one affluent and the other impoverished—the allocation of public spending is examined under an initially centralized and autocratic political process. In a stable autocracy, the decision to implement decentralization reforms hinges on a tradeoff: while centralization enables the autocrat to extract higher rents, it also results in reduced productivity in the poor region. The autocrat opts for decentralization when the negative impact on productivity outweighs the benefits of rent extraction. Moreover, under the pressure of democratic movements and growing instability, an authoritarian regime may also pursue decentralization reforms to preserve its wealth from the decisions of the poor median voter.
PB Elsevier
SN 0014-2921
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50115/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/130115