RT Conference Proceedings
SR 00
A1 Lamp, Stefan
A1 Samano, Mario
A1 Tiedemann, Silvana
T1 Firms' Bidding Behavior in a New Market: Evidence from Renewable Energy Auctions
YR 2024
FD 6-7/06/2024
K1 electricity markets
K1 renewable energy
K1 pay-as-bid auctions
K1 non-discriminatory
K1 auctions, government support policies
AB Auctions are increasingly used by governments to select suppliers and determine levels of policy support. In the context of renewable energy (RE) investment, they have become dominant in the ongoing energy transition. This paper makes use of unique bid-level data from German RE pay-as-bid auctions (2015-2019) to document bidding behavior of firms in this newly established market and recover bidders’ costs by estimating a structural model of multi-unit auctions. We show that bidding behavior has changed over time and explore alternative mechanisms driving the observed price  evolution and conduct counterfactual analyses to examine the impact of implementing a non-discriminatory auction format. Our primary findings indicate that adopting a non-discriminatory auction would have resulted in reduced subsidy expenses and mitigated market power. By identifying the factors influencing bidding prices and costs,  our empirical insights offer gui
T2 14th Toulouse Conference on the Economics of Energy and Climate
ED Toulouse School of Economics
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/49454/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/129376