eprintid: 48566 rev_number: 8 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/04/85/66 datestamp: 2024-04-23 13:09:52 lastmod: 2024-04-23 13:09:57 status_changed: 2024-04-23 13:09:52 type: article metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Hubner, Valentin creators_name: Staab, Manuel creators_name: Hilbe, Christian creators_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu creators_name: Kleshnina, Maria creators_id: krishnendu.chatterjee@ista.ac.at creators_id: maria.kleshnina@qut.edu.au creators_idrefppn: 268471096 creators_idrefppn: 272058335 creators_halaffid: 506116 title: Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for cooperation in social dilemmas. The very logic of reciprocity, however, seems to require that individuals are symmetric, and that everyone has the same means to influence each others’ payoffs. Yet in many applications, individuals are asymmetric. Herein, we study the effect of asymmetry in linear public good games. Individuals may differ in their endowments (their ability to contribute to a public good) and in their productivities (how effective their contributions are). Given the individuals’ productivities, we ask which allocation of endowments is optimal for cooperation. To this end, we consider two notions of optimality. The first notion focuses on the resilience of cooperation. The respective endowment distribution ensures that full cooperation is feasible even under the most adverse conditions. The second notion focuses on efficiency. The corresponding endowment distribution maximises group welfare. Using analytical methods, we fully characterise these two endowment distributions. This analysis reveals that both optimality notions favour some endowment inequality: more productive players ought to get higher endowments. Yet the two notions disagree on how unequal endowments are supposed to be. A focus on resilience results in less inequality. With additional simulations, we show that the optimal endowment allocation needs to account for both the resilience and the efficiency of cooperation. date: 2024-02-26 date_type: published publisher: National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America id_number: 10.1073/pnas.2315558121 official_url: http://iast.fr/pub/129024 faculty: tse divisions: tse language: en has_fulltext: FALSE doi: 10.1073/pnas.2315558121 view_date_year: 2024 full_text_status: none publication: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America volume: Vol. 121 number: N° 10 place_of_pub: Washington, D.C. refereed: TRUE issn: 0027-8424 oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:129024 harvester_local_overwrite: pending harvester_local_overwrite: note harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn harvester_local_overwrite: creators_id harvester_local_overwrite: number harvester_local_overwrite: volume harvester_local_overwrite: date harvester_local_overwrite: issn harvester_local_overwrite: creators_halaffid harvester_local_overwrite: publication harvester_local_overwrite: publisher harvester_local_overwrite: place_of_pub harvester_local_overwrite: hal_id harvester_local_overwrite: hal_version harvester_local_overwrite: hal_url harvester_local_overwrite: hal_passwd oai_lastmod: 2024-03-11T09:54:35Z oai_set: tse site: ut1 hal_id: hal-04556422 hal_passwd: 4idar& hal_version: 1 hal_url: https://hal.science/hal-04556422 citation: Hubner, Valentin, Staab, Manuel, Hilbe, Christian, Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Kleshnina, Maria (2024) Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 121 (N° 10).