relation: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/48533/
title: Is a fiscal union optimal for a monetary union?
creator: Berriel, Rafael
creator: Gonzalez-Aguado, Eugenia
creator: Kehoe, P.
creator: Pastorino, Elena
subject: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
description: When is a fiscal union appropriate for a monetary union? In a monetary union without fiscal externalities, when local fiscal authorities have an informational advantage over a central fiscal authority in terms of their knowledge of countries’ preferences for government spending, a decentralized fiscal regime dominates a centralized one. Our novel result is that in the presence of fiscal externalities across countries, however, a decentralized fiscal regime is optimal for small monetary unions, whereas a centralized fiscal regime is optimal for large ones. These results shed new light on the debate on fiscal integration within the EU and its enlargement.
publisher: Elsevier
date: 2024-01
type: Article
type: PeerReviewed
identifier:   Berriel, Rafael, Gonzalez-Aguado, Eugenia <https://www.idref.fr/265637058>, Kehoe, P. and Pastorino, Elena  (2024) Is a fiscal union optimal for a monetary union?    Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 141.  pp. 157-177.       
relation: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/128956
relation: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.11.003
identifier: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.11.003
doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.11.003
language: en