eprintid: 48396
rev_number: 6
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/04/83/96
datestamp: 2023-11-22 08:38:37
lastmod: 2023-11-22 10:31:21
status_changed: 2023-11-22 08:38:37
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Bayer, Peter
creators_idrefppn: 259789666
creators_affiliation: Toulouse School of Economics
creators_halaffid: 1002422
title: Evolutionarily stable networks
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: This paper studies the evolution of behavior governing strategic network formation. I first propose a general framework of evolutionary selection in non-cooperative games played in heterogeneous groups under assortative matching. I show that evolution selects strate-gies that (i) execute altruistic actions towards others in the interaction group with rate of altruism equal to the rate of assortative matching and (ii) are stable against pairwise coali-tional deviations under two qualifications: pairs successfully coordinate their deviations with probability equaling the rate of assortative matching and externalities are taken into account with the same weight. I then restrict the domain of interaction games to strategic network formation and define a new stability concept for networks called ‘evolutionarily stable networks’. The concept fuses ideas of solution concepts used by evolutionary game theory and network formation games. In a game of communication, evolutionarily stable networks prescribe equal information access. In the classic co-authorship game only the least efficient network, the complete network, is evolutionarily stable. Finally, I present an evolutionary model of homophilistic network formation between identity groups and show that extreme high degrees of homophily may persist even in groups with virtually no preference for it; thus societies may struggle to eliminate segregation between identity groups despite becoming increasingly tolerant.
date: 2023-11
date_type: published
publisher: TSE Working Paper
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/128722
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: Networks
keywords: Evolution
keywords: Relatedness
keywords: Stability
keywords: Homophily
language: en
has_fulltext: TRUE
subjectsJEL: JEL_C73
subjectsJEL: JEL_D85
view_date_year: 2023
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
series: TSE Working Paper
volume: 23-1487
place_of_pub: Toulouse
institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
department: Toulouse school of economics
book_title: TSE Working Paper
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:128722
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_name
harvester_local_overwrite: pending
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oai_lastmod: 2023-11-20T12:15:54Z
oai_set: tse
site: ut1
citation:   Bayer, Peter <https://www.idref.fr/259789666>  (2023) Evolutionarily stable networks.  TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1487, Toulouse     
document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/48396/1/wp_tse_1487.pdf