TY  - JOUR
ID  - publications48198
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/128463
IS  - n° 1
A1  - Love, Brian
A1  - Lefouili, Yassine
A1  - Helmers, Christian
N2  - To what extent and with what effect do owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs) “hold-up” companies that produce standard-compliant products? To explore this question, we construct measures of opportunistic patent licensing behaviors using detailed information collected from the dockets of U.S. patent cases filed (2010-2019) to enforce SEPs and a matched sample of non-SEPs. Overall, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by the patent enforcer in approximately 77% of SEP and 65% of non-SEP assertions in court. The figures mask important heterogeneity. There is significantly more opportunistic conduct aimed at increasing a potential licensee’s loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court: 35% of SEP assertions vs. 10% of non-SEP assertions. In contrast, conduct that increases a potential licensee’s litigation costs is less common and the difference between SEP assertions (8%) and non-SEP assertions (6%) is small. We also show that opportunistic behavior is associated with case outcomes, with the effect on settlement depending on the type of opportunistic behavior. Behavior that increases a potential licensee’s litigation costs is associated with an increase in the probability
of settlement, while behavior that increases a potential licensee’s loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court is negatively associated with settlement.
VL  - vol. 25
TI  - Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets
AV  - public
EP  - 337
Y1  - 2023///
PB  - Oxford Academic review
JF  - American Law and Economics Review
KW  - Litigation
KW  - standards
KW  - patents
KW  - holdup
KW  - U.S
SN  - 1465-7252
SP  - 300
ER  -