@article{publications48198,
          volume = {vol. 25},
          number = {n? 1},
          author = {Brian Love and Yassine Lefouili and Christian Helmers},
           title = {Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets},
       publisher = {Oxford Academic review},
         journal = {American Law and Economics Review},
           pages = {300--337},
            year = {2023},
        keywords = {Litigation, standards, patents, holdup, U.S},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/48198/},
        abstract = {To what extent and with what effect do owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs) ?hold-up? companies that produce standard-compliant products? To explore this question, we construct measures of opportunistic patent licensing behaviors using detailed information collected from the dockets of U.S. patent cases filed (2010-2019) to enforce SEPs and a matched sample of non-SEPs. Overall, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by the patent enforcer in approximately 77\% of SEP and 65\% of non-SEP assertions in court. The figures mask important heterogeneity. There is significantly more opportunistic conduct aimed at increasing a potential licensee?s loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court: 35\% of SEP assertions vs. 10\% of non-SEP assertions. In contrast, conduct that increases a potential licensee?s litigation costs is less common and the difference between SEP assertions (8\%) and non-SEP assertions (6\%) is small. We also show that opportunistic behavior is associated with case outcomes, with the effect on settlement depending on the type of opportunistic behavior. Behavior that increases a potential licensee?s litigation costs is associated with an increase in the probability
of settlement, while behavior that increases a potential licensee?s loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court is negatively associated with settlement.}
}