eprintid: 48021 rev_number: 5 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/04/80/21 datestamp: 2023-07-20 15:32:55 lastmod: 2023-07-20 15:33:22 status_changed: 2023-07-20 15:32:55 type: article succeeds: 44279 metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Canes-Wrone, Brandice creators_name: Ponce de Leon, Christian creators_name: Thieme, Sebastian creators_idrefppn: 112003389 creators_idrefppn: 259940348 creators_halaffid: 1002422 title: Institutional constraints on the executive, investment, and elections ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: In recent years, a variety of countries worldwide have experienced an increase in executive power. Long-standing concerns about this concentration include reduced property rights protection. Particularly for developing democracies, scholars theorize that a lack of institutional constraints on the executive may impede long-term investment. Analyzing this question empirically has proven difficult, however, because economic activity can affect political institutions and behavior. This article, which analyzes four decades of data from 57 developing democracies, addresses the identification challenges by leveraging elections as a source of exogenous turnover and by accounting for the potential endogeneity of executive institutions. Consistent with the argument that institutional constraints reassure investors, the results suggest that as constraints on the executive increase, investment is less affected by prospective electoral turnover. Moreover, the results are stronger for presidential and semi-presidential systems with fixed elections, where the chief executive's term cannot be ended early by elections or the legislature, than for parliamentary systems. date: 2023-03 date_type: published publisher: Blackwell Publishing id_number: 10.1111/psq.12822 official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/128160 faculty: tse divisions: tse language: en has_fulltext: FALSE doi: 10.1111/psq.12822 view_date_year: 2023 full_text_status: none publication: Presidential Studies Quarterly volume: vol. 53 number: n° 2 pagerange: 273-292 refereed: TRUE issn: 0360-4918 oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:128160 harvester_local_overwrite: number harvester_local_overwrite: volume harvester_local_overwrite: issn harvester_local_overwrite: pending harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn harvester_local_overwrite: creators_halaffid harvester_local_overwrite: pagerange harvester_local_overwrite: publisher harvester_local_overwrite: hal_id harvester_local_overwrite: hal_version harvester_local_overwrite: hal_url harvester_local_overwrite: hal_passwd oai_lastmod: 2023-06-20T11:59:04Z oai_set: tse site: ut1 hal_id: hal-04167501 hal_passwd: s0j7ys hal_version: 1 hal_url: https://hal.science/hal-04167501 citation: Canes-Wrone, Brandice , Ponce de Leon, Christian and Thieme, Sebastian (2023) Institutional constraints on the executive, investment, and elections. Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 53 (n° 2). pp. 273-292.