eprintid: 47938
rev_number: 25
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/04/79/38
datestamp: 2023-07-06 10:43:03
lastmod: 2024-04-05 08:12:22
status_changed: 2024-04-05 08:12:22
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Iossa, Elisabetta
creators_name: Loertscher, Simon
creators_name: Marx, Leslie M.
creators_name: Rey, Patrick
creators_idrefppn: 157141047
creators_idrefppn: 177907576
creators_idrefppn: 030613957
creators_halaffid: 1002422
title: Coordination in the fight against collusion
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multi-market buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter collusion when multiple independent buyers would not, consistent with the view that “large” buyers are less susceptible to collusion.
date: 2023-06
date_type: published
publisher: TSE Working Paper
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/128130
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: Collusion
keywords: Cartel
keywords: Auction
keywords: Procurement
keywords: Reserves
keywords: Sustainability and initiation of collusion
keywords: Coordinated effects
language: en
has_fulltext: TRUE
subjectsJEL: JEL_D44
subjectsJEL: JEL_D82
subjectsJEL: JEL_H57
subjectsJEL: JEL_L41
view_date_year: 2023
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
series: TSE Working Paper
volume: 23-1441
place_of_pub: Toulouse.
pages: 60
institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
department: Toulouse School of Economics
book_title: TSE Working Paper
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:128130
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citation:   Iossa, Elisabetta <https://www.idref.fr/157141047>, Loertscher, Simon, Marx, Leslie M. <https://www.idref.fr/177907576> and Rey, Patrick <https://www.idref.fr/030613957>  (2023) Coordination in the fight against collusion.  TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1441, Toulouse.     
document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/47938/1/wp_tse_1441.pdf