eprintid: 47395 rev_number: 36 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/04/73/95 datestamp: 2023-03-31 07:28:19 lastmod: 2024-05-17 07:50:27 status_changed: 2024-05-17 07:50:27 type: monograph metadata_visibility: no_search creators_name: Fleckinger, Pierre creators_name: Martimort, David creators_name: Roux, Nicolas creators_idrefppn: 148516432 creators_idrefppn: 070009635 creators_affiliation: Toulouse School of Economics creators_halaffid: 1002422 title: Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: What is the most efficient way of designing incentives for a group of agents? Over the past five decades, agency theory has provided various answers to this crucial question. This line of research has argued that, depending on the specific organizational context, the best channel for providing incentives involves either relying on collective compen-sations or, on the contrary, employing relative performance evaluations. In the first scenario, cooperation among agents is the key aspect of the organization. In the second, competition among agents prevails. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of this extensive literature, with the aim of understanding the conditions under which one or the other type of incentive scheme is more desirable for the principal of the organiza-tion. To achieve this, we use a flexible workhorse model that is capable of addressing a wide range of scenarios characterized by different technologies, information constraints, and behavioral norms. date: 2023-03 date_type: published publisher: TSE Working Paper official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/127855 faculty: tse divisions: tse language: en has_fulltext: TRUE subjectsJEL: JEL_D20 subjectsJEL: JEL_D86 subjectsJEL: JEL_J33 subjectsJEL: JEL_L23 subjectsJEL: JEL_M12 subjectsJEL: JEL_M50 view_date_year: 2023 full_text_status: public monograph_type: working_paper series: TSE Working Paper volume: 23-1421 place_of_pub: Toulouse pages: 88 institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole department: Toulouse School of Economics book_title: TSE Working Paper oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:127855 harvester_local_overwrite: department harvester_local_overwrite: pending harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn harvester_local_overwrite: creators_halaffid harvester_local_overwrite: institution harvester_local_overwrite: place_of_pub harvester_local_overwrite: pages oai_lastmod: 2024-05-15T06:55:58Z oai_set: tse site: ut1 citation: Fleckinger, PierreIdRef , Martimort, DavidIdRef and Roux, Nicolas (2023) Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory. TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1421, Toulouse document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/47395/1/wp_tse_1421.pdf