RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4428
A1 Mariotti, Thomas
A1 Schweizer, Nikolaus
A1 Szech, Nora
A1 von Wangenheim, Jonas
T1 Information nudges and self control
JF Management Science
YR 2023
FD 2023-04-26
VO vol. 69
IS n° 4
SP 2182
OP 2197
K1 Nudges
K1 Information Design
K1 Present-Biased Preferences
K1 Self-Control
AB We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For any distribution of risks, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending abstinence if riskiness is high enough. Depending on the distribution of risks, more or less consumers may have to be sacriced in that they cannot be warned even though they would like to be. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible warning to abstain must be tightened, but this need not increase the probability of harmful consumption. If some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, traffic-light nudges turn out to be optimal and, when subgroups of consumers differ sufficiently, the optimal traffic-light nudge is also subgroup-optimal. We finally compare the consumer-optimal nudge with those a health authority or a lobbyist would favor.
PB INFORMS
SN 0025-1909
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/46210/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/126839