TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications45453
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/126939
A1  - Joseph, George
A1  - Miquel-Florensa, Josepa
A1  - Hoo, Yi Rong
A1  - Pahuja, Sanjay
A1  - Tebekew, Tewodros
Y1  - 2022/05//
N2  - We present a lab-in-the-field experiment with employees of the Addis Ababa Water and Sanitation Authority with the aim to understand how to improve coordination and collaboration in their daily crew work. Participants play a series of public good games under different rules: standard game, with identifiable set of partners, game with threshold, and game with a randomly selected anonymous leader with the power to punish.
We show that a common goal, in the form of a threshold to be attained for the group success, is significantly more effetive than a potentially punishing leader to increase individual effort and ultimately group outcomes. This result advocates for the introduction of team goals as coordination and motivation devices in settings where tasks are performed by groups and are subject to free-riding and coordination challenges.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Motivating Public Sector Employees: Public Good Contributions in Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority
AV  - public
EP  - 37
ER  -