RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Ichihashi, Shota
A1 Smolin, Alexey
T1 Data Collection by an Informed Seller
YR 2022
FD 2022-04
VO 22-1330
SP 48
K1 consumer privacy
K1 data collection
K1 information design
K1 mechanism design
K1 price discrimination
AB A seller faces a consumer with an uncertain value for the product. The seller has imperfect private information about the value and requests additional data to set the price. The consumer can decline any request. The consumer’s willingness to provide data depends on his belief about the seller’s type which in turn depends on the request. We show that the type uncertainty limits the scope of data collection: All equilibrium payoffs are spanned by fully pooling equilibria in which the seller collects the same data regardless of the type. The seller’s private information lowers efficiency and profits, but benefits the consumer by fueling his skepticism and preventing excessive data collection. Having less private information may enable the seller to collect more data directly from the consumer and may lower the overall consumer welfare.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/45174/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/126871