TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse.
ID  - publications44941
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/126748
A1  - Borsenberger, Claire
A1  - Cremer, Helmuth
A1  - Joram, Denis
A1  - Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie
A1  - Malavolti-Grimal, Estelle
Y1  - 2022/03//
N2  - We study how consumers’ environmental awareness (CEA) affects the design of environmental policy in the e-commerce sector. We also examine if there is a need for regulation requiring delivery operators to reveal their emissions. We consider a model with two retailers who sell a differentiated product and two parcel delivery operators. Delivery generates CO2 emissions and their total level creates a global (atmosphere) externality. We assume that it is more expensive for the delivery operator to use less polluting technologies. We consider different scenarios reflecting the type of competition and the vertical structure of the industry. We shown that CEA mitigates the inefficiency of the equilibrium by bringing the level of emissions closer to its optimal level. This is true under perfect and imperfect competition. This efficiency enhancing effect of CEA also affects the design of emissions taxes, which leads to an amended Pigouvian rule. Under perfect competition the tax is reduced by exactly the level of CEA expressed in monetary terms. Under imperfect competition the adjustment exceeds this level.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - Consumers' environmental awareness
KW  - Pigouvian rule
KW  - emission taxes
KW  - e-commerce
KW  - parcel delivery operators
KW  - vertical integration
M1  - working_paper
TI  - E-commerce and parcel delivery: environmental policy with green consumers
AV  - public
EP  - 27
ER  -